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Abstract 
This thesis examines whether implications from research in the field of implicit 
cognition apply to achievement goals via firstly an extensive re-assessment of 
the literature (Chapters 2 and 3) and then via a series of experiments (Chapters 
4-7).  
Chapter one introduces the work, and outlines the rationale, aims and research. 
Chapter two is a critical examination of how achievement goals are currently 
defined and operationalized, and highlights the underlying assumptions that 
achievement goals are conscious and accessible. Chapter three challenges these 
assumptions by examining the literature on implicit cognition and 
nonconscious goal pursuit. Chapter three argues that as cognitive 
representations, there is a potential for achievement goals to be activated and 
operate nonconsciously, and that a methodology predominantly based on self-
report is limited in the access it may provide to achievement goals.  
Chapter four designs, tests, and compares two original achievement goal 
implicit methods, the Valence IAT and Self/Other Referent IAT, with the 
Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R, Elliot & Murayama, 2008), 
and found good internal consistency for both IATs but no significant 
correlations between IATs and AGQ-R.  Chapter five compares the Valence IAT 
and the AGQ-R with students’ persistence behavior on an achievement task, 
and found both methods to be equally consistent with behavior.  Chapter six 
tests whether achievement goals can be primed to influence subsequent 
achievement behavior, and found that persistence behavior differed 
significantly by priming condition in line with theorized patterns for 
performance and mastery goals. In Chapter seven, achievement goals are 
primed and compared directly with the Valence IAT and the AGQ-R, and both 
methods were found to be equally consistent with the primed goal.  
Chapter eight summarizes and concludes that this thesis provides the first in-
depth theoretical and methodological exploration of the potential for 
nonconscious achievement goals in what is a promising field for continued 
study. 
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Preface 
Organization of the PhD 
This PhD is split into 7 chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the study 
of motivation and why it should be studied within educational contexts, 
highlighting the significance of the research carried out in this thesis and its 
contribution to knowledge. The second chapter provides a background to the 
theory and measurement of achievement goals, critically considering a series of 
definitional and methodological issues. Chapter three, A Case for Nonconscious 
Achievement Goals, presents the empirical support for the claim that individuals 
pursue goals nonconsciously (c.f. consciously), assesses the implications of 
nonconscious goal pursuit for achievement goal theory, and considers possible 
methods for exploring whether achievement goals can be examined at the 
nonconscious level.  
The next four chapters report empirical investigations conducted for this thesis 
of studies that examine implicit and explicit methods for studying achievement 
goals. Chapter four describes and discusses the design, development, and 
administration of two original achievement goal Implicit Association Tests 
(IATs, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), including a comparison of IAT 
scores with the participants’ self-reported achievement goals (Study 1). Chapter 
five reports a second study wherein participants’ persistence behavior on an 
achievement task was compared with their responses to either an explicit or an 
implicit method (Study 2). Chapter six documents a study in which the potential 
for nonconscious achievement goals is tested using a priming paradigm and 
persistence behavior on an achievement task (Study 3). Chapter seven then 
describes a fourth study in which achievement goals were again primed, but 
then compared directly with explicit and implicit methods (Study 4).  
The final chapter comprises a discussion and conclusion to the thesis, offering 
suggestions for changes to how achievement goals can be defined and captured, 
as well as future directions for scholarship in the exploration of implicit and 
explicit aspects of achievement goals.  
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Introduction 
Achievement goal theory is one of the most popular and widely researched 
theories of academic motivation. The theory argues that students’ achievement 
behavior is directed by the cognitive goals they choose in achievement settings. 
However, in recent years, research findings on implicit cognition have 
highlighted and challenged achievement goal theorists’ key assumptions 
regarding the consciousness and accessibility of achievement goals (da Costa & 
Remedios, 2014; see Appendix 10.5). This thesis is an attempt to assess the 
extent of this challenge, and to understand both theoretically and empirically 
whether the implications of implicit cognition research apply to achievement 
goals.   
In establishing the need for and significance of this endeavor, three initial 
questions are posed:  
1. Why should we undertake research on achievement motivation?  
2. Why should we undertake pure basic research on achievement motivation?  
3. Why should we undertake pure basic research on achievement motivation 
and conscious awareness?  
1.1 Why should we undertake research on achievement 
motivation? 
Answering the logical first ‘why’ question, why we should undertake research on 
achievement motivation, requires a short deconstruction of what is meant by the 
term achievement motivation. Motivation itself can be understood as “the 
physiological process involved in the direction, vigour, and persistence of 
behaviour” (Bergin, Ford, & Hess, 1993, p. 437). The ‘direction’ of this behavior 
implies ends, or goals, while ‘vigour’ and ‘persistence’ are descriptions of the 
nature of the behavior directed at these goals. The study of achievement 
motivation, in the vein of research by McClelland, Atkinson and colleagues 
(Atkinson, 1957; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark & Lowell, 1953), is concerned with 
why individuals behave as they do when presented with opportunities to 
achieve, looking specifically at their need for achievement and fear of failure as 
motives. Achievement goal theory is a later theoretical development that is 
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focused on achievement and specifically, competence, in academic settings. 
The work originated in studies in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s e.g. Diener 
and Dweck (1978, 1980), Dweck (1986), Dweck and Elliott (1983), Dweck and 
Leggett (1988), Maehr and Nicholls (1980), and Nicholls (1975, 1978, 1984), that 
examined children’s attributional responses to failures in achievement. 
Achievement goals have been defined as “a cognitive representation of a future 
object that the organism is committed to approach or avoid” (Elliot & Fryer, 
2008, p. 244; for more details, see Chapter 2). At the heart of goal theory lie the 
complex interactions between the choice of behavior to which one is directed 
(i.e., the achievement goal), and differences in learning and achievement.  
1.1.1 Ethical Rationale 
According to Nicholls (1978), one of the main rationales for studying 
achievement goals is an ethical one: to help children have an equal opportunity 
to succeed. In other words, achievement goal research should be conducted to 
address the inequalities inherent in the far from ideal world of the classroom. 
While all students in a classroom might be presented with the same lessons and 
similar treatment by way of encouragement to achieve from their teacher, how 
they affectively, cognitively, and behaviorally respond to these materials and 
the teacher-student relationship may differ, and can lead to the academic 
success of some and the failure of others. As such, if a student’s motivation 
impacts on their academic success and subsequent life opportunities, 
educational research and teaching need to ensure that students have access to 
equal opportunities in terms of the motivational patterns required for success 
(Nicholls, 1978). If researchers can systematically identify those motivational 
patterns that consistently characterise a relationship to maladaptive learning 
outcomes, affect and achievement, they can try to understand and intervene to 
help children who are stuck within these patterns. 
For example, the exploration of learned helplessness in terms of achievement 
(Diener & Dweck, 1978, 1980; see also Seligman & Maier, 1967), or “the 
perceived inability to surmount failure” (Diener & Dweck, 1978, p. 451), has 
sought to provide information on the classroom practices and emotions, beliefs 
about ability, and learning behaviors that often accompany students’ avoidance 
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of challenges, poor performance, and lack of persistence in the face of 
difficulty. Acknowledging that difficulty and failure are a part of life, and that 
all students deserve to develop processes for dealing with this adaptively, 
Dweck and her colleagues (Dweck, 1975; Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 
2007, see Dweck & Master, 2009, for a review) have investigated redressing 
students’ beliefs about their achievement-related successes and failures within 
the effort-ability framework of attribution theory (Weiner, 1986, 1995). In 
attribution retraining (Dweck, 1975), where students learn how to adopt 
incremental rather than entity theories regarding the respective mutable versus 
fixed nature of their intelligence and ability, failure is presented as a function of 
effort, a dynamic factor that can be increased to obtain future success. The 
likelihood of success is thereby transformed into something achievable, and 
students are likely to be more motivated to keep trying, as evidenced in 
Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck’s (2007) finding that experimental group 
participants’ motivation and maths achievement improved compared to that of 
students in a comparison group. Likewise, helping students develop the ability 
to deal adaptively with failure ensures that students initially take the chances 
that might ultimately lead to success.  
Attributions and beliefs about the self as a learner, or self-theories (Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988), even in the absence of actual differential achievement, interact 
with motivation and affect behavior both within the classroom and in later life. 
A striking example is evident in a recent study of math-gender stereotypes in 
elementary school children, in which Cvencek, Meltzoff, and Greenwald (2011) 
emphasise children’s “reduced interest in future academic courses and 
occupations that are incompatible with their academic self-concept” (p. 767). 
This suggests serious motivational consequences that can bleed into eventual 
life choices when, as early as in the second grade, girls are even unwittingly 
exposed to a math-boy stereotype incongruent with their identification as 
females. Ensuring equal motivational opportunity to achieve thus also requires 
that we deconstruct the forces underlying students’ motivational decisions and 
behaviors and address such features of a hidden curriculum (Jackson, 1968). 
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1.1.2 Pedagogical Rationale 
In addition to the ethical rationale, research on achievement motivation can 
provide helpful pedagogical insights. For example, within the literature on 
school reform, Anderman (1997) has made a case for the application of 
achievement motivation research findings to the development of 
motivationally adaptive classroom materials and practices, teacher behaviors, 
school management policies, and even reform at the level of the nation. The 
logic behind this reform is based more on addressing the achievement setting 
rather than the individual student as a starting point: if education professionals 
ensure not only classroom but whole school learning environments are as 
conducive as possible to stimulating adaptive motivational behaviors, it is 
assumed this will elicit these behaviors from students. As part of this, 
achievement motivation research findings could be used to provide examples of 
classroom goal structures that replace emphasis on peer comparisons with 
personal improvement (e.g., Anderman & Young, 1994), or external rewards for 
learning with examples of how lessons relate and may be relevant to students’ 
lives (e.g., Meece, 1991).  
Work in both elementary and middle schools (Ames, 1990; Maehr & Midgley, 
1996) in the US has provided examples of occasions on which change in schools 
has been based on achievement goal orientation research. Ames’s (1990, 1992) 
work with the TARGET framework first introduced by Epstein (1989) has 
focused on how changes to traditional teaching methods in the areas of tasks, 
authority, recognition, grouping, evaluation and time can improve student 
motivation. Ames (1990) found that students who had experienced this system 
used more appropriate learning strategies and held better attitudes to maths 
than their control group peers. More recently, Lueftenegger, van de Schoot, 
Schober and colleagues (2014) completed a longitudinal study of TARGET in a 
secondary school population, and found a positive impact on student mastery 
goal orientations. Maehr and Midgley (1996) also spent three years working on 
the Coalition Project in an elementary and a middle school with teams 
comprising school staff, teachers, and parents, devising means of applying goal 
orientation research to school policies. They found that changing the school 
culture in terms of better alignment with a mastery goal focus had a positive 
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impact on student motivation in both the elementary and middle school, such 
that students exhibited “more motivationally adaptive goal orientations, higher 
levels of academic efficacy, and more positive perceptions of the classroom goal 
structure than did students at a comparison middle school” (Anderman, 1997, 
p. 329, but see also Anderman, Maehr, & Midgley, 1999).  
Thus there is evidence that studying achievement motivation can have direct 
effects on improvements in pedagogical practices that are intended to indirectly 
improve students’ motivational patterns.2 While the latter may not be 
guaranteed, Anderman and Anderman (1999) and Urdan and Midgley (2003) 
have indicated that incorporating achievement motivation research into 
teacher practices and school policies can improve the likelihood that students 
themselves endorse and pursue more positive motivational patterns.  
1.1.3 Philosophical Rationale 
It is not only important to study achievement motivation with the goal of 
motivating in terms of addressing maladaptive motivational patterns, revising 
school policies and teaching methods, or tackling the forces that 
disproportionately affect students’ motivation to achieve. It is also important to 
study achievement motivation with the goal of better understanding how 
motivation works; breaking achievement motivation constructs down into their 
component parts and exploring their structure and operation. This difference 
between motivating and motivation represents the same distinction made by 
Crutchfield (1992, p. 68) between engineers and scientists in their respective 
searches for knowledge. While an engineer needs to know what works, 
scientists strive for understanding the underlying mechanisms, the why and how 
of how things work.  
                                                             
2 Although there is evidence of using achievement goal findings to inform pedagogical practice, 
there have been relatively few attempts to do so. Elliot and Murayama (2008) have suggested 
that this may be linked to a lack of correspondence between the articulation of goal concepts, 
operationalization, and testing, resulting in “interpretational ambiguity [which]…undermines 
attempts to transfer information gleaned from research to real-world achievement settings” (p. 
613).  
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Pintrich (2003) outlines the need for a concerted effort to conduct systematic 
research on motivating and motivation using Stokes’s (1997) visual 
conceptualization of research goals into quadrants (see Table 1 below). Pintrich 
locates motivational research at the intersection between Pasteur’s quadrant of 
use-inspired basic research and Bohr’s quadrant of pure basic research, arguing 
that a meaningful, holistic understanding of motivation requires scientists to 
work in both of these quadrants.  While the former works towards the goals of 
both scientific understanding and practical utility, Bohr’s quadrant, 
characterised by research into physiological mechanisms and the role of basic 
motives and unconscious processes, has the primary goal of scientific 
understanding.  
Table 1. Different types of research in motivational science  
 
 
Research 
Goal 
Pure basic 
research  
(Bohr’s 
quadrant) 
Use-inspired 
basic 
research 
(Pasteur’s 
quadrant) 
 
 
Unlabeled 
Pure applied 
research  
(Edison’s 
quadrant) 
Goal–
Scientific 
Understanding 
High High Low Low 
Goal–
Practical 
Utility 
Low High Low High 
Research 
Examples 
Research on 
physiological 
mechanisms 
of motivation; 
role of basic 
motives and 
unconscious 
processes 
Theory-driven 
design or 
intervention 
studies; 
longitudinal, 
developmental 
studies of role 
of motivational 
constructs in 
context 
Research 
undertaken 
for a class to 
learn research 
skills 
Testing and 
developing 
interventions, 
technologies, 
curricula to 
foster student 
motivation 
Note. Adapted from Pintrich (2003, p. 669). 
Much research on achievement motivation, including that covered in the 
previous section on pedagogical rationale, reflects the concerns of Pasteur’s 
quadrant. Such concerns are both considerable and reasonable, especially given 
the pressure educational researchers may experience to produce research that 
directly improves students’ motivation, at least in the short term, and 
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realistically, that consequently improves student attainment. However, the 
associated opportunity cost may be obtaining a more integrated understanding 
of the actual mental representation and functioning of achievement goals. 
Though the worth of use-inspired basic research on achievement motivation 
seems obvious – it can be used to directly help students improve their 
motivational responses and behaviors – the merits of pure basic research on 
achievement motivation may not appear as obvious.  
1.2 Why should we undertake pure basic research on 
achievement motivation?  
The second ‘why’ question is, why should we undertake pure basic research in 
achievement motivation?   
1.2.1 The Advancement of Theory through Bohr’s 
Quadrant 
One reason is that the provided examples of research in Pasteur’s quadrant 
include interventions that are ‘theory-driven’. Logically, such interventions 
require theory generation and represent a means of theory testing. Pure basic 
research is represented both by the stage at which theories are generated and at 
which, having been tested and found to be problematic either through 
consistently conflicting empirical findings or logical, reasoned argument, 
theories undergo revision before further testing. Not only, then, is pure basic 
research necessary for maintaining the figurative health of theoretical 
constructs; it also goes hand in hand with research conducted in Pasteur’s 
quadrant, by providing the clear theoretical bases for intervention and 
ultimately, improvement.  
Recent debates in achievement goal research have surrounded conflicting 
findings of whether the endorsement of one type of achievement goals, 
performance goals, is adaptive or maladaptive. As conflicting findings make it 
difficult to translate research findings into recommendations for practical 
application, researchers have paused to explore why such divergent findings 
have emerged. One attempt to understand conflicting findings has targeted the 
different ways goals have been operationalized. Operationalization is the 
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process through which a construct is translated into something measurable 
(Trochim, 2006). This process is vital because how a construct is defined 
impacts on the questions that can be asked about it, what is found, and how that 
research is assessed. Questioning achievement goal researchers’ operational 
definitions has highlighted fundamental and crucial differences in the 
assumptions made about performance goals amongst achievement goal 
researchers, and thrown up several compelling conclusions. In this way, this 
pause has provided a chance to re-examine the theoretical underpinnings of the 
achievement goal construct, a task falling under the remit of Bohr’s quadrant. 
This thesis takes the critique further, by questioning the ontological and 
epistemological context in which goal theory assumptions are made. 
1.2.2 ‘Context’ in Pasteur’s Quadrant 
Another reason that pure basic research in achievement motivation should be 
undertaken is that Pasteur’s quadrant is described as involving studies of 
motivational constructs in ‘context’. Logically, this assumes that achievement 
motivation can also be studied without ‘context’, or objectively. This reading is 
undergirded by a weight of ontological assumption and suggests that 
achievement motivation does not exist solely as a socially constructed concept. 
It is not just a powerful tool for understanding our lives in the sense of the 
Thomas theorem, that if men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences (1928). Instead, achievement goals may be understood as reified 
constructs. They may represent a reality external to our perception and 
understanding of it, with causal antecedents and effects. This line of argument 
is firmly anchored in Bhaskar’s (1978) three levels of critical or depth realism. 
According to Bhaskar, ontological reality has depth, with different 
epistemological levels. Thus, there are different extents of being able to know 
and access reality. The real layer is the deepest, and is that of the generative 
processes, which exist, but cannot be known directly, only inferred. The second 
deepest is the actual layer, which is that of the events that may or may not be 
perceived by observers. The third, empirical, layer is that on which events are 
experienced through the senses. When applied to achievement goal theory, 
conflation of these layers can hide the crucial distinction between, on the real 
level, the working of motivational processes, on the actual level, the mental 
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representation of achievement goals, and on the empirical level, their 
availability to human consciousness (and nested within this latter, human 
understanding of causality as regards motivation and achievement). The 
question that remains thus is how should we go about trying to capture students’ 
achievement goals?  
Using pure basic research to shed light on current operationalizations of 
achievement goals actually raises a series of serious issues not only regarding 
the methods used to capture goals and how goals are operationalized in these 
methods, but also about the context of assumptions underlying this process. 
Unpicking these assumptions and exposing them to critique generated by 
research findings in different fields forms part of the process of pausing to take 
stock of where achievement goal theory is right now, thirty years since its 
beginnings, and by addressing these issues and opening up a debate regarding 
them, betters the chance that goal theory will emerge a stronger, more 
application-relevant theory in the decades to come.  
1.3 Why should we undertake pure basic research on 
achievement motivation and conscious awareness? 
This leads to the third ‘why’ question posed in this thesis, why should we 
undertake pure basic research on the interactions between achievement motivation 
and conscious awareness? Though an individual’s thoughts, beliefs and behaviors 
all occur to some extent on a conscious level,3 allowing for the possibility of 
some self-report, the extent to which this is the case with their goals is not so 
clear. Taking stock of the field of achievement motivation research in 2003, 
Pintrich asked seven substantive questions. One of these questions was do 
                                                             
3 In terms of the unconscious level, an example of an unconscious belief could be an implicitly 
held stereotype regarding race, as in the research of Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji (1998). An 
example of an unconscious behavior could be that which is triggered by a nonconsciously 
activated trait such as competitiveness, as in the research of Kawada, Oettingen, Gollwitzer, 
and Bargh (2004). The unconscious level of a thought, however, lies in the generation of that 
thought, rather than its appearance in the conscious mind. So, for example, an unconscious 
thought could be the result of a nonconscious process, as is observed with ‘mystery moods’ in 
the research of Chartrand and Bargh (2002). For further discussion on the unconscious, see 
Chapter 3.  
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students know what they want or what motivates them? According to Pintrich, the 
question refers to the “many occasions when motivation and learning, in the 
classroom and in life in general, are not so conscious, intentional, and self-
regulating” (2003, p. 678) as current models of motivation and self-regulation 
might assume. He pointed at a range of research literatures, such as that on 
implicit cognition and nonconscious goal pursuit, which have produced findings 
that challenge assumptions of conscious awareness and control. While these 
fields already grapple with issues surrounding intentionality, the implications of 
their findings for achievement goal theory have largely been left unaddressed.  
It is unlikely that the entirety of the current achievement goal model will 
require revision. Instead, Pintrich (2003, p. 678) suggests that largely explicit 
models of self-regulation and motivation must be amended but that this need 
not necessarily mean switching to entirely implicit models. Instead, models of 
achievement goals that emerge from evidence provided by reasoned argument 
and empirical investigation will most likely integrate explicit and implicit 
aspects. And yet, ten years have passed since Pintrich’s question was posed, and 
relatively little attention has been paid to pure basic research on conscious 
awareness in achievement goal research. It is an important time for the field to 
consider the findings of such research and assess the extent to which they apply 
to achievement goal models - to fail to do so for much longer would indicate an 
unwillingness to address these potential challenges to the robust measurement 
of achievement goals.  
Within this context, the following thesis envisions a series of tasks ahead of 
achievement goal theory, and seeks to address them in turn. The first task is to 
achieve a better, more critical understanding of how current methods 
operationalize achievement goals. This will be done through exploring and 
critiquing how current methods employed in achievement goal theory such as 
experiments, questionnaires, and interviews purport to capture achievement 
goals. Recognizing that the changing definition of achievement goals occurs 
through differences in operationalization, the thesis will examine the 
assumptions of consciousness and accessibility underlying these operational 
definitions.  
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The second task is to incorporate what the findings from research on implicit 
cognition and nonconscious goal pursuit are and what they imply for 
achievement goal theory and research. This will be done by presenting the 
findings of theoretical and empirical work on telling more than we can know 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), the illusion of conscious will (Wegner, 2002; Wegner 
& Wheatley, 1999), limits to conscious self-regulatory capacity (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), automaticity and nonconscious goal 
pursuit (Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), and the concepts of the 
cognitive unconscious and the new unconscious described by Kihlstrom (1987) 
and Hassin, Uleman and Bargh (2005), respectively. Once these findings have 
been set out, an assessment will be made of the extent to which their 
implications are applicable to achievement goals, and whether an argument can 
be made for nonconscious achievement goals.  
The third task represents a move from reasoned argument to empirical studies: 
from how these implications should theoretically apply to achievement goals as 
they are currently theorized to a series of studies from which it might be 
possible to infer a model of how achievement goals are mentally represented in 
terms of degrees of conscious awareness. The first such study describes the 
design and administration of an implicit method for assessing achievement 
goals, followed by a comparison of whether this method indicates anything 
different or additional to a more commonly used self-report method (Study 1). 
The second study then expands on the first; it compares participants’ responses 
to either the implicit or explicit method with their behavior on an achievement 
task (Study 2). The third study explores whether it is possible to nonconsciously 
activate achievement goals, such that the priming might elicit goal-consistent 
behavior on a subsequent achievement task in the absence of conscious 
awareness (Study 3). In the fourth and final exploratory study, nonconscious 
activation of achievement goals is compared with participants’ responses to 
either the implicit or explicit method (Study 4).  
From the reasoned argument and these empirical studies, the fourth task is 
finally to suggest the extent to which researchers studying achievement goals 
should seriously consider the implicit, and which methods this thesis has found 
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to be the most appropriate for doing so in future research on students’ 
achievement goals.  
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
The primary aim of the current research is thus to explore the nature and 
methodological implications of the possibility for nonconscious achievement 
goal pursuit. The guiding objectives are to: 
1. Understand current operationalizations of achievement goals and the 
assumptions underlying them (Chapter 2); 
2. Examine the literature on implicit cognition and nonconscious goal pursuit 
and identify the key implications of these literatures for the definition and 
operationalization of achievement goals (Chapter 3); 
3. Assess the extent to which the implications of findings on implicit cognition 
and nonconscious goal pursuit apply to how achievement goals are currently 
theorized through  
a. reasoned argument (Chapter 3); 
b. designing and running a series of studies to empirically test if 
achievement goals can operate and be captured without conscious 
awareness by: 
i) developing an implicit method to access achievement goals 
and  comparing it with an explicit achievement goal method 
(Chapter 4)  
ii) conducting a comparison between achievement behavior and 
implicit and explicit achievement goal methods (Chapter 5) 
iii) exploring if achievement goals can be nonconsciously 
activated (primed) and subsequently influence achievement 
behavior (Chapter 6) 
iv) conducting a comparison between nonconscious activation 
and implicit and explicit achievement goal methods (Chapter 
7) 
4. Finally, to suggest any potential changes to the model of achievement goals 
based on the arguments and findings resulting from the previous aims 
(Chapter 8). 
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1.5 Research questions  
The overall question guiding the thesis is to what extent do the implications from 
research on implicit cognition impact on how achievement goals are currently and 
could possibly be captured? Ultimately, this question could also be phrased as is 
there a possibility that achievement goals can be pursued nonconsciously, and if so, 
what does this imply for how we theorize and capture them? This then breaks down 
into a question corresponding to each of the aforementioned aims of the thesis: 
1. What are the operational definitions of achievement goals as evidenced by 
current methods employed to capture students’ goals for studying? What are 
the assumptions regarding consciousness and accessibility underlying 
achievement goal methods? How explicit are these assumptions and how are 
they addressed in the field? 
2. What are the key findings from the various literatures on implicit cognition 
and what are their methodological implications? 
3. Are the implications of research on implicit cognition applicable to 
achievement goal theory?  
4. Given the implications of research on implicit cognition, and a reasoned 
argument and evidence from a series of empirical studies on their 
applicability to achievement goals, are there any changes that might need to 
be made to how achievement goals are theorized and the methods used to 
capture them? 
1.6 Original Contributions & Significance of the Research 
1.6.1 Addressing the Potential Importance of the 
Implicit for Achievement Goals 
This thesis presents the first theoretical and methodological attempt at 
investigating the potential importance of the implicit for achievement goal 
theory. The implications of research on implicit cognition, especially where 
limited introspective ability or nonconscious goals detract from an individual’s 
ability to accurately self-report, have already received much attention where 
goals in general rather than achievement goals specifically are concerned. 
Given the prominence of achievement goal theory and its potential to improve 
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educational practice, however, in addition to current methodological issues 
regarding conflicting findings, it is time that these implications are considered 
so that the field can decide their lack of applicability or address them directly, 
both theoretically and methodologically. The thesis aims to make this 
contribution. 
1.6.2 Methodological Contributions: Nonconscious 
Activation, Behavioral Aspects, and an Implicit Method 
Also, that empirical studies are carried out, in addition to a theoretical 
argument, provides further contributions. The first contribution is in providing 
an indication of whether nonconscious activation, or priming, procedures work 
with achievement goals in the same way as they have been shown to work with 
other behavioral, cognitive, and even achievement-related goals.4 The second is 
the rare examination of a variety of achievement goal methods – behavioral, 
self-reported, and implicit, which supersedes the current largely questionnaire-
based corpus of achievement goal research. The third contribution is the 
design, development, and administration of two versions of an original implicit 
method for capturing achievement goals, which may undergo replications, 
further validation procedures, and possibly be used in future research 
elucidating why, how and in what situations achievement goal pursuit may be 
conscious at times and nonconscious at others. Furthermore, the description of 
considerations for adapting this implicit method may be useful for those 
studying other, similar social psychological constructs, for which the 
implications of the limits to self-report methodology that this thesis explores 
are likely to be equally relevant. 
Altogether, this program of research aims to shed light both on how 
achievement goals are mentally represented and how the factors in everyday 
learning situations may influence achievement goals operating at a conscious 
and/or nonconscious level. This will ultimately enhance researchers’ 
                                                             
4 For example, researchers have observed behavioral differences in whether and how soon 
participants interrupt a research confederate’s conversation after participants have been 
primed to be either polite or rude (experiment 1, Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Examples of 
nonconscious cognitive and achievement-related goals are provided in section 3.2.4.1.  
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understanding of the achievement goals students pursue and how these can be 
better conceptualised, captured, and, if need be, acted upon to improve their 
learning experiences. 
1.7 Assumptions 
Given that this thesis will be critically examining the assumptions underlying 
achievement goal theory, it is only fitting that the assumptions underlying the 
thesis arguments are also made explicit at this time. First is the assumption that 
achievement goals, as cognitive representations and part of the cognitive 
revolution in psychology, are real, as has been covered in terms of critical 
realism in Section 1.2.2, and will be expanded upon in Section 1.7.1. Secondly, as 
will be addressed in Chapter 2, achievement goals are assumed to 
simultaneously guide and provide an end for individuals’ achievement 
behaviors, with real antecedents and real consequences. Thirdly, as will 
become apparent in Chapter 3 of this thesis, it is assumed that achievement 
goals can be either consciously or unconsciously selected or activated, pursued 
and fulfilled.  
1.7.1 Ontology and Epistemology 
This thesis is underpinned by depth realist assumptions. As previously referred 
to in Section 1.2.2, depth realism offers both an ontological and an 
epistemological approach from which to select an appropriate methodology. 
Given that ontology represents the nature of reality, and epistemology the 
means for accessing this reality, if reality is considered to be stratified and 
differentiated, as is held by depth realists (Bhaskar, 1978), researchers must 
select and make explicit which level they are attempting to access and ensure 
that the methods they choose are appropriate for accessing that level of reality.  
The current environment within achievement goal research is largely based on 
a cognitive understanding of behavior and decision-making. This is consistent 
with the cognitive revolution in psychology that occurred in the 1950’s as a 
response to predominantly behaviorist approaches such as those of Skinner 
(1938) and Watson (1913). Instead of focusing solely on outwardly observable 
stimulus-response relationships, achievement goal research follows the 
cognitive approach of valuing internal states such as thoughts and feelings. If 
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achievement goals are located in a cognitive reality, then the methods deemed 
appropriate for accessing achievement goals are those that can access students’ 
meanings. Questionnaires and interviews that ask students about their 
achievement goals are thus assumed to provide valid and adequate 
methodological choices.  
However, advances in research on implicit cognition, which itself stems from 
the cognitive revolution, have suggested the ever-increasing prevalence of a 
cognitive unconscious in everyday behavior and decision-making (see Chapter 
3). Implicit cognition findings have changed what is known about cognitive 
reality. Hence although the location of the reality of several cognitive constructs 
stays the same, the awareness and accessibility, as part of the epistemology or 
how this reality can be known, has been altered. General cognitive and 
behavioral goals can be consciously selected, pursued and fulfilled, but 
research has shown that they can also be nonconsciously activated, pursued, 
and fulfilled. Thus the methods used to access them must take a nonconscious 
element into account. Overall, such research reveals a richer and deeper 
dimension to cognition, which requires not only an acknowledgement of the 
more complex reality and epistemology of cognition, but also a more suitable 
toolbox of varied implicit and explicit methods to capture goals, including 
achievement goals.   
1.8 Validity 
In essence, this thesis thus presents an investigation into the validity of 
achievement goal constructs and methods within a context of the 
nonconscious. In the words of Messick, the thesis represents “an integrated 
evaluative judgment of the degree to which empirical evidence and theoretical 
rationales support the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences and actions 
based on test scores or other modes of assessment’ (Messick, 1989, p. 13, 
emphasis in the original). This thesis provides an integrated evaluative 
judgment of the degree to which reasoned argument (Chapter 3) and empirical 
evidence (Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7) support the adequacy and appropriateness of 
predictions and practical recommendations for interventions that are based on 
how achievement goals are currently conceptualized and assessed (Chapter 2). 
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However, given the methodological focus of this thesis not only in its critiques 
of current achievement goal methodology but also in its empirical explorations, 
it both provides the integrated evaluative judgment and is itself open to such 
judgment. It poses questions about the validity of current operationalizations, 
concurrent validity, and construct validity, and can itself, in terms of the 
empirical investigations it carries out, be assessed in terms of predictive 
validity, discriminant validity, and construct validity.  
1.8.1 Assessing the Validity of Current Goal 
Operationalizations 
Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2007) define operationalization as the process 
of “specifying a set of operations or behaviors that can be measured, addressed 
or manipulated… [thus] translating a very general research aim or purpose into 
specific concrete questions to which specific, concrete answers can be given” 
(p. 81). In other words, operationalization represents the process of translating 
an abstract construct into a measureable concept. In this thesis, such 
operationalization can mean translating the concept of an achievement goal 
into answerable questions on an achievement goal questionnaire, and as with 
all operationalizations, is open to an assessment of construct validity, or 
whether the translation provides an adequate representation of the original 
construct (Trochim, 2006). However, for this assessment to be made, the 
original construct must be well defined. A commonly acknowledged issue in 
achievement goal theory is the variety of interpretations and assumptions 
underlying achievement goal definitions. For example, Elliot and Murayama 
(2008) identify the primary challenge and difficulty for achievement goal 
theory as the “long-term struggle to assess achievement goals in a conceptually 
rigorous manner” (p. 613), such that both the definitions and the 
operationalizations proceeding from these definitions are clear. The quality of 
operationalizations, or what is actually measured, cannot be adequately 
determined if what the operationalizations purport to measure remains unclear.  
For example, Senko, Hulleman, and Harackiewicz (2011) point out that 
achievement goal researchers often conflate demonstrating ability and 
outperforming others in their operationalizations of performance goals, a key 
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achievement goal construct. As a result, two questionnaires that purport to 
adhere to achievement goal theory might employ two different ways of 
operationalizing performance goals; the same can be said for whether 
achievement goal methods focus on the goal or reason for a goal (Elliot & 
Thrash, 2001) or assume goals to be state-like or trait-like. This difference can 
be masked when making collective judgments regarding the consequences of 
pursuing performance goals. Such operational conflation, resulting from a lack 
of clarity in definitions, has been shown to interfere firstly in the clarity of 
assessing whether the findings of achievement goal research support 
theoretical predictions governing the consequences of performance goals, but 
can also have effects further afield, in terms of gaining a cumulative research 
base from which to suggest practical interventions aimed at improving 
motivational approaches. The issues with clearly defining and operationalizing 
achievement goals are particularly relevant to this thesis and are thus explored 
further in Chapter 2, given the need to identify the assumptions underlying the 
definition of achievement goals as a prerequisite for assessing the extent to 
which it can be shown to accommodate an implicit dimension.  
Another issue in current achievement goal research is that of convergent 
validity. Convergent validity is upheld when the findings of methods that claim 
to measure the same underlying theoretical construct are consistent (Trochim, 
2006). When findings are divergent, however, researchers may be unclear as to 
whether this is a factor of the research design or the phenomenon under study. 
In achievement goal research at present, goals are commonly measured using 
self-report measures such as questionnaires. Given certain criticisms of 
questionnaires (for more details, see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3), interviews have 
been employed and yet have found conflicting results. There is thus a lack of 
convergent validity in achievement goal methodology. Chapter 2 identifies such 
issues with validity, while Chapter 3 presents a methodological argument for 
why such divergence may be occurring.   
Construct validity is closely tied to convergent validity in that the latter is 
required when different methods are compared in order to assess the former, 
the overall extent to which a theoretical construct is an accurate reflection of 
the reality it tries to represent. This thus represents an ideal type of validity, 
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  31 
especially in terms of depth realism, and given that researchers are limited in 
their ability to fully know reality.5 Within achievement goal research, the closest 
researchers can get to determining whether the construct is valid is through 
ensuring that the methods they use to explore and further theory are carefully 
and continually checked and revised. In the assessment of how well current 
methods contribute to the construct validity of achievement goals, this thesis 
suggests that there are both definitional and methodological issues impairing 
the construct validity of achievement goals, and that research on implicit 
cognition must be taken into consideration in addressing these issues.  
1.8.2 Being Assessed for Validity 
This thesis not only evaluates the validity of currently employed achievement 
goal operationalizations; it puts forward several new operationalizations within 
its empirical investigations of implicit achievement goals, and can therefore 
also be assessed for predictive, discriminant, convergent, and construct 
validity.  
Predictive validity involves making an assessment of whether the measure 
actually predicts what it is meant to predict (Trochim, 2006). In this thesis, in 
addition to the use of questionnaire methods, implicit methods are used to 
assess the potential for nonconscious achievement goal pursuit. Each of these 
methods can be assessed for how well they actually predict individuals’ 
achievement behavior, as well as for how well they do this in different 
conditions (i.e., amidst attempts to prime goals).  
It has been argued that using convergent (discussed above, see Section 1.8.1) 
and discriminant techniques can help to address construct validity (Campbell & 
Fiske, 1959; Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007). Both can be assessed within 
this thesis. Discriminant validity is observed when two measures or 
operationalizations that are theorized to differ actually differ (Trochim, 2006). 
In this thesis, an argument is made regarding the limits of introspection, which 
suggests that it may not always be possible to accurately report on one’s 
                                                             
5 The paradox inevitably is that our problematic measures are our only available means for 
attempting to access reality. 
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achievement goals. The conditions in which this would occur are instances of 
nonconscious goal activation, pursuit, and fulfilment. Within these conditions, 
the findings of implicit methods should diverge from those of explicit, self-
report methods, such that low correlation coefficients would be expected and 
thus should be observed between implicit and explicit methods. The findings of 
an implicit operationalization of achievement goals, such as the IAT score 
obtained using an implicit association test for achievement goals, should 
theoretically also show both convergent and predictive validity by correlating 
with non-self-reported behavioral indicators such as timed persistence and 
attempts on an achievement task.  
Finally, in terms of construct validity, the thesis can be assessed in two ways. 
One way is the extent to which it improves the construct validity of 
achievement goal operationalizations, by attempting to clarify the theory and 
its underlying assumptions, and improve and diversify its operationalizations. 
The second way the thesis can be assessed for its own construct validity is the 
extent to which the implicit method designed for capturing achievement goals 
adequately operationalizes achievement goals as they are defined in this thesis.  
Summary 
This introductory chapter has outlined the main tasks of this thesis, the 
rationale for accomplishing these tasks, their contribution and significance to 
the field when completed, and the assumptions and validity concerns that 
govern this endeavor. The next chapter addresses the first task of the thesis, 
namely, providing a background to achievement goals, before critically 
considering how they are operationalized within achievement goal research. 
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2 Achievement Goals: Issues in Definition and 
Measurement 
Introduction 
The first aim of this thesis is to understand current operationalizations of 
achievement goals and the assumptions underlying them. This chapter sets out to 
meet the first part of this aim, regarding current operationalizations, and 
although it goes some way towards setting up the second part of the aim, 
regarding assumptions, these receive a continued discussion in Chapter 3.  
Understanding current operationalizations of achievement goals involves 
answering two questions, what are achievement goals? And, how are they 
operationalized? Answering these questions requires understanding how goals 
have been defined in the achievement goal literature, which can be 
accomplished by exploring both the theoretical work that has been done on 
defining students’ goals for studying and the empirical work in which the 
methods inform and have been informed by these definitions. This chapter is 
thus split into two parts, each focussing on one of these questions. The first part 
traces the trajectory of achievement motivation from its beginnings in Murray’s 
(1938) need for achievement to McClelland and Atkinson’s (McClelland, 
Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953) work on achievement motives, through to the 
development of achievement goal theory. It indicates early theoretical 
definitions of achievement goals, as well as areas of difficulty in arriving at a 
consensus as the construct has developed, evidenced in conflicting 
operationalizations and findings.  
The second part of the chapter delves into the methods that are employed in 
accessing achievement goals, shows how goals are operationalized in these 
methods, and provides a critique at the methodological level. By undertaking 
these tasks, Chapter 2 answers both guiding questions and paves the way for the 
subsequent chapter’s exploration of problems with the underlying assumptions 
of achievement goal theory and methods, and discussion of what research on 
nonconscious processing might contribute to how we define and set out to 
capture achievement goals.   
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  34 
2.1 What are achievement goals?  
Today’s definitions depend on the theoretical beginnings and developments 
that came before, hence the first section of this chapter documents the 
development of the study of achievement motivation culminating in the 
achievement goal.  
2.1.1 Beginnings of Achievement Motivation 
Achievement goal theory is one of several popular theories of achievement 
motivation, which include (amongst others) expectancy-value theory (Wigfield 
& Eccles, 2000), intrinsic motivation theory (Deci, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1985), 
self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985), and interest theory (Renninger, 
Hidi, & Krapp, 1992). Achievement motivation is the study of behavior, 
cognition, and affect6 in achievement settings, most commonly in educational 
contexts, although theories of achievement motivation can apply in any 
achievement-focused domain (e.g., business, medicine, and sports). Elliot and 
Dweck (2005, p. 3) point to evidence of a scientific interest in understanding 
individuals’ motivation to achieve in the way it is understood today as far back 
as the work of James (1890), Ach (1910), and Hillgruber (1912). William James’s 
interest lay in comprehending the link between achievement strivings and self-
evaluation, Ach’s in the effects of intentions on perseverance, and Hillgruber’s 
in how increasing the difficulty of a task influences an individual’s performance 
on that task.  
Prominent theoretical developments within the study of achievement 
motivation that would ultimately lead to the creation of achievement goal 
theory appeared later, in the work of Murray (1938), McClelland (McClelland, 
Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953), Lewin (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 
1944), Atkinson (1957, 1964), and Weiner (Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & 
Rosenbaum, 1971). Each of these researcher’s contributions are linked to 
today’s definitions of achievement goals, albeit in ways that have 
understandably undergone considerable refinement and adaptation. Indeed, 
Elliot (2005) points out that “both Dweck and Nicholls viewed the achievement 
                                                             
6 The list goes on, including for example, “evaluation anxiety, goals, competence perceptions, 
values, and explicit theories” (Elliot & Dweck, 2005, p. 4).  
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goal construct as more of an integration of new and existing concepts than as a 
completely novel construct created ex nihilo” (p. 55).  
2.1.1.1 Murray  
Murray’s (1938) Explorations in Personality provided both a construct and a 
method for researchers interested in studying achievement motivation. In his 
explorations, Murray used the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), a 
psychoanalytic, fantasy-based method developed by Morgan and Murray 
(1935). The TAT examined the motivational content of participants’ story 
responses to ambiguous images, with the logic that they would project their 
internal states in their stories.  
Using this method, Murray identified a range of twenty manifest needs, 
including the need for achievement (n Ach) along with others, such as the needs 
for affiliation (n Aff), dominance (n Dom), and autonomy (n Auto). A need in 
general was defined as “a force which organizes perception, apperception, 
intellection, conation and action in such a way as to transform in a certain 
direction an existing, unsatisfying situation” (Murray, 1938, p. 124), whereas the 
need for achievement specifically was defined as a desire to  
accomplish something difficult. To master, manipulate or 
organize physical objects, human beings or ideas. To do this as 
rapidly, and as independently as possible. To overcome obstacles 
and attain a high standard. To excel one’s self. To rival and 
surpass others. To increase self-regard by the successful exercise 
of talent. (Murray, 1938, p. 164)  
Murray’s n Ach was thus a personality variable that indicated the stable extent 
to which an individual has an internal force directing them towards mastery 
and accomplishment. This, he argued, was associated with the following 
actions: 
intense, prolonged and repeated efforts to accomplish something 
difficult. To work with singleness of purpose towards a high and 
distant goal. To have the determination to win. To try to do 
everything well. To be stimulated to excel by the presence of 
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others, to enjoy competition. To exert will power; to overcome 
boredom and fatigue. (Murray, 1938, p. 164)  
Murray also noted that the presses of the need for achievement were the task 
itself and rivals, reminiscent of current absolute/task and normative/other- 
based dimensions in achievement goal theory. In terms of accessibility, the 
beginnings of achievement motivation thus assumed that the need for 
achievement was accessible via indirect, projective measures, rather than by 
directly asking the individual.  
2.1.1.2 McClelland  
Murray’s taxonomy of needs provided the raw material for McClelland and 
colleagues (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953) who in the 1950’s 
adapted Murray’s need for achievement construct in The Achievement Motive. In 
this seminal text, McClelland and colleagues reported on their experimental 
work, using a combination of the TAT (with some modification to its 
interpretation procedures) and the animal motivation method of arousing 
motives (i.e., by manipulating task instructions, tasks, and success and failure 
experiences on achievement-related tasks), to explore and build up a theory of 
human achievement motivation.  
McClelland and colleagues moved the need for achievement away from what 
they interpreted as a reactive, deficit-reducing need towards a proactive 
motive. The new need for achievement was focused on the directedness of 
behavior and was theorized to operate in connection with affective arousal. A 
motive was defined as “the redintegration [previous learning] by a cue of a 
change in an affective situation” (McClelland et al., 1953, p. 28), prompting in 
the individual the response either to approach or avoid the achievement 
situation. It was argued that all motives are learned, and that the need for 
achievement most likely results from “standards of excellence” in childhood. If 
parents imposed these “standards of excellence” on the tasks their children 
accomplished, the children would have high achievement motivation, as 
compared to parents who did not impose these standards on their children’s 
task accomplishment, and their children’s subsequent low achievement 
motivation.  It was also suggested that children’s consequent positive or 
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negative affect would arise through their success or failure to accomplish tasks 
to the required standard. As such, the theory suggested that there are “two 
kinds of achievement motivation, one of which appears to be oriented around 
avoiding failure and the other around the more positive goal of attaining 
success” (McClelland, 1951, p. 202). Consequently, accessing an individual’s 
achievement motive using the indirect, projective TAT method required 
establishing not only that they possessed a need for achievement but also 
whether this need was characterized by an approach or avoidance valence.  
2.1.1.3 Lewin 
Around this time, Lewin and colleagues (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 
1944) were conducting work on parallel theories of motivation, namely the level 
of aspiration (Dembo, 1931) and the theory of resultant valence (Escalona, 
1940; Festinger, 1942). Level of aspiration was defined as “the level of future 
performance in a familiar task which an individual, knowing his level of past 
performance in that task, explicitly undertakes to reach” (Frank, 1935, p. 119). 
By speaking of levels of performance, the theory accorded goals a central role in 
directing achievement behavior. Individuals were theorized as having 
overarching ideal goals and situation specific action goals, and important 
discrepancies could be perceived between these latter goals and individuals’ 
expected performance, past performance, and actual performance. Espousing a 
current action goal (e.g., scoring from the halfway line in football) higher than 
one’s level of past performance (e.g., scoring from inside the box) was said to 
comprise a positive discrepancy, whereas the inverse was considered a negative 
discrepancy. Links were made between various, relatively consistent gradients 
of discrepancy and one’s realism regarding achievement (Sears, 1940), as well 
as individual personality differences (Sears, 1941) such that children with a low 
positive discrepancy or realistic level of aspiration were also rated by their 
teacher as being “highly confident, successful and comfortable in their 
achievement” (Lewin et al., 1944, p. 352), whereas those who had a higher 
discrepancy between their past performance and their current action goal were 
characterized as having poorer academic achievement, low self-confidence, 
and feelings of incompetence (ibid.).  
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Choice of the level of aspiration, or the action goal, was calculated as part of the 
theory of resultant valence. Here, the level of aspiration was that which had the 
highest resultant weighted valence. This was posited mathematically as the 
sum of the products of the valence of success and its subjective probability, and 
the valence of failure and its subjective probability. According to Lewin and 
colleagues, the subjective probabilities for success and failure depended on past 
experience, the activity’s goal structure, and the individual’s wishes, fears, and 
expectations (Lewin et al., 1944, p. 366-367), whereas the valence of success 
and failure differed by person depending on their tendency to seek success or 
avoid failure. For example, if an individual judged him or herself to be failing, 
their tendency to avoid failure, referred to as the force on the person away from 
failure (fP, -Fai, Lewin et al., 1944, p. 373), would be greater. Thus the values on 
the failure valence scale increase and the individual’s level of aspiration would 
be lowered. Finally, the tendencies to seek success (fP, Suc) and avoid failure also 
impacted on the individual’s reaction to achieving or not achieving their level of 
aspiration, including their affect, rationalizations, and whether they persisted or 
desisted (Lewin et al., 1944, p. 375).  
Although Lewin and colleagues’ work framed the motivation of behavior in 
terms of goals, they neglected to provide a clear definition of the term (Elliot & 
Fryer, 2008). Nevertheless, their theorizing implied that goals could be 
conceived of as both “goal striving”, entailing the “‘valenced’ activities or 
objects that attract or repel the person” and “goal setting,” denoting the 
“specific targets or aspirations that individuals select and strive to attain in 
achievement situations” (Elliot & Fryer, 2008, p. 243).  
2.1.1.4 Atkinson 
John Atkinson’s (1957, 1964) elaboration of the need for achievement drew 
from his contributions with McClelland and colleagues as well as from work by 
Lewin and colleagues on level of aspiration. Atkinson defined the need for 
achievement as the “capacity to experience pride in accomplishment” 
(Atkinson, 1964, p. 214), thus representing the affect-based, disposition-like 
motive for success (MS), while the motive to avoid failure (MAF) was 
characterized by the possibility of failure and the emotion of shame. According 
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to Atkinson, an individual’s tendency of approaching (hope of success) or 
avoiding (fear of failure) an achievement situation could be determined first by 
calculating the product of the motive for success or to avoid failure (MS, MAF), 
how probable that success or failure was (Ps, Pf), and the incentive value of that 
success or failure (Is, -If). In this model, it was assumed that success at a more 
difficult task, which would hold a lower probability of success, would be linked 
to greater feelings of pride. Failure at an easy task, which would hold a lower 
probability of failure, would be linked to greater feelings of shame. Next, 
subtracting the resultant tendency to avoid from the resultant tendency to 
approach determined whether the individual’s overall behavior would be 
characterized by approach or avoidance. If the resulting tendency to approach 
was a negative value, the individual would be likely to avoid the achievement 
situation, whereas if the tendency to approach was positive, the individual 
would be likely to engage.  
In Atkinson’s studies, the TAT was used to measure the motive for success.7 A 
different measure, the Test Anxiety Questionnaire (TAQ, Mandler & Sarason, 
1952), was used to operationalize the motive to avoid failure, and interestingly 
this was a direct, self-report measure.8 Consequently, each individual could be 
classified as having high or low motive for success and high or low motive to 
avoid failure, with varying consequences for achievement behavior and 
performance. For example, in a study with Litwin (Atkinson & Litwin, 1960), 
Atkinson found that those who were higher in the motive for success took 
greater risks on a ring toss game, in terms of the percentage of shots made from 
further distances from a target, than those with a higher motive to avoid failure. 
Furthermore, those with a higher motive for success also persisted for longer on 
a final three-hour exam, and received higher scores on a final exam than those 
who had a higher motive to avoid failure.  
                                                             
7 Atkinson and Litwin (1960) also explored the French Test of Insight (French, 1955), another 
projective instrument.  
8 The indirect method for the motive to approach success and self-report method for the motive 
to avoid failure seems to be the result more of the methods that were available at the time, 
rather than an explicit theoretical decision denoting the differential accessibility of the success 
and failure motives.  
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2.1.1.5 Weiner 
Work on attribution theory and achievement conducted by Weiner and 
colleagues (Weiner, 1972, 1974; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & 
Rosenbaum, 1971) also impacted heavily on early achievement goal theorists’ 
thinking. According to attribution theory, individuals explain their success or 
failure in terms of luck, ability, effort, and task difficulty. Effort and ability are 
classed as internal factors, while task difficulty and luck are external factors. In 
terms of stability, effort and luck are unstable, while ability and task difficulty 
are considered stable. Attributing one’s success or failure to internal or 
external, and stable or unstable factors was argued to produce different 
outcomes. For example, if an individual attributed their failure internally to 
their ability, which was considered stable, then it was likely that their 
motivation might suffer, as they would believe they were unable, and would 
always be, to succeed in that task. On the other hand, if an individual attributed 
their failure internally to their effort, which they deemed changeable, then it 
was likely they could be motivated to complete a task, by increasing their effort.  
When seen in terms of achievement motivation, it was posited that high 
achievement motivation is linked with internal causal attributions for success, 
feelings of pride in accomplishment, persistence in the face of failure, and 
choice of tasks of intermediate challenge, whereas low achievement motivation 
was linked with internal causal attributions for failure, such as lack of ability, 
and external attributions for success, such as task difficulty or luck.  
2.1.2 Summary 
The achievement motivation constructs covered up till now have mostly 
assumed that achievement motivation is dispositional: Murray’s need for 
achievement, McClelland’s achievement motive, Lewin and colleagues’ 
discrepancies and level of aspiration, Atkinson’s motives for success and to 
avoid failure, and even to an extent, Weiner’s attributions. The early theories of 
achievement motivation also mostly assumed that the various motivational 
constructs should be accessed using indirect, projective methods, implying 
some lack of possibility for introspection and instead the need for trained 
markers, and to a smaller extent, self-reports (e.g., motive to avoid failure, Test 
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Anxiety Questionnaire), seeming to suggest otherwise. By the end of the 1970’s, 
researchers dissatisfied with the largely dispositional explanations for 
achievement motivated behavior (Dweck & Wortman, 1982) began to examine 
cognitive goals as potential explanations for individual differences in 
achievement behavior, leading to the first theories of achievement goals. 
2.1.3 Beginnings of the Achievement Goal 
In the late 1970’s, psychologists at the University of Illinois, Carol Dweck, John 
Nicholls, Martin Maehr and Carole Ames, began to organize meetings from 
which the earliest publications on achievement goal approaches followed (e.g., 
Maehr & Nicholls, 1980; Nicholls & Dweck, 1979; for reviews, see Elliot, 2005; 
Murayama, Elliot, & Friedman, 2012). How these early achievement goals were 
defined drew heavily on the research conducted by the individual 
psychologists.  
2.1.3.1 Dweck  
Dweck’s (1986) dichotomous framework of learning and performance goals 
originated in work she and colleagues had conducted on responses to failure 
(Diener & Dweck, 1978; 1980; Dweck & Reppucci, 1973). Diener and Dweck’s 
explorations systematically examined the cognitive-motivational verbalizations 
accompanying two clear responses to failure. The researchers asked children 
who had been classified as either helpless or mastery-oriented to complete a 
discrimination task. The design of the task involved eight training problems and 
then induced failure on four test problems. This task allowed for the study of 
children’s hypothesis-testing and learning strategies before and after failure. 
When some children failed, their verbalizations indicated a strong focus on 
finding the cause for the failure. In ultimately attributing their failure to a lack 
of ability, these children forgot their previous successes, and their performance 
suffered, even on tasks they had shown they were capable of solving. These 
children’s behavior was characterized as depicting a helpless response to failure. 
Other children, who had performed similarly to the previous group prior to the 
failure, instead looked at their own effort and ways to constructively negotiate 
their way to success. These children did not show the same diminished 
performance on later tasks, and were described as possessing a mastery-oriented 
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response to failure. Encountering failure brought out a constellation of 
differences between the two types of responses. Systematic differences were 
observed in the children’s verbalizations in terms of affect, amount of task-
relevant and irrelevant statements, persistence, expectancy of success, self-
instructions, strategy use, and approach to challenge. For example, when 
encountering failure, helpless children increasingly voiced negative affect, such 
as “This isn’t fun anymore” versus the much more adaptive response of “I love 
a challenge” from mastery-oriented children (Diener & Dweck, 1978, p. 459).  
Delving deeper to try to explain these individual differences required 
addressing the weaknesses of both attribution theory and achievement motives, 
which, respectively, were unable to account for the reasons underlying the 
maladaptive attributional response and failed to acknowledge the role played 
by cognitions (Murayama, Elliot, & Friedman, 2012, p. 192). Dweck proposed 
that students had goals guiding their achievement behavior: goals were at the 
root of the different responses to failure that she had observed. Learning goals 
were linked with the mastery-oriented response to failure, and performance 
goals with the helpless response to failure. Where those with learning goals 
sought to develop their competence in achievement situations and used failure 
feedback to moderate their effort input, those with performance goals sought to 
demonstrate their competence and attributed their failure to a lack thereof. 
Additionally, Dweck argued that individuals’ implicit beliefs about ability acted 
as antecedents to their goal pursuit, such that those who believed ability to be 
stable and unchangeable, the entity theorists, were more likely to attribute 
failure to a lack of ability and pursue performance goals, and those who 
believed that ability could be improved, the incremental theorists, were more 
likely to make effort attributions and pursue learning goals (Bempechat, 
London, & Dweck, 1991).  
2.1.3.2 Nicholls 
Nicholls’s conception of achievement goals stemmed from his research on 
changes in students’ motivation and views of ability and effort during the 
transition from elementary to middle school (Nicholls, 1983). Nicholls (1984) 
observed:  
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For young children, high ability is implied by learning or by 
success at tasks they are uncertain of being able to complete. 
They do not judge ability with reference to performance norms 
or social comparisons. When more effort is needed for success, 
this implies more learning, which is more ability. Effort can have 
quite different implications for adults and older children. They 
realize that, though more effort produces more learning, higher 
effort can imply lower ability if others require less effort for the 
same performance. Effort is a two-edged sword (Covington & 
Omelich, 1979) only for adolescents and adults. (p. 41-42)  
For younger children, ability thus seemed to be conflated with effort, judged 
against a self-criterion, which Nicholls described as a less differentiated view of 
ability. Older children and adults were more likely to feel they were being 
judged against the ability of others and distinguished more between effort and 
ability, and were described as having a differentiated view of ability (Nicholls, 
1978, 1984). Applying an undifferentiated view of ability to an achievement 
situation, Nicholls (1984) argued, could be seen as leading to task involved goals, 
while applying differentiated views would lead to ego involved goals. As with 
Dweck’s theory, competence was at the heart of these achievement goals, in 
that “achievement behavior is that in which the competence of one’s behavior 
is at issue – where the goal is to be, or to appear to be, competent rather than 
incompetent” (Nicholls, 1984, p. 40). Furthermore, perceived ability was 
argued to impact on the outcomes of these goals, such that the ego involved 
goal could lead to the selection of tasks of moderate challenge when perceived 
ability was high, but to either extreme of easy or difficult task challenge when 
perceived ability was low (Nicholls, 1984). 
2.1.3.3 Uniting the field 
By the late 1980’s, Ames and Archer (1987, 1988) unified the achievement goal 
theories that were emerging into a collective field by suggesting the term 
mastery goals in place of mastery focus, task-involved, and learning oriented, 
and performance goals in place of ability focus, ego-involved, and performance 
oriented goals (Ames, 1984; Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Elliott, 1983; Maehr, 1983; 
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Maehr & Nicholls, 1980; Nicholls, 1983, 1984). They argued that these new 
terms could be applied to describe the theoretically similar dichotomy of 
competence development and demonstration goals, and many subsequently 
employed these terms in their continued achievement goal research.  
2.1.4 Major theoretical developments to the present 
2.1.4.1 From Dichotomous to Trichotomous 
Although these theories of achievement goals began as dichotomies, they have 
developed considerably over the years. Looking to previous achievement 
motivation theorists’ (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953, Atkinson, 
1957) approach and avoidance valences, discussed earlier, Elliot (1994) argued 
that a performance avoidance goal could be added to the achievement goal 
framework in order to help explain the diversity of processes and outcomes 
related to the adoption of performance goals (Ames, 1992; Urdan, 1997). This 
transformed achievement goal theory into a trichotomous model (Elliot, 1994; 
Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996; Elliot & Church, 1997),9 in which performance 
goals were bifurcated: a performance approach goal oriented an individual 
“toward the attainment of favorable judgments of competence” (Elliot & 
Church, 1997, p. 218), whereas a performance avoidance goal oriented the 
individual toward “avoiding unfavorable judgments of competence” (Elliot & 
Harackiewicz, 1996, p. 461). The three-factor model was validated by several 
researchers (Elliot & Church, 1997; Middleton & Midgley, 1997; Skaalvik, 1997; 
VandeWalle, 1997), and linked the three goals to different antecedents and 
consequences (Elliot, 1999). For example, maladaptive processes and outcomes 
previously associated with performance goals as a unitary construct such as fear 
of failure, low competence expectancies, low intrinsic motivation, and low 
graded performance now seemed to be explained by performance avoidance 
goals (Elliot & Church, 1997), while for adaptive constructs such as intrinsic 
motivation, similar levels were found for performance approach and mastery 
goals (Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996).  
                                                             
9 According to Elliot and colleagues (Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996; Elliot & McGregor, 2001), 
Dweck and Elliott (1983) had already been implicitly incorporating an approach-avoidance 
dichotomy but this was not explicitly laid out until the trichotomous framework. 
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2.1.4.2 The 2 x 2 Goal Framework 
By 2001, Elliot and McGregor had posited an avoidance valence for mastery 
goals, resulting in a fully balanced two-by-two, competence valence by 
definition, framework (Elliot & McGregor, 2001, see Figure 1). Herein, mastery 
avoidance was characterized by a negative valence, a focus on avoiding 
incompetence, and an absolute/intrapersonal competence definition (Elliot & 
McGregor, 2001). Multiple factor analyses were conducted to confirm the 
validity of the model, and the four constructs were shown to “predict a distinct 
pattern of achievement-relevant processes and outcomes” (Elliot & McGregor, 
2001, p.515). This finding has repeatedly been supported by subsequent 
research (Elliot & Murayama, 2008; Finney, Pieper, & Barron, 2004; for a 
review, see Elliot, 2005), with findings suggesting that mastery avoidance goals 
are less adaptive than mastery approach goals, but less maladaptive than 
performance avoidance goals. More research on mastery avoidance goals 
remains to be done, especially given findings showing that respondents may 
endorse mastery avoidance items on goal questionnaires as a result of 
misinterpretation (Carr & Marzouq, 2012; Ciani & Sheldon, 2010).  
  Definition 
 
  Absolute/ 
intrapersonal 
(mastery) 
 
 
Normative 
(performance) 
 
 
Valence 
Positive 
(approaching 
success) 
 
 
Mastery- 
approach goal 
 
Performance-
approach goal 
Negative 
(avoiding failure) 
 
 
Mastery- 
avoidance goal 
 
 
Performance-
avoidance goal 
Figure 1. The 2 x 2 framework 
Note. Adapted from Elliot and McGregor (2001, p. 502). 
2.1.4.3 The Multiple Goal Perspective 
As performance approach goals started to be associated with more positive 
learning processes and outcomes previously only associated with mastery goals, 
debates have arisen over when and whether to encourage performance 
approach goals. This brought the multiple goal perspective into focus. In their 
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multiple goal perspective, Harackiewicz and colleagues (Harackiewicz, Barron, 
Pintrich, Elliot, & Thrash, 2002) argue that students “can and do pursue 
multiple goals” (p. 640). Indeed, Skaalvik (1997) has suggested that goals 
should be viewed as orthogonal rather than as oppositional poles on a 
continuum. However, others have contended that performance approach goals 
will only have adaptive consequences when they are pursued along with 
mastery approach goals (Midgley, Kaplan, & Middleton, 2001). In response, 
Harackiewicz and colleagues (2002, p. 641) conducted an analysis comparing 
independent and interactive effects of performance approach and mastery 
goals in terms of academic performance and interest in college students, and 
found that performance approach goals could have a positive impact on 
achievement outcomes without the student simultaneously holding a mastery 
approach goal. At present, while some intuitive criticisms have been shown to 
lack empirical support, Senko, Hulleman, and Harackiewicz (2011) point to 
directions for continued research in exploring the nature and affordances of the 
multiple goal perspective for achievement goal research.  
2.1.4.4 Competence at the Core 
A similar theoretical move has been to more explicitly centre achievement goal 
theory on a core concept of competence (Elliot, 1999; Elliot & Thrash, 2001; see 
also Elliot & Dweck, 2005). Proponents have argued that “competence 
motivation is ubiquitous in daily life…has a substantial impact on emotion and 
well-being…is operative across the lifespan, and…is evident in all individuals 
across cultural boundaries” (Elliot & Dweck, 2005, p. 6). In addition, adopting it 
as the conceptual core of the achievement goal approach systematically and 
straightforwardly “constrains the number of goal constructs that may be 
delineated” (Elliot & McGregor, 2001, p. 517), which affords greater clarity and 
theoretical parsimony (see also Section 2.1.5.2).  
2.1.4.5 A 3 x 2 Goal Framework 
One of the most recent developments in the field has come in the form of a 3 x 2 
achievement goal framework put forward by Elliot, Murayama, and Pekrun 
(2011). This framework is argued to more carefully align achievement goal 
constructs with the theorized core of competence by shifting the focus more 
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explicitly onto the evaluative standards by which individuals gauge their 
competence. As such, the model argues for distinctions to be made between 
task-based (absolute) and self-based (intrapersonal) goals, previously contained 
within mastery goals, and other-based (interpersonal) goals, previously known 
as performance goals. In this model, goals retain their approach and avoidance 
valences, as can be seen in Figure 2 below. Elliot and colleagues’ (2011) findings 
supported the structural validity of the new model in comparison with previous 
achievement goal models and also suggested antecedents (approach and 
avoidance temperaments) and consequences (performance attainment, 
intrinsic motivation, learning efficacy, worry about exams, absorption during 
class, and energy in class) for the six goals. Other researchers have also recently 
begun to test the 3 x 2 model, including Wu’s (2012) validation study with a 
sample of Taiwanese junior high and elementary school students, and Mascret, 
Elliot, and Cury’s (2015) adaptation of the model to the sports domain.  
  Definition 
   
Absolute (task)  
 
Intrapersonal 
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(approaching 
success) 
 
 
Task-approach  
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approach  
goal 
 
Other- 
approach 
 goal 
 
Negative 
(avoiding 
failure) 
 
 
Task-
avoidance goal 
 
Self- 
avoidance 
goal 
 
Other-
avoidance goal 
Figure 2. The 3 x 2 framework 
Note. Adapted from Elliot, Murayama, and Pekrun (2011, p. 634). 
2.1.5 Defining achievement goals?  
Despite all of this theoretical development, there has been surprisingly little 
consistency in how achievement goals are defined in the majority of the 
literature (see for example, Elliot & Thrash, 2001; Hulleman, Schrager, 
Bodmann, & Harackiewicz, 2010). Arguably, this is largely due to varying 
interpretations of theory that are seldom clearly stated before incorporation 
into the empirical design. Consequently, constructs are unwittingly conflated, 
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  48 
rendering the comparison of empirical findings a complex process, and one that 
is impeded by the necessity of understanding the implicit assumptions 
underlying studies and linking operationalizations to conclusions.  
In response, the last decade has seen a wealth of definitional work that has 
attempted to highlight these commonly conflicting underlying assumptions. 
The intent of this work has been to clarify empirical findings both to advance 
the field and to allow for researchers to determine how achievement goal 
findings can be applied to practical educational settings. This definitional work 
has ranged from enhancing the precision of the component terms making up 
existing goal definitions, to dismissing some interpretations in favor of 
retaining theoretical parsimony.  
2.1.5.1 Three different approaches 
In a recent review of achievement goal theory, Murayama, Elliot, and Friedman 
(2012, see also Elliot & Thrash, 2001) have identified three different approaches 
to how researchers have defined achievement goals. The first approach defines 
an achievement goal as a “purpose for which a person engages in achievement 
behavior” (Murayama et al., 2012, p. 195). This was the approach first taken 
within the field by such authors as Dweck (1986) and Nicholls (1989). However, 
the problem with this definition is that a goal as a ‘purpose’ can have different 
meanings, such as the actual ‘end’ towards which an individual is working, as 
well as the ‘reason’ the individual is working toward it. Unarticulated 
differences in defining ‘purpose’ may lead to differences in findings that are 
unfortunately masked. A second approach has been to define a goal as an 
orientation (see Ames, 1992; Kaplan & Maehr, 2007), in which goals are 
understood as “a network or integrated pattern of beliefs and feelings about 
success, effort, ability, errors, feedback, and standards of evaluation that 
together provide a wide-ranging framework or schema toward achievement 
tasks” (Murayama et al., 2012, p. 195). The problem with this definition has been 
that it is better characterized as a descriptive, more macro-level model, given 
that it does not focus explicitly on an achievement goal as the active ingredient, 
and therefore makes it difficult to identify which aspect of the model leads to 
consequences of interest and thus areas for change. The third definitional 
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approach identified by Murayama, Elliot, and Friedman (2012), one that is 
clearly endorsed by the authors, is that of an achievement goal as “an aim with 
competence at its conceptual core” (p. 195). Murayama et al. (2012) argue that 
this definition truly focuses on the goal, reflects the valence and definition 
components of the two-by-two model, including the different evaluative 
standards for competence (absolute, intrapersonal, interpersonal), and the 
positive and negative valences (approach, avoidance).  
2.1.5.2 Further definitional issues 
Further issues with defining achievement goals come from debates over what 
qualifies as an achievement goal and an achievement goal, whether goals are 
dispositional and trait-like or more temporary and state-like, and how they are 
cognitively represented. How these questions are answered has important 
implications for what we measure, how we measure it, and what we find.  
What qualifies as an achievement goal? Researchers have introduced such goals 
as work-avoidance goals (Meece, Blumenfeld, & Hoyle, 1988; Nicholls, 1989), 
extrinsic goals (Maehr, 1983; Pintrich & Garcia, 1991), and social goals (Urdan & 
Maehr, 1995; Wentzel, 1989, 1991). Although these goals have been linked with 
student achievement and with the academic achievement setting, given 
Murayama et al.’s (2012) aforementioned definition, they cannot be considered 
achievement goals in that they are not centrally focused on competence per se.10 
On one hand, the exclusion of these goals might be considered overly 
parsimonious in that it favors one stream of achievement goal reasoning. On 
the other hand, the competence definition narrows the focus of achievement 
goal theory in a good way, by contributing conceptual clarity and precision. 
Moreover, it still allows for the study of achievement goals in other 
competence-based, non-academic life settings.  
                                                             
10 A topic that is yet to be widely discussed is what to do with competence-focused goals that are 
mentioned as part of more open-ended rather than forced-choice methodologies (see, for 
example, Lemos & Gonçalves, 2004). Furthermore, Kaplan and Maehr (2007) have warned that 
to use such a constrained definition of a goal may lessen its “phenomenological realism” 
(Hulleman, Schrager, Bodmann, & Harackiewicz, 2010, p. 423).  
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What qualifies as an achievement goal? The question of where a goal starts and 
ends has also arisen, as suggested in the previous section discussing goals 
defined as orientations versus goals defined as aims. Urdan and Mestas’s 
(2006) study of the reasons behind performance goals discussed whether the 
varying reasons students have for pursuing the same achievement goals might 
impact the results of pursuing that goal. However, Elliot (2005, p. 65) argued 
that while both goals and reasons are valuable constructs, goals, understood as 
aims, and the underlying reasons for these aims, must be held as conceptually 
distinct. The possibility that different underlying reasons might have an impact 
has then been incorporated into the idea of goal complexes (ibid.), which has 
recently begun to attract some research attention (see Dompnier, Darnon, & 
Butera, 2009).  
Whether goals should be theorized (and operationalized) as trait-like or state-
like is a long-standing question. To conceive of goals as entirely dispositional 
would imply a strong similarity to motives (see also Murayama et al., 2012, p. 
199), whereas to conceive of goals as purely state-like could imply anywhere 
between having different goals for different classes (Maths and English 
Literature) or different goals for different aspects of a single class (essays and 
class presentations) to total unpredictability (group mates, day of the week, 
weather, etc.). Of course, these differences are important for how goals are 
operationalized: achievement goal methods must take these different degrees 
of context-specificity into account. Similarly, comparing findings across studies 
and designing interventions are inevitably affected. It is important to note that 
achievement goal theory originated in part in a critique of the overemphasis on 
dispositional constructs (Dweck & Wortman, 1982; Maehr & Nicholls, 1980), 
and a suggested move to analysis of more context-specific, cognitive processes. 
Ultimately, more explicit acknowledgment and discussion of this topic would 
be beneficial.11  
                                                             
11 Not with the goal of providing some sort of definitive answer of whether achievement goals 
are either dispositional or state-like, but more to achieve a consensus of how to cope with this 
topic methodologically and for generalization purposes. 
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  51 
A further issue underlying those just mentioned is how achievement goals are 
actually cognitively represented. For example, Pintrich (2000, p. 102) suggested 
intraindividual stability and contextual sensitivity do not have to be mutually 
exclusive: it depends on how we theorize the cognitive representation of 
achievement goals. From the body of achievement goal research, Pintrich 
(2000) extrapolates that goal theorists seem to imply “schema-theoretic ideas 
about representation” (p. 97). Within this sort of model, an achievement goal 
represents 
a structured knowledge unit, or subjective, personal conception 
or “theory” (c.f. Nicholls, 1990; Smith, 1998) about the purposes 
for an achievement task as well as other elements in terms of 
how success and competence are defined, the role of effort and 
errors, and standards for evaluation. These elements would be 
activated together—that is, the whole schema or theory would be 
activated—as the individual encounters relevant information in 
the context…or through conscious explicit thought and 
awareness about the achievement task. (Pintrich, 2000, p. 97) 
Verbal methods are an appropriate method for accessing goals according to this 
representation, but must still be tailored toward the correct context, for 
example when accessing situation-specific or more general goals (Pintrich, 
2000, p. 97).  
While the schema-theoretical model represents an “object-oriented approach 
to goals” (Pintrich, 2000, p. 98), Pintrich argues that goals may be represented 
differently, in a connectionist or parallel distributed processing (PDP) model. 
Within this more dynamic model, nodes form a network, parts of which are 
activated in different situations (Pintrich, 2000, p. 98, but see also Shah & 
Kruglanski, 2000). In achievement goal terms, the nodes could be understood 
as comprising different aspects of goals (i.e., definition of success, role of effort 
and errors, standards for evaluation), while the pattern of activation through 
specific parts of the network comprises the achievement goal. This model is 
endorsed by this thesis. A goal is much more dynamic in the connectionist 
model, drawing in part from both the situation and the individual, yet 
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intraindividual stability is attainable: although paths between nodes are 
activated in different ways based on how they interact with factors in the 
individual’s surrounding environment, paths that are often activated in the 
same way may be strengthened over time and therefore become more readily 
activated (Pintrich, 2000, p. 99). Importantly, this model allows for multiple 
goals to be activated simultaneously (see Section 2.1.4.3), does not require 
consciousness for the goal to operate (see also Section 3.3), and poses questions 
regarding the best methods for accessing this type of representation.  
2.1.5.3 Summary 
The previous three sections have explored the beginning of the achievement 
goal construct, its theoretical developments to date, and aspects of its definition 
that are often (and problematically) taken for granted. There is still much to be 
done to further clarify these aspects of achievement goals, but in the meantime, 
the next section looks at how researchers have worked with what they have to 
operationally define and access students’ achievement goals.  
2.2 How are achievement goals operationalized?  
Despite the aforementioned issues with defining achievement goals, much 
research has been done into the links between this achievement motivation 
construct and important educational processes and outcomes. How this 
research has been conducted has also helped to operationally define 
achievement goals and provide new directions for how goals are theorized. The 
next section of this chapter provides a critical look at the each of the most 
common methods that have been used to capture students’ achievement goals 
and how they have operationalized goals. In doing so, the following sections 
answer the question, how are achievement goals operationalized? In providing 
critiques of these operational definitions and methods, the following sections 
also highlight points that contribute to answering the question, how should 
achievement goals be operationalized? 
Given that the conceptual development and advancement of a theory go hand 
in hand with what is considered theoretically consistent methodology, the 
following section explores chronologically and critically the methods that have 
been used to investigate achievement goal theory over time, leading to the 
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present moment. It begins with the think aloud protocols used in some original, 
exploratory studies, then moves to experimental manipulations, and finally 
comes through to the questionnaire and interview present.  
Of course, it is possible to see these different movements in achievement goal 
methodology as linear and logical in retrospect, but in reality these ‘phases’ do 
not possess discrete, clear boundaries, and run into the present. In part this is 
due to the nature of research generally, and to the variety in research questions 
and methodologies chosen to explore these questions. However, this can also 
be argued to result in part from the aforementioned sustained lack of consensus 
in defining goals and determining how best they should be studied. As such, 
though the following sections move from one dominant method to another in a 
seemingly logical manner, this does not mean that these methods have entirely 
fallen out of use. Although the use of experimental manipulations was more 
common in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s (for reviews, see Rawsthorne & 
Elliot, 1999; Utman, 1997), they are still used now (e.g., Standage, Treasure, 
Hooper, & Kuczka, 2007), albeit in a way that reflects the influence of 
intervening findings and methodological discussion. The somewhat linear path 
presented in the following section thus draws on the methods that have 
predominated at different times, critiques of these methods, and the 
methodological responses to these critiques.  
2.2.1 Think Aloud 
Looking at the work that would set the stage for the development of 
achievement goal theory helps to provide an idea of the original behavior that 
characterized achievement goals, allowing for contrast with later methods. 
Diener and Dweck (1978), for example, conducted two studies examining 
children’s responses to failure on hypothesis-testing tasks using verbal 
methods. In both studies, they sought to explore individual differences between 
children with what had come to be termed helpless and mastery-oriented 
responses to failure. Dweck would later look to achievement goals as the 
reasons for these different responses. In the studies, children were taught a 
discrimination learning task over eight practice problems, and were then 
assessed on the type and sophistication of their strategy use on four test 
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problems. These latter four were unsolvable, inducing a failure experience. In 
one study, once children had finished the task, they were asked why they 
believed they had had difficulty solving the last four problems. In the second 
study, children were encouraged to think aloud from the seventh and eighth 
training problems until the end of the task. Both methods provided a slightly 
different means for the systematic comparison not only of the types and 
sophistication of strategy use denoting performance before and after failure, 
but also of the affect, attributions, and cognitions of children in both the 
helpless and mastery-oriented groups.  
By asking the children to voice the reasons they felt they had had difficulty 
solving the four test problems in the first study, Diener and Dweck were able to 
assess attributions the children may have been making during their failure. 
They found that fifty-two percent of children in the helpless group claimed they 
were “not smart enough” (1978, p. 456) while not one of the mastery-oriented 
children made this claim. This would later develop into Dweck’s implicit entity 
and incremental theories of intelligence (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck, 
1999). By using the think aloud method throughout the second study however, 
Diener and Dweck gained access to a real time, dynamic understanding of what 
concerned the children during some of the training problems and for the 
entirety of the test problems. In this way, they could appreciate the sharp 
contrasts between verbalized reactions during the training problems and the 
failure on the first test problem, in which both groups of children made similar 
comments regarding the usefulness of their strategies, and the next three 
failure problems, in which helpless children largely made ability attribution 
statements such as “I never did have a good rememory” (1978, p. 458) while 
mastery-oriented children again made few attributions and instead spent more 
time verbally monitoring their progress with statements such as “I should slow 
down and try to figure this out” and “The harder it gets the harder I need to try” 
(1978, p. 459). In addition to attributions to loss (or lack) of ability, examining 
the children’s verbalizations illuminated further differences in terms of 
statements of negative affect, solution-irrelevant statements, amount of self-
instruction, and ineffectual task strategy. 
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The most important aspect of Diener and Dweck’s (1978) studies 
methodologically speaking is their use of the think aloud research strategy in 
the second study. Firstly, this allowed the children to verbalize those aspects of 
their experience on the task that were most important to them as soon and as 
often as they felt or thought them. As a result, the ecological validity of this 
approach presents an advantage over artificially inducing or asking participants 
at researcher-specified times about what they are thinking or why they are 
behaving as they are. In other words, the children got a chance to frame their 
own behavior and thoughts. To the research program of the two combined 
studies, this provided a chance to understand how the children’s behavior, 
cognitions, and affect changed from their success on the training problems to 
their failure on the test problems. However, it could be argued that by asking 
the children to think aloud, Diener and Dweck were changing the failure 
situation as, for example, children may have been more attentive to their 
cumulative performance and felt their failure more acutely, not to mention the 
effect of the experimenter’s presence and the potentially uncommon one-on-
one situation. An attempt is made at addressing these issues in the authors’ 
mention of an earlier study carried out by Dweck and Gilliard (1975). This study 
provided empirical support showing that asking participants to make 
expectancy of success statements at pre-specified times, such as prior to each 
trial, prior to the first and last trials, and prior to only the last trial, is obtrusive 
and impacts on persistence. They warned how “by asking for a report we may 
be distorting the very process that we are attempting to understand” (Dweck & 
Gilliard, 1975, p. 1083). One argument fuelling their concern was that of an 
“implicit social demand” (Dweck & Gilliard, 1975, p. 1077). For example, 
imagine the researcher asks a participant to make an expectancy of success 
statement prior to each trial out of four. If, prior to the first trial, the participant 
voices an expectation that they are highly likely to succeed on it but then fails, 
they are likely to feel that as the researcher has seen them fail, they must amend 
their expectation of success on the next trial accordingly. Such implicit aspects 
might have resulted in children in Diener and Dweck’s (1978) study feeling a 
pressure, albeit an unnecessary and unintended one, to make steady 
verbalizations, explain their behavior, and in turn become more aware of their 
own behavior than they would have been had they been working on their own. 
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However, it is clear that Diener and Dweck (1978) considered this, by pairing 
the think aloud study with the first study wherein they asked participants at the 
end of the task why they might have found it difficult to get the test problems 
correct. As a result, the first study can be seen as a check of the unexpected 
influences of the think aloud method, to determine whether findings were 
similar for helpless and mastery-oriented individuals. Indeed, both studies 
showed similar patterns of statistically significant differences in performance 
after failure between helpless and mastery-oriented children (Diener & Dweck, 
1978, p. 457).  
Ultimately, the studies were essentially exploratory in terms of gathering 
characteristics of the helpless and mastery-oriented groups, and for this reason, 
employing the think aloud method was well suited. Moreover, the use of the 
think aloud method shows that through ascribing value to the children’s 
verbalizations as highlighting motivation-relevant cognitions in the face of 
failure, Diener and Dweck (1978) were ascribing value also to outwardly 
verbalize-able aspects of achievement goals. In turn, this means that some 
aspects of achievement goal-related behavior could be accessed via self-report. 
However, the next direction in achievement goal research, that of experiments, 
did not seem to place such an emphasis on aspects that could be verbalized, and 
instead focused on inducing achievement goals in order to investigate possible 
antecedents and consequences.  
2.2.2 Experimental Manipulations  
2.2.2.1 Advantages 
Following on from these think aloud studies that predated and gave rise to 
achievement goal theory, educational researchers sought to explore the 
antecedents and consequences of pursuing certain goals. The design selected 
for doing so was the experimental manipulation, in which achievement goals 
were often induced, using task descriptions and instructions alluding to 
normative evaluations or learning aspects, and then explored in terms of 
behavior on tasks. Looking back, Murayama, Elliot, and Friedman (2012) have 
recently commented “although a number of studies have utilized experimental 
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  57 
manipulations, interventions, and observational methods, these studies are 
relatively rare” (p. 202).  
The advantage of using experiments, however, is that they can help provide 
evidence to establish causal models for how achievement goals impact on 
achievement outcomes of interest to researchers and educators. They provide a 
way for researchers to ostensibly manipulate the achievement situations in such 
a way as to control out of their design any non-goal-related explanations for 
participants’ behavior on an achievement task. This enables researchers to 
distinguish between the consequences of pursuing different goals. 
Furthermore, the internal validity of this method is not reliant upon self-report, 
thereby lessening bias due to participant subjectivity (Murayama, Elliot, & 
Friedman, 2012, p. 202).  
2.2.2.2 Work conducted with experimental manipulations 
Early examples of such experiments were Butler’s (1987) work on goals as 
differential predictors of performance, Jagacinski and Nicholls’s (1987) study of 
the impact of social comparison information on students’ task and ego 
involvement, Elliott and Dweck’s (1988) investigation into goals and their 
impact on students’ choice of tasks, performance in the face of difficulty, 
attributions, and expressions of affect, and Stipek and Kowalski’s (1989) study 
into whether goal pursuit was linked to the use of effective learning strategies. 
These were followed in the early nineties with studies such as Graham and 
Golan’s (1991) work on goals and levels of information processing, 
Harackiewicz and Elliot’s (1993) study of achievement goals and intrinsic 
motivation, and Elliot and Harackiewicz’s (1996) exploration of whether 
endorsing a performance approach or avoidance goal undermined intrinsic 
motivation.  
2.2.2.3 Challenges with experimental manipulations in 
achievement goal research 
However, certain issues pertain to the use of experimental manipulations, some 
of which tend to plague all experiments and some of which are specific to 
experimental manipulations of achievement goals. In order to highlight these, 
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Elliot and Harackiewicz’s (1996) study of achievement goals and intrinsic 
motivation is considered in further detail. 
In experiment 1 of their study, Elliot and Harackiewicz (1996) investigate the 
then recently theorized distinction between performance approach and 
performance avoidance goals by examining how these may differently predict 
intrinsic motivation. From the outset, this requires the operationalization of the 
achievement goals (the independent variables) and intrinsic motivation (the 
dependent variable), and the need to indicate a high likelihood of causality. The 
different goals are operationalized via varying task instructions and intrinsic 
motivation is measured with free-choice persistence as a behavioral indicator 
and task enjoyment as a self-report measure.  
Elliot and Harackiewicz split participants into four induced goal conditions, 
comprising three performance goal groups and one mastery goal group. 
Students in each of the three performance groups read that the purpose of the 
task is “to compare college students to one another in their ability to solve 
hidden figure puzzles” (i.e., Nina puzzles, Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996, p. 464). 
The remainder of the written explanation then differs. Students in the first two 
performance conditions, performance approach and performance avoidance, 
are informed that the task is a diagnostic for success or failure, respectively, 
while students in the performance neutral goal condition are not given this 
diagnostic information. All performance condition participants are told that 
once they complete the task they will find out how they have done in 
comparison to other students. In the fourth condition, the mastery goal group, 
the task explanation reads that the researchers are interested in collecting “data 
on college students’ reactions to hidden figure puzzles” (ibid.), and that upon 
completion, they will be told the “percentage of the total hidden Ninas” (ibid.) 
that they have found within the 90 seconds given to solve each puzzle.  
The logic of the experiment is that the normative comparison with positive 
possibility as relayed by the task instructions should induce a performance 
approach goal in the first performance condition. Theoretically, these 
participants will then show similar intrinsic motivation to participants in the 
mastery goal condition. The normative comparison with negative possibility 
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should induce a performance avoidance goal in the second performance 
condition, negatively impacting on their intrinsic motivation. Finally, the task- 
and self-based instruction should induce a mastery goal for those in the mastery 
condition. The study findings suggested that, as hypothesized, the only 
condition to undermine intrinsic motivation was the performance avoidance 
condition.  
However, there were several issues with the achievement goal 
operationalization through task instruction. The mastery goal condition, for 
which the instructed purpose was to collect students’ reactions, strangely did 
not include any instructions “about learning anything from the experience or 
trying to develop one’s skills at solving hidden figure puzzles” (Brophy, 2005, p. 
170), which are essential aspects of the mastery goal construct. Also, by adding 
the phrases “This session will give you the opportunity to demonstrate that you 
are a good puzzle solver” (Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996, p. 464) for those in the 
performance approach condition, and “This session will give you the 
opportunity to demonstrate that you are not a poor puzzle solver” (ibid.) for 
those in the performance avoidance condition, the researchers may have 
shifted the emphasis from normative comparison onto just “trying to do well” 
(Brophy, 2005, p. 170), which is associated with mastery goals. Hence these task 
instructions were meant to activate only the desired goal but may have 
activated another goal simultaneously, in so doing calling into question the 
validity of the performance goal operationalization. Indeed, these goals are 
usually characterized both by normative comparison and demonstrating 
competence or avoiding demonstrating incompetence.12  
Elliot and Harackiewicz (1996, p. 464) do mention that they conducted a 
manipulation check: when they asked participants to state the purpose of the 
experiment, the majority were able to answer correctly regarding the normative 
comparison (performance approach and performance avoidance) or solving 
Nina puzzles without mention of normative comparison (mastery goals). 
However, this means that the participants remembered the task instructions of 
                                                             
12 The difference Elliot (2005) and Urdan and Mestas (2006) make between appearance and 
competition aspects of performance goals. 
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the experiment; it does not necessarily equate to an explicit indication of what 
goal they pursued, or that they were even aware of pursuing a goal. It also does 
not indicate that participants in the performance approach and performance 
avoidance conditions would have been able to distinguish between the 
differently construed diagnostic explanations and consequently make an 
informed decision to either try doing better or avoid doing worse than other, 
unknown students. Indeed, an additional explanation for the performance 
approach intrinsic motivation finding could be that being told that students 
tend to do well might assure the participants in the performance approach 
condition that they, too, will fit into this trend, thereby alleviating any pressure 
that might cause a negative challenge appraisal, ultimately freeing them to 
enjoy the process more explicitly and resulting in higher perceived intrinsic 
motivation. It does not mean that they would necessarily take on performance 
approach goals, however, and thus provides a challenge to the internal validity 
of Elliot and Harackiewicz’s (1996) study. 
A further, more general issue underlying this study, as with other experiments, 
is that of low ecological validity. The study was carried out in a laboratory, in 
which “participation is a one-shot, isolated experiment” (Brophy, 2005, p. 170) 
without real consequences similar to those students encounter in their usual 
achievement settings, such as a known peer group to compare their competence 
with or the potential to progress to a higher level of understanding and mastery. 
In terms of internal validity, in this study, Elliot and Harackiewicz encountered 
further difficulty in attempting to transform goal definitions into explicitly 
presented task instructions, finding an appropriate way of measuring what goals 
participants did pursue, and determining whether these matched the goals the 
researchers had intended to induce. These criticisms highlight how despite 
providing the possibility to explore causal relationships, there are considerable 
methodological difficulties in using experimental manipulations to assess 
achievement goals and their impact on achievement processes.  
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2.2.3 Questionnaires  
2.2.3.1 Advantages 
Questionnaires have been suggested to provide an improvement on 
experimental inductions of achievement goals (e.g., Elliot & Harackiewicz, 
1996). In the last section, it was shown that a problem with experimental 
manipulations of achievement goals is that the internal validity of suggested 
relationships between goals and achievement outcomes can be unclear. This 
uncertainty was shown to stem from difficulty in distinguishing between 
participants’ understanding of the instructions representing the goal 
operationalizations of the different conditions and whether or not participants 
actually pursue the goal the researchers try to induce. Within goal theory, the 
use of questionnaires has been used as a way of allowing for the measurement 
instead of the manipulation of achievement goals (Elliot & Church, 1997, p. 
219), which attaches value to asking students about what goals they may have 
rather than just trying to induce them in a controlled laboratory setting, where 
they may act differently to how they usually would in an achievement setting. 
Indeed, Koskey, Karabenick and colleagues (2010) have suggested that the 
“predominance of student self-reports reflects the pervasive social-cognitive 
perspective that privileges individuals’ subjective experiences” (p. 254-255).  
Whereas experiments can help answer causal questions, questionnaires can be 
used to link self-reported achievement goal orientations with important 
achievement-relevant outcomes. On questionnaires, goals are operationalized 
through carefully planned statements intended to correspond as exclusively as 
possible to the underlying goal constructs. Standardized statements allow for 
comparison between participants and lessen the time required for, and 
ambiguity of, interpreting participants’ responses. Overall, questionnaires can 
be given easily to large numbers of respondents, take little time to administer, 
and are a low-cost method.  
2.2.3.2 Work conducted with questionnaires 
In part due to such ease, questionnaires are the most common method for 
assessing achievement goals to date. Although there exist multiple others, the 
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two most prevalent questionnaires employed in assessing achievement goals 
are the Patterns of Adaptive Learning Scales (PALS, Midgley et al., 2000) and 
the Achievement Goal Questionnaire (AGQ, Elliot & Church, 1997; Elliot & 
McGregor, 2001; AGQ-Revised, Elliot & Murayama, 2008). The PALS is 
comprised of several different subscales, of which the most pertinent to 
students’ personal achievement goals is the 14-item personal achievement goal 
orientations student scale, whereas the AGQ-R has 12 items designed uniquely 
to assess students’ achievement goal endorsement. While PALS uses the 
trichotomous goal framework, with five items each for mastery and 
performance approach goals and four items for the performance avoidance 
goal, the AGQ-R has three items for all four of the goals of the 2 x 2 framework.  
On these questionnaires, participants are asked to think about either their 
general or domain-specific goals. Participants are assumed to be able to 
introspect, access, and comment on their goals, such that their endorsement of 
questionnaire items implies their pursuit of these goals in achievement settings. 
Participants must indicate their level of agreement with the goal statements on 
a Likert scale. For example, participants might select 5, “very true” for the 
statement “One of my goals in class is to avoid looking like I have trouble doing 
the work” (performance avoidance goal item 4, PALS, Midgley et al., 2000, p. 
13) or 7, “strongly agree” for the statement “My goal is to avoid performing 
poorly compared to others” (performance avoidance goal item 6, AGQ-R, Elliot 
& Murayama, 2008, p. 617). All of the items addressing each of the types of 
goals is then added up and averaged to provide a subscale for each achievement 
goal.  
Questionnaires have been used in the exploration of statistical antecedents, 
mediators, and consequences of pursuing different achievement goals. 
Researchers have used questionnaires to explore the positive associations of 
achievement goals, such as the relation between performance approach goals 
and academic performance (Elliot & Church, 1997), task value (Bong, 2001), 
academic self-concept (Skaalvik, 1997), and effort expenditure (Elliot, 
McGregor, & Gable, 1999); and mastery goals and help-seeking (Ryan & 
Pintrich, 1997), interest (Harackiewicz, Barron, Carter, Lehto, & Elliot, 1997), 
and self-regulation (Middleton & Midgley, 1997). Questionnaires have also 
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been used to explore maladaptive links, for example between performance 
approach goals and fear of failure (Elliot & Church, 1997; Elliot & McGregor, 
1999) and performance avoidance goals and academic self-handicapping 
(Midgley & Urdan, 2001).  
2.2.3.3 Challenges with questionnaires in achievement 
goal research 
In recent years, these questionnaires have undergone revisions to incorporate 
changes in achievement goal concepts – especially the approach-avoidance 
distinction – and to improve their face validity. To this end, PALS reflects the 
trichotomous model of achievement goals, asking students about their 
performance approach, performance avoidance and mastery approach goals. In 
its revision, the authors removed “items that assess intrinsic value, 
and…references to specific behaviors…[to focus] more directly on the goals as 
orienting frameworks within which students function rather than behaviors or 
interests that students exhibit or teachers encourage while learning” (Midgley 
et al., 2000, p. 3). Interestingly, while removing prefixes such as “I would 
feel…,” (Midgley et al., 2000, p. 9) and “An important reason why…,” (Midgley 
et al., 2000, p. 7) for their affective and value references, the authors have used 
“It’s important to me that…,” (Midgley et al., 2000, p. 13), which should attract 
the same critique. The revised PALS prefix “One of my goals is to…,” (Midgley 
et al., 2000, p. 13) is closer to those employed in the revised AGQ (Elliot & 
Murayama, 2008). Here, again, the authors accept that “particular AGQ items 
do not optimally correspond” to the conceptual foundations they emerged from 
(Elliot & Murayama, 2008, p. 613). Thus prefixes alluding to values or concerns 
such as “It is important for me to…,” or “I worry that…,” are replaced with no 
more than three explicit goal and aim prefixes, “My goal is to…,” “My aim is 
to…,” and “I am striving to…,” (Elliot & Murayama, 2008, p. 617). These are 
subtle but important changes, which enhance the precision of the 
operationalized goal constructs.  
Though the creators of both the PALS and AGQ-R have subjected their 
questionnaires to rigorous psychometric testing, there remain difficulties with 
the prickly issue of construct validity. The aforementioned changes made to 
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achievement goal questionnaire items intended to improve face validity may 
reduce other researchers’ confusion as regards the operationalization of the 
achievement goals in the questionnaires. However, the questionnaire 
statements remain restrictive considering that students may not actually think 
in terms of goals when they are in achievement settings. In other words, 
administering achievement goal questionnaires assumes that students 
conceptualize their achievement behaviors in terms of goal strivings and that 
they actively set and pursue these goals. Furthermore, ensuring questionnaire 
items are internally consistent goes some way toward establishing 
questionnaire reliability, but it is more important and considerably more 
difficult to ensure the reliability of students’ responses, which Koskey, 
Karabenick, and colleagues (2010, p. 255) argue are still “subject to concerns 
about the veracity of self-reports”.  
These concerns are interlinked and include researcher-imposed goal 
statements, respondents’ various understandings and misunderstandings of 
these statements, and also endorsement of statements that respondents might 
not spontaneously mention if asked with open-ended questions. Researchers 
can do their utmost to ensure a measure is psychometrically sound, but when 
the measure is administered to students, the forced-choice response method 
can elicit a ‘now-that-you-mention-it’ effect (Urdan & Mestas, 2006). Students 
are limited in their potential responses, they are provided with statements that 
they can only agree or disagree with. Additionally, they cannot indicate if they 
have other, more pertinent goals or discuss what may be complex personal goal 
concepts in their own words. Urdan and Mestas (2006, p. 355) suggest that this 
may result in an overestimation of “the natural occurrence of mastery and 
performance goals in particular settings, such as classrooms and schools.”  
The reason for using these standardized statements is, of course, that 
researchers can consistently assess students’ responses and make comparisons 
across their sample. Generally, a main strength of using questionnaires is the 
potential for consistency in responses and consequently analysis, in addition to 
their time effectiveness, and that they can be given to large amounts of 
respondents at a time. The difficulty with assuming consistent responses and 
analysis, however, stems from a further issue regarding the veracity of students’ 
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responses on questionnaires: the assumption that respondents understand the 
goal statements as the researchers intend. Assuming that all respondents 
understand the questionnaire items in the same way is unreasonable, given that 
even researchers’ understandings of these items are so often varied and 
multifaceted. Ignoring these varied understandings is far worse as there is clear 
evidence that invariability is often not the case. Urdan and Mestas (2006) 
interviewed participants who had higher than median scores on the 
performance approach and performance avoidance subscales of the Patterns of 
Adaptive Learning Scales (PALS). They found that participants “often failed to 
distinguish between the approach and avoidance dimensions of performance 
goals even when asked to respond to survey items that were designed to make 
this distinction” (Urdan & Mestas, 2006, p. 362). In one such example, 
participants explained their responses to performance avoidance items with 
performance approach descriptions such as “Yes, I want to do better than 
others” (Urdan & Mestas, 2006, p. 363).  
Ciani and Sheldon (2010) also found that questionnaire goal statements can 
mask participants’ misunderstandings of goal items. In their study, elite college 
baseball players were asked to answer achievement goal items and then provide 
open-ended written explanations describing their endorsement. The 
researchers found that although roughly half of their participants were high 
endorsers of mastery avoidance goal items, this seemed to be a result of 
misinterpretation as only two out of nine endorsements were followed with a 
written explanation that correctly described the goal. In contrast, participants 
who were low endorsers of the mastery avoidance goal provided valid written 
explanations. Ciani and Sheldon suggested that follow-up questions or 
interviews may have furnished the researchers with a better understanding of 
whether participants were misreading the question, were mentally reframing 
mastery avoidance goals into mastery approach or considered “approach and 
avoidance motivation as logically equivalent” (2010, p. 131). Murayama, Elliot 
and Friedman (2012) argue that respondents must be making these distinctions, 
otherwise their responses would not load onto individual factors during factor 
analysis (see also Murayama, Elliot, & Yamagata, 2011). Nevertheless, these are 
serious issues and clearly indicate that enhancing researchers’ precision in 
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distinguishing goal statements goes only so far in ensuring the robustness of 
achievement goal questionnaires. 
Furthermore, in their current configuration, achievement goal questionnaires 
do not sufficiently take into account the potential for individuals’ goals to 
change over time and/or in different situations. They provide a snapshot of the 
individual’s goals at one point in time.13 With the added endeavor of correlating 
these achievement goals with relevant achievement outcomes, this suggests the 
measurement of achievement goals as disposition-like, rather than specific and 
context-based (see Section 2.1.5.2).14 On one hand, this latter issue of specificity 
and context is arguably addressed by the domain-specific15 rather than 
generalized nature of the goal statements on both PALS and AGQ-R, which ask 
respondents to keep a specific class or course in mind, rather than thinking 
about their goals in general (which would even more clearly imply achievement 
goals as trait-like). However, on the other hand, this does not allow for 
respondents to mention differing goals they may have in relation to the 
different aspects of a course, such as reading and comprehension in preparation 
for seminars, essay writing, or exam preparation. Although the argument could 
be advanced that repeatedly administering current achievement goal 
questionnaires could provide a longitudinal idea of how students’ goals may 
change over time (e.g., Lieberman & Remedios, 2007), the act of making the 
questionnaires more dynamic and in the moment or integrating items to assess 
the time/goal change dimension would allow for even single time series studies 
to explore these issues. It is likely that this would provide a more complex, 
albeit more holistic measurement of students’ achievement goals.  
                                                             
13 This presents an interesting contrast to the dynamic, in the moment think aloud method used 
by Diener and Dweck (1978) in the earlier studies of achievement goals.  
14 One way of addressing this issue is to repeatedly administer achievement goal questionnaires 
to the same individuals over a specific time period; Murayama, Elliot, and Friedman (2012) 
recommend this approach should be taken more often.  
15 For PALS, this domain-specificity applies to students in middle school and older. For younger 
children in elementary school, the statements on PALS ask students to respond thinking of 
“class or schoolwork in general” (Midgley et al., 2000, p. 2), given that these children spend 
most of their time in a single classroom. 
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A further issue lies in the strategies respondents use while answering 
questionnaires. While the anonymity of completing achievement goal 
questionnaires might be argued to occasion more honest responses, it is not 
difficult to anticipate what the ideal responses are and tailor one’s responses 
accordingly. Mastery approach items are intrinsically more positive and likely 
to be aspired to.16 Performance approach goals, although ultimately associated 
with success, present a version of success that comes at the expense of others. 
Indeed, agreeing strongly that one endorses the goal of doing better than other 
students requires that these ‘others’ do worse. Explicitly endorsing this goal 
most likely requires that the individual possess strong feelings of competence, 
and alludes to a further issue that Brophy (2005) introduces regarding the 
epiphenomenal potential of performance scales on questionnaires. Brophy 
argues that the “endorsement of such items is realistic only for higher achievers 
whose past histories of success on similar tasks make it reasonable for them to 
expect to do better than most of their peers” (p. 173; see also Elliot & Church, 
1997; van Yperen, 2003). If one has been at “the top of the class” previously, 
and has thus experienced doing better than others it is likely that they will select 
a response that reflects this. In sum, questionnaires may perpetuate 
researchers’ goal definitions, assume participants understand researchers’ 
intended goal operationalizations, and do not rule out desirability effects or the 
use of self-presentational strategies.  
                                                             
16 The concept of aspiration highlights an important question regarding the purpose of 
achievement goal questionnaires. On one hand, weighing up how you would like to view 
yourself or be viewed by others could be seen as an integral part of a goal that is defined as 
forward-facing, as represented by Elliot and Fryer’s (2008, p. 244) definition of an achievement 
goal as “a cognitive representation of a future object that the organism is committed to 
approach or avoid.” If goals are thus defined, there is no challenge to the validity of an 
achievement goal questionnaire that is capturing aspirations. On the other hand, if the purpose 
of the achievement goal questionnaire is to capture which goals an individual is more likely to 
pursue, rather than aspire to, in an achievement situation, then this possibility that the 
questionnaire might be capturing aspiration rather than reality lends the questionnaire a 
problematic ambiguity. More explicit discussion of the purpose of achievement goal 
questionnaires is thus in order, as this issue has direct ramifications for the program of 
exploring the predictive validity of questionnaires. 
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Thus, while experimental manipulations can provide information to illuminate 
causal relationships, albeit with considerable difficulty in design, an advantage 
of using questionnaires should be that they enable students to express the 
nature of the goals they actually pursue in achievement settings. However, this 
does not seem to equate to the nature of achievement goal questionnaires in 
their current manifestation, the formats of which only provide the options to 
agree or disagree with what will be understood by researchers as performance 
approach, performance avoidance, mastery approach, and mastery avoidance 
items, giving the impression that students themselves actually do pursue these 
goals and only these goals (Brophy, 2005, p. 168).  
2.2.4 Interview Methods  
2.2.4.1 Advantages  
Such problems with experimental and questionnaire methods have led some to 
advocate the use of interviews in order to access learners’ achievement goals. 
Those that have called for (Brophy, 2005) and conducted (e.g., Dowson & 
McInerney, 2003; Lemos, 1996; Mansfield, 2012; Urdan & Mestas, 2006) 
interviews to access learners’ achievement goals have done so in attempts to 
avoid researcher-defined operationalizations of goals as critiqued above. They 
are interested in investigating the meanings students themselves give to their 
goals for achievement (Urdan & Mestas, 2006, p. 364) in more naturalistic, non-
laboratory classroom conditions (Lemos, 1996, p. 154).  
In most cases, the interview format selected is that of the semi-structured 
interview. This can be adapted on an individual basis to the experiences of the 
interviewees, allowing for interviewees to comment on achievement settings 
they are familiar with, and providing the space for the complex and unexpected 
in responses. Achievement goals are here accessed through asking learners 
about their behavior in achievement settings. Interviewees describe in their own 
words what goals they have, if any, in achievement settings, and also explain 
which are more pertinent in which situations. The use of semi-structured 
interviews additionally provides space for interviewers to ask follow up 
questions when responses are unclear, thus allowing for a better understanding 
of the interviewee’s experience. It is claimed, “such research can yield benefits 
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for theory (i.e., how goals are defined and conceptualized) and for research (i.e., 
how achievement goals can be assessed and examined)” (Urdan & Mestas, 
2006, p. 364).  
2.2.4.2 Work conducted with interviews 
Approaches to using interviews in achievement goal research have varied, in 
part due to the limited number of studies that have used this method. As such, 
there is no common means by which achievement goal interviews are 
conducted that can be readily adopted by others wanting to explore 
achievement goals using interviews (which in turn might prevent some from 
using the method and adding to the body of interview research). Within this 
sparse environment, the use of interviews has ranged from a secondary method 
to explore the answers participants provide on questionnaires to the primary 
research method in attempts to access students’ goals directly.  
Lemos’s (1996) work with Portuguese sixth-graders is an example of the latter. 
Lemos asked students questions about specific achievement settings. These 
were phrased as “what” questions (e.g., “What do you want?” “What are you 
trying to accomplish?”), allowing the students to provide their own 
explanations. Lemos found that the goals students mentioned that related to 
achievement per se17 included working goals (e.g., “to finish it and to go on to 
the next one”, “to get it done”), evaluation goals (e.g., “desire to be positively 
evaluated and/or…avoid negative evaluations concerning academic 
classifications”), learning goals (e.g., “to know more about”, “to find out how”), 
and enjoyment goals (e.g., “activities in which they engaged for pleasure, 
enjoyment, and fun”). Brophy (2005, p. 171) cited Lemos’s study in arguing, 
“when allowed to describe their goals in their own words, students…seldom 
mention performance goals spontaneously”.18 Even in the goal students 
                                                             
17 These I myself consider to deal with achievement, in accordance with the Murayama, Elliot, 
and Friedman’s (2012, see Section 2.1.5.1) definition of goals as competence-based aims. Lemos 
(1996) actually considers seven goals that the sixth-graders mentioned (in addition to the goals 
already mentioned): complying goals, interpersonal relationship goals, and discipline goals.  
18 Although Senko, Hulleman and Harackiewicz (2011) provide evidence that students do 
spontaneously report performance goals more frequently than reported by Brophy and 
colleagues (see Harackiewicz, Barron, Carter, Lehto, & Elliot, 1997; Levy, Kaplan, & Patrick, 
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mentioned that was most similar to the aforementioned characterization of 
performance goals, the evaluation goal, “students…talked about getting good 
grades but not about displaying ability or looking good in comparison with their 
classmates” (Brophy, 2005, p. 171). Hence, exploring what goals the sixth 
graders brought up themselves indicated that mastery and work avoidance 
goals, among others, were more pertinent to their experience than performance 
goals as researchers define them.  
Dowson and McInerney (2003) used various stages of interviews as a primary 
research method in their study of eighty-six middle school students’ goals. 
Their approach was unique in that it emphasized the need to be “inductive, 
systematic, and contextual” (original emphasis, Dowson & McInerney, 2003, p. 
92). Initial conversational interviews, in which the researchers asked questions 
like, “Do you want to do well at school? Why” and “What sort of things 
motivate you to do well at school?” (Dowson & McInerney, 2003, p. 96) 
provided an idea of the range of students’ achievement goals. Students 
elaborated on these goals in subsequent semi-structured interviews, where they 
were asked questions such as “Are you motivated to do well at school because 
you want to get good marks? Why/Why not?” (p. 96). Finally, the researchers 
used structured interviews to investigate students’ agreement with the specific 
goal approaches they had ventured in previous stages, asking questions like, 
“Some students say that they have to want to beat other students before they 
can do good work at school, but they also like to be friends with people even 
when they want to beat them. Do you think this is true of you? What does it feel 
like when you beat one of your friends?” (p. 97). Dowson and McInerney found 
that the students mentioned and then expanded upon three academic goals 
proffered: mastery goals, performance goals, and work avoidance goals. This 
process elicited a more dynamic, multidimensional, and complex picture of 
students’ goals, in which “purposes for achievement moved freely between 
descriptions of various behaviors, affects, and cognitions” (Dowson & 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2004; Urdan, 2004; Job, Langens, & Brandstätter, 2009), it is clear that in some research, 
participants do not make any mention of performance goals. Further discussion as to why this 
may be can be found in Murayama, Elliot and Friedman (2012, p. 199) with regard to how 
normative comparison is processed.  
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McInerney, 2003, p. 99), without favoring a single component a priori. 
Furthermore, multiple goals were reported as being possessed simultaneously, 
and these often combined in different ways. Most importantly for the 
researchers, goals originated in statements the students themselves had made 
in interviews (Dowson & McInerney, 2003, p. 107).  
Urdan and Mestas (2006) conducted interviews with students who had scored 
highly for performance approach and avoidance goals on the PALS. As the 
PALS scores provided the primary measure of the students’ achievement goals, 
the interviews in this case performed the secondary role of illuminating the 
reasons behind the students’ endorsements. As previously mentioned, it was at 
this point that the interviewers learned not only that the students had different 
reasons for endorsing performance approach or avoidance goals, but also that 
interviewees’ definitions of performance goals differed from those intended by 
researchers. Indeed,  
students often responded to the performance goal items in 
unexpected ways…to performance-avoidance items with 
approach explanations, saying they wanted to appear able or 
outperform peers even though the question asked about not 
performing or appearing worse than others. (Urdan & Mestas, 
2006, p. 363) 
 
The interviews showed that students perceived the normative demonstration of 
competence to be representative of their achievement behavior strivings, even 
if their interpretation of performance approach and avoidance goals differed 
from the researchers’ intended meaning. Though this could have suggested 
merely having misunderstood or reframed the items, a third suggestion coming 
from Ciani and Sheldon’s (2010) study of elite athletes, wherein respondents 
provided approach explanations for their avoidance responses, is that students 
in Urdan and Mestas’s (2006) study might have considered “approach and 
avoidance motivation as logically equivalent” (Ciani & Sheldon, 2010, p. 131). 
This would suggest that although the distinction between approach and 
avoidance is statistically sound, it is not consistently reflected in how students 
understand their own goals.  
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More recently, Mansfield (2012) conducted focus group interviews with twenty-
nine secondary school students, in groups of four or five students at a time. 
Mansfield (2012, p. 570) provided students with cards on which they were asked 
for written responses to the question, “Why do you want to achieve at school?” 
Once they had completed this, students were asked to explain their responses 
and discussion ensued, before the exercise was repeated with any remaining 
goals students wished to achieve at school. Finally, the researcher asked 
students to arrange their goals by importance, and to explain the reasons for 
their order. Along with future goals, social goals, and personal well-being goals, 
Mansfield found that students mentioned three types of achievement goals: 
mastery goals as they are defined generally in the literature, performance goals 
defined in terms of attaining or maintaining certain grades, and performance 
goals in terms of approach - wanting to do better academically than others (p. 
571). Interestingly, Mansfield found that only sixteen of the twenty-nine (55%) 
students mentioned achievement goals as compared to all twenty-nine students 
mentioning future goals, twenty-eight mentioning social goals, and twenty-two 
mentioning personal well-being goals. Of these sixteen who mentioned 
achievement goals, eight (27%) mentioned performance goals in terms of 
grades, six mentioned mastery goals (21%), and only three (10%) mentioned 
performance goals in terms of wanting to do better than others. Hence, in 
Mansfield’s research, dichotomous mastery and performance goals did arise, 
although they varied in definition from how achievement goals have been 
conceptualised in the literature. For example, categorizing achievement goals 
in terms of grades as performance goals was problematic in that the attainment 
of good grades can be indicative of both mastery and performance approach 
goals, and the maintenance of such goals can be argued to imply an avoidance 
valence. Nevertheless, of note was the fact that students did not spontaneously 
mention avoidance goals, in addition to the fact that fewer students mentioned 
achievement goals than the other types of goals. The former echoes the issues 
with approach and avoidance seen in Urdan and Mestas’s (2006) and Ciani and 
Sheldon’s (2010) studies, while the latter seems to support Urdan and Mestas’s 
(2006, p. 355) and Brophy’s (2005, p. 168) arguments that questionnaire 
methods solely focusing on achievement goals may overemphasise their 
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importance to students’ personal achievement experiences and their 
occurrence in achievement situations.   
2.2.4.3 Challenges with interviews in achievement goal 
research 
Conducting achievement goal interviews thus holds certain strengths over 
questionnaires and experimental manipulations. Researchers can find out not 
only how students interpret goal questionnaire items but also how, and the 
extent to which, they experience and explain achievement cognitions and 
behaviors in their own words. However, this does not mean that interview 
methods are unproblematic means of accessing achievement goals. 
Indeed, even when interviews are carried out as systematically as described in 
the study by Dowson and McInerney (2003), interviewees may employ self-
presentational strategies in order to represent themselves in a more positive 
light (see also Section 2.2.3.3). According to Goffman (1959), engaging in social 
interactions often gives rise to “impression management” (see also Schlenker, 
1980). Taking this factor into consideration, it may be that participants are 
under-reporting certain goals. For example, Urdan and Mestas (2006) reported 
that even when students had strongly endorsed performance goals on the 
questionnaire, during the interviews, these same students rarely made 
statements that emphasised comparing themselves to others. This led Urdan 
and Mestas (2006) to suggest that the set up of one-on-one interviews with 
students can be problematic in terms of reliability, as “participants may be 
more reluctant to honestly discuss their goals and motives in school than if they 
were responding to an anonymous survey” (p. 364). Acknowledging Goffman’s 
claims, students may have under-reported their performance goals during the 
interviews. Engaging in impression management might lead at least some 
students to avoid mentioning their desire to do better than others when in the 
interview situation. On one hand, the lack of mention of performance goals 
might be down to the fact that these social comparative/competitive goals just 
do not exist in classrooms in the way they are currently defined by researchers. 
On the other hand, considering the social undesirability (both to one’s self-
conception and how they desire to be viewed by the interviewer) of 
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spontaneously admitting that one wants to do or be perceived as doing better 
than their classmates, it is no wonder that few students mention these goals. 
A further issue that may appear in interviews regarding achievement goals is 
suggested by Kaplan and Maehr (1999, p. 331), who point out about wanting to 
be successful that often “success…is evaluated in social comparison terms…”, 
that it is “[b]y definition…a limited commodity”. Even saying “It is my goal to 
do well…” in an interview then implicates underlying notions of doing well in 
comparison to others, among other aspects such as wanting to improve one’s 
own ability. Trying to understand what the interviewee means in such a 
situation, as part of the conversational setting of semi-structured interviews, 
makes it possible that the interviewer, despite their best effort, leads the 
interviewee to elaborate and make distinctions that they would not make 
themselves. Follow-up questions to clarify that the researcher has understood 
the interviewee’s implied meaning might in this case produce the same “now-
that-you-mention-it” (Urdan & Mestas, 2006, p. 355) effect that is argued to 
exist in questionnaire settings. The extent to which interviewers might thus feel 
that they have understood sufficiently or not, and their subsequent questioning, 
can also vary among interviews, making it even harder to ensure consistency 
when conducting interviews. 
Interviewees may have various interpretations of the interviewer’s question 
about what they want to achieve in school, and answer accordingly. By leaving 
the question open to allow for non-researcher-defined goals, one student might 
interpret the question as asking about long-term goals, which they are likely to 
be reminded of continually by their teachers, whereas another student might 
answer the question in terms of very specific goals that they have for very 
specific tasks. While this could be argued to allow for the individuals to share 
what meaning achievement has in their own lives, this variety also means that 
interviewees may be answering different questions, inevitably affecting the 
findings, including the extent to which achievement goals are mentioned in 
comparison to other goals.  
This problem of understanding what students mean when discussing their 
achievement goals in interview settings impacts on the validity of researchers’ 
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reports of what the students have said, and is compounded by the data analysis 
process. As an exploratory approach, the interview attempts to access students’ 
subjective operational definitions of their goals for studying. But the products of 
these interviews remain raw information until coded within a subjective 
analytic framework developed by the researchers. During this process, it is 
undoubtedly difficult to depart from current theoretical conceptualization and 
categorization of goals; decipher whether students are speaking of one or 
another, or even several goals simultaneously; define the boundaries of verbal 
units; or determine whether students are discussing goal complexes (i.e., the 
goals and the reasons behind them, Elliot, 2005) or the specific aims they 
assume in certain achievement settings. There is a possibility of a conflict here. 
On one hand, there is the quest of the semi-structured interview to understand 
learners’ achievement goals spontaneously and in their own words, in a way 
that values the meanings and importance the learner gives to them. On the 
other hand, there is the issue of distinguishing the goal from the reason, and the 
extent to which learners would even respond with goal-type explanations of 
their achievement behavior. This underlines the development of methods in 
achievement goal theory, as discussed till now. Think aloud protocols involved 
simultaneous engagement in achievement behaviors and achievement-relevant 
verbalizations from which goals were extrapolated via systematic coding. The 
move towards having students verbalize their goals, although returning to a 
learner-focused methodology, is difficult to reconcile with achievement goals 
as they are currently, narrowly defined. However, as so little work so far has 
been carried out using interviews as a means to access achievement goals, 
much more could be done to establish an interview system that could balance 
spontaneity and goal-focus. One possible way forward could be the 
combination of a flexible semi-structured interview and a more structured 
method, as with the Self-Regulated Learning Interview Schedule (Zimmerman 
& Martinez-Pons, 1986, 1990).  
In addition, operationalizing achievement goals through gauging students’ own 
definitions relies on the assumption that they are able to proffer these 
definitions and accurately comment on the goals they adopt. If they cannot, the 
validity of using interview methods to access students’ goals for studying is 
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seriously undermined. On one hand, students may just not think of their actions 
in achievement settings as behavior meaningfully directed by goals, and thus 
offer up the first plausible reasons that come to mind when asked about them. 
Indeed, in his theory of self-perception, Bem (1972) argues that individuals’ 
ability to introspect may be limited to what they can infer from their behavior, 
implying limits to interviewees’ ability to comment on their achievement goal-
directed behavior (see also Section 3.2.2). In other words, students may not 
expressly construct goals to follow, making it difficult for them to articulate 
answers to interview questions and questionnaire items. On the other hand, 
though it is understood that students can and do explicitly construct goals to 
direct their achievement behavior, the question of what happens if these goals 
are adopted automatically  (for example, see Sections 3.1 and 3.2.6) remains a 
threat to not only interview methods, but any methods that assume that goals 
are entirely conscious, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Summary  
In sum, this chapter has considered the ways that achievement goals are 
defined and operationalized, in theoretical work and empirical work, 
respectively. The first part of the chapter outlined how achievement goals 
theoretically descend from work on achievement motivation, the aspects 
retained, and those that differ. Developments and disputes in theory and how 
these have affected the definition of achievement goals were also considered. 
The overarching conclusion of this first section was that achievement goal 
theory as a field has struggled with consistently and consensually defining 
achievement goals, including debates over goals as purposes, orientations and 
aims, as well as competence-based goals versus other types of goals operating in 
achievement settings, whether achievement goals are best understood as trait-
like or state-like, and how they are cognitively represented.  
The second part of the chapter then critically examined the methods that have 
been used in capturing achievement goals, with an emphasis on how these 
methods have operationally defined achievement goals. Think aloud 
methodology was linked with the founding of achievement goal theory and 
early exploration, operationalizing goals through a mix of behavioral and verbal 
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indicators that together suggested the participant’s pursuit of a certain goal. 
Experimental manipulations were linked with beginning to explore causal 
relationships between different goals and relevant achievement goal outcomes, 
and operationalized goals through task instructions used to induce goals. 
Questionnaires were seen to predominate, providing correlational information 
about achievement goals, their antecedents and consequences, and relevant 
achievement outcomes, and operationalized goals through statements to which 
participants could indicate the extent of their agreement. Interview methods 
were shown as a more recent, albeit less frequently used, method, resulting 
from calls for more student-defined achievement goals, and operationalized 
goals through the descriptions students give in response to what and why 
questions regarding their academic achievement. Critiques were then levelled 
at each of the methods. Weaknesses of experimental manipulations included 
the lack of ecological validity, difficulty with ensuring task instructions 
differentiate appropriately between the different goals, and questions over 
whether induced goals were actually those pursued. Weaknesses of 
questionnaire methods included researcher-defined goals, forced choice 
responses, impression management, and respondents’ possible 
misinterpretation of goal items. Weaknesses of interview methods included the 
possibility that follow up questions meant for clarification may direct the 
interviewees’ responses, interviewees’ impression management, and the 
difficulty of reconciling interviewees’ responses with narrow achievement goal 
definitions during analysis.  
Elliot and Murayama (2008, p. 616) claim that critiques of the 
operationalization of achievement goals are “not meant to invalidate these 
measures or the empirical work that has been produced by them,” and indeed 
this chapter has focused on both the strengths and the weaknesses of these 
operationalizations. However, a further potential weakness that applies to all 
methods that rely on self-reports, such as manipulation checks in experiments, 
agreement with statements on questionnaires, and answers to questions in 
interviews, concerns the ability of individuals to introspect and comment on 
their goals. This is discussed in depth in Chapter 3, which introduces the 
concepts of automaticity and limited introspective access, and discusses 
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whether critique informed by these literatures not only offers a serious 
challenge to Elliot and Murayama’s (2008) statement, but also to the 
definitions and operationalizations of achievement goals discussed till now. 
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3 A Case for Nonconscious Achievement Goals 
We have, as human beings, a storytelling problem. We’re a bit too 
quick to come up with explanations for things we don’t really have an 
explanation for.  
(Malcolm Gladwell, Blink, p. 69) 
 
The first thing we learn from studying our own circuitry is a simple 
lesson: most of what we do and think and feel is not under our 
conscious control.  
(David Eagleman, Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain, p. 4) 
Introduction 
In the last decade alone, books on the power of the unconscious in the everyday 
have grasped the public imagination and become bestsellers. Three such books 
are Nobel-prize winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman’s (2011) Thinking, Fast 
and Slow, Rice University neuroscientist David Eagleman’s (2011) Incognito: The 
Secret Lives of the Brain, and popular science writer Malcolm Gladwell’s (2005) 
Blink. The popularity of these works has given some indication of the public 
fascination with recent research suggesting that our unconscious minds are 
busy at work in ways we are only beginning to understand. The implications of 
this idea in relation to how achievement goals are theorized and captured form 
the subject of this chapter. 
Chapter 2 introduced achievement goals and issues in their definition and 
measurement. This chapter looks further at the assumptions underlying 
achievement goal theory in relation to the second aim of the thesis, to examine 
the literature on implicit cognition and nonconscious goal pursuit, and identify the 
key implications of these literatures for the definition and operationalization of 
achievement goals. Furthermore, it seeks to meet aim 3a of the thesis, which is to 
assess the extent to which the implications of findings on implicit cognition and 
nonconscious goal pursuit apply to how achievement goals are currently theorized 
through reasoned argument. To accomplish these aims, the following chapter 
examines some of the ways in which research has begun to illuminate the power 
and prevalence of the unconscious. Initially, key terms are defined, before the 
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chapter goes on to answer two guiding questions, what are the key findings from 
the various literatures on implicit cognition? And what are their methodological 
implications? Once these guiding questions are answered, the chapter considers 
whether the implications of research on implicit cognition can be seen as 
applicable to goal-directed behavior and more specifically, achievement goal 
theory.  
This chapter is split into three sections. In the first section, entitled The 
Unconscious, key findings from the literature on implicit cognition are 
considered in a loosely chronological order. The first subsection briefly 
highlights early philosophical ideas about the limits of consciousness within the 
history of psychology, looking at James (1890), Freud (1901/1965), and the 
behaviorists. The second subsection explores an early seminal review and 
research by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) into the limits of introspection, which 
suggested individuals often tell more than they can know. The next subsections 
examine research on the illusion of conscious will and the theory of apparent 
mental causation (Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), research into 
automotive theory and automaticity conducted by Bargh and colleagues (e.g., 
Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), and new ways of defining the 
unconscious including Kihlstrom’s (1987) cognitive unconscious and Hassin, 
Uleman, Bargh and colleagues’ (2005) new unconscious. The structure of each of 
these subsections includes the presentation of central arguments and empirical 
support (where applicable), followed by the implications these arguments hold 
for the conceptualization of achievement goals and how they can be accessed.  
The second section of this chapter, entitled The Unconscious and Achievement 
Goals examines these implications further, particularly in relation to 
achievement goal theory assumptions of consciousness and accessibility. This 
section outlines how these assumptions have been challenged in motivation 
research and assesses the responses from achievement goal theorists. Finally, 
the structure of achievement goals is considered in comparison with that 
suggested by research on nonconscious goals, with the resulting argument: it is 
theoretically possible that achievement goals can be activated, fulfilled, and 
their accompanying affective effects experienced without conscious awareness 
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that this has occurred, with the consequence that individuals are thus unable to 
comment accurately on their goals.  
In light of this argument, the third section of the chapter, entitled Implicit 
Methods, examines how nonconscious achievement goals could be explored, 
looking at methodological alternatives to conscious methods. It begins with a 
historically common implicit method, the Thematic Apperception Test 
(Morgan & Murray, 1935), and then moves to the methodological toolbox of 
more recent implicit methods, including the Implicit Relational Assessment 
Procedure (IRAP, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Power, Hayden, Milne, & 
Stewart, 2006), trace measures (Zhou & Winne, 2012), priming (e.g., Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999), and the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, 
& Schwartz, 1998). A case is made for using a combination of such methods to 
investigate potentially nonconscious achievement goals, ending this chapter 
and anticipating the next one, an empirical study doing just that.  
3.1 Definitions 
Given the varying fields from which the research outlined below is drawn, there 
are inevitably differences in term usage. It is important to clarify what is meant 
by these terms more generally. Definitions are thus proffered for the two main 
groups of terms, conscious mental processes and automatic processes. Conscious 
mental processes can be defined as “mental acts of which we are aware, that we 
intend (i.e., that we start by an act of will), that require effort, and that we can 
control (i.e., we can stop them and go on to something else if we choose…)” 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 463). Hence, awareness, intention, effort, and 
control are key elements of conscious processes. As will be discussed later in 
this chapter, achievement goal theorists assume that goals are such processes, 
and thus methodologically speaking, that it is appropriate to use self-reports to 
ascertain information about their goals. There is less of a consensus for what 
constitute automatic processes. Accordingly, two definitions are offered. On 
one hand, automatic processes can be defined as “intentional, goal-directed 
processes that [become] more efficient over time and practice until they [can] 
operate without conscious guidance” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 463). On the 
other hand, there are also automatic processes that involve “perceptual analysis 
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or encoding of environmental events…[taking] place not only effortlessly, but 
without any intention or often awareness that it [is] taking place” (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999, p. 463-4). The former definition of automatic processes can 
involve processes such as learning to read sheet music, which begin as 
conscious and effortful processes but require less effort over time and practice. 
Examples of processes referred to in the latter definition are behaviors, 
attitudes (e.g., likes and dislikes), perceptions of others (e.g., race, gender, 
social class stereotypes), emotions, learning, and even goals; this is the 
definition of automatic processes used in this chapter. It is also important to 
note that the terms automatic, nonconscious, unconscious and the implicit are 
used interchangeably throughout this chapter to refer to this latter definition.   
3.2 The Unconscious  
3.2.1 Early Modern Unconscious  
Much of the recent research on the limits of consciousness in psychology 
stemmed from the cognitive revolution that started in the 1950’s. However, 
long before this, discussion concerning the role of the unconscious emerged in 
the writing of William James (1890). James conceived of the ‘empirical self’ as 
comprised of different types: the material, the social, and the spiritual (James, 
1890, p. 292), of which, according to the interpretation offered by later authors, 
“only some portion…is knowable at any point in time…and even knowing a 
particular portion [is] difficult because much of human experience and action 
takes place at an unconscious level” (Murphy & Alexander, 2000, p. 37).19 Later 
researchers have also looked to James’s writings regarding the potential that a 
conscious choice may become superfluous in a process that is repeated 
consistently (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001), as 
well as his principle of ideomotor action, which suggests, “merely thinking about 
an action increases its likelihood of occurring” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 
465). These are important concepts in terms of the unconscious, as they do not 
require the attendant will that is usually assumed in the initiation of behavior.  
                                                             
19 There is inevitably argument regarding different interpretations of James’s position on the 
unconscious, see for example, Weinberger (2000), especially given the change in meaning of 
the term unconscious over time.  
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The individual most commonly associated with the unconscious, however, is 
Freud (1901/1965). However, the unconscious that is explored in this chapter is 
different from Freud’s in important ways. Wilson (2002; Wilson & Dunn, 2004) 
suggests three main aspects of Freud’s model of the unconscious that are 
distinct from more recent understandings of the unconscious: the reasons why 
the unconscious is unconscious, its nature, and its accessibility. In Freud’s 
writings, mental processes are unconscious because of repression, the 
unconscious is merely “a repository of the primitive, infantile drives and 
desires” (Wilson & Dunn, 2004, p. 499), and the individual can access their 
unconscious mental states during psychoanalysis. Ultimately, Freud’s version 
of the unconscious has been considered so complex and meandering that it has 
been difficult to extract hypotheses to test (Uleman, 2005, p. 5, cf. Kihlstrom, 
1987, p. 1638). Nevertheless, Freud did argue for the power of the unconscious 
in everyday life, which has inevitably paved the way for modern theories of the 
unconscious, discussed later, such as the cognitive unconscious (Kihlstrom, 1987, 
see Section 3.2.5) and the new unconscious (Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005, see 
Section 3.2.5).  
Another early conception regarding the limitations of consciousness was that of 
the behaviorists (e.g., Skinner, 1938; Watson, 1913), who argued that while the 
mind might have some role to play in predicting behavior, only behavioral 
responses to stimuli could be measured in a consistent manner. With the advent 
of the cognitive revolution, the study of consciousness burgeoned, 
accompanied by the gradual unearthing of its limits and the power of the 
unconscious. 
3.2.2 We Often Tell More Than We Can Know  
In the 1970’s, questions arose regarding social psychologists’ justification in 
asking participants about the reasons for their behavior, choices, and 
evaluations (for a review, see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Cognitive psychologists 
Mandler (1975), Miller (1962), and Neisser (1967) had controversially proposed 
that “we may have no direct access to higher order mental processes such as 
those involved in evaluation, judgment, problem solving, and the initiation of 
behavior” (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 232). While this claim stemmed from work 
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on the relatively automatic processes underpinning perception and memory, 
more research was required to justify generalizing such claims to social 
psychology, where much self-report research depended (and still does) upon 
the assumption of introspective access. Reviewing work on cognitive 
dissonance, attribution, subliminal perception and complex judgment tasks, 
Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977, p. 233) seminal research on self-reports argued 
there was indeed evidence that individuals are often unable to accurately 
account for factors impacting on their responses.  
For example, in a study carried out by the authors, participants were provided a 
list of word pairs to memorize. Interested in whether participants were aware of 
influences on their associative behaviors, the researchers provided some 
participants with pairs that were meant to activate associations with desired 
words that could then be elicited in participants’ responses during a later word 
association task. The critical word pairs that participants were asked to 
memorize in the first task contained words such as “ocean” and “moon”. In the 
subsequent standard word association exercise, the experimenters provided 
participants with probe words (i.e., “Detergent”) and asked the participants to 
utter the first word that came to their minds. They found that the words they 
had intentionally semantically cued (target words, i.e., “Tide”) were twice as 
likely to be uttered by the participants who had been exposed to the critical 
word pairs. When asked about what influenced their responses, participants 
provided reasons such as “My mother uses Tide”, or “I like the Tide box” 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 243), with only a third of participants, when directly 
asked, ceding that the word pairing memorization may have been a possible 
influence.  
Nisbett and Wilson found similar instances in a wide range of social 
psychological research, including their own work examining positioning effects 
and reported reasons for product appraisal (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), and even 
in Latané and Darley’s (1970) classic bystander effect, wherein participants 
were unaware of the effect that the presence of a greater number of bystanders 
had on their helping behavior. Nisbett and Wilson concluded from such studies 
that participants’ self-reports were often inaccurate in three different ways: 
participants were strikingly unable to report accurately that an influential 
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  85 
stimulus existed (i.e., Nisbett & Schachter, 1966), that they were responding to 
this stimulus (i.e., Valins & Ray, 1967), or that these processes were even 
occurring (i.e., Bem & McConnell, 1970).  
The consistent inaccuracy of participants’ self-reports led Nisbett and Wilson to 
question where participants were actually drawing self-reports from, if not from 
direct introspection. One answer came in the form of Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1974) representativeness heuristic, by which “a particular stimulus will be 
deemed a representative cause if the stimulus and response are linked via a 
rule, an implicit theory, a presumed empirical covariation or overlapping 
connotative networks” (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 249). In other words, the 
often-inaccurate reports implied that participants’ (strongly held) beliefs were 
not the product of awareness or memory of some internal process, but a priori 
theories linking stimuli and responses (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 233). 
Participants were assessing a situation and reporting what might be a plausible 
reason for their behavior. Support for this reasoning came from studies in which 
observers not participating in a situation were asked to give reasons for the 
behavior of those actually participating. The studies showed that the observers’ 
predictions were identical to reports provided by participants, challenging the 
assumption that the latter possessed some introspective access that could be 
called upon in their self-reports (Nisbett & Bellows, 1976).  
According to Nisbett and Wilson, not only is there considerable evidence that 
individuals are poor at (accurately) reporting reasons for their behavior, there is 
actually a very good reason. As human beings, we have built up a store of 
experience of causal connections between events. When asked to report the 
reason for our own behavior, we use that experience. Hence in the study by 
Latané and Darley (1970), in which a greater number of bystanders reduced 
one’s own likelihood of helping in an emergency, participants were unlikely to 
say “the reason I didn’t help was because there were so many other people 
around” when much more plausible and personally defensible reasons such as 
“I was too busy” were available. Translating the evidence from studies reported 
by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), when asked about their achievement goals, 
learners can be argued to base their self-reports on post hoc rationalizations of 
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their achievement behavior, rather than direct introspection and accessing of 
the goals that directed it. 
3.2.3 Our Experience of Conscious Will as Causal is an 
Illusion 
Consciousness	  is	  a	  much	  smaller	  part	  of	  our	  mental	  life	  than	  we	  are	  
conscious	  of,	  because	  we	  cannot	  be	  conscious	  of	  what	  we	  are	  not	  
conscious	  of…How	  simple	  that	  is	  to	  say;	  how	  difficult	  to	  appreciate!	  
It	  is	  like	  asking	  a	  flashlight	  in	  a	  dark	  room	  to	  search	  around	  for	  
something	  that	  does	  not	  have	  any	  light	  shining	  upon	  it.	  The	  
flashlight,	  since	  there	  is	  light	  in	  whatever	  direction	  it	  turns,	  would	  
have	  to	  conclude	  that	  there	  is	  light	  everywhere.	  And	  so	  
consciousness	  can	  seem	  to	  pervade	  all	  mentality	  when	  it	  actually	  
does	  not.	  	   (Jaynes,	  1976,	  p.	  23)	  
A further collection of challenges to the assumption that achievement goals are 
conscious and accessible comes in the form of Daniel Wegner’s book The 
Illusion of Conscious Will. Here, Wegner examines what the fruits of 
psychological research can contribute to addressing the debate surrounding our 
ability to control or consciously will our actions. This leads him to discuss not 
only the delicate links between brain, mind, thoughts and actions, but also how 
they interact to create the illusion of a causal link.  
3.2.3.1 Theory and Empirical Findings 
3.2.3.1.1 Separating the Action from the Experience 
The crux of Wegner’s argument is the difference between the causal force 
generating our actions and the consciously experienced feeling of willing those 
actions into being. The idea of conscious will conceived as separate from the 
cause, force or motor setting the action in motion, and construed instead as an 
experience, dates back to Hume’s (1739) understanding of it as the “personal 
conscious feeling of…causing, forcing, or motoring” (Wegner, 2002, p. 3). 
Conceptualizing the causal force and this feeling of doing (Ansfield & Wegner, 
1996) as distinct requires that even though there may be occasions on which 
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both might be present there must also be occasions on which one is present in 
the absence of the other. One way of illustrating such a distinction is in 
instances where the experience of will is absent where the action is, at least 
observably, present. In these situations, actions would be said to occur 
unaccompanied by the conscious feeling of doing. Table 2 below provides the 
combinations suggested by Wegner as highlighting the possibilities for when 
causal force and experienced feeling of doing are conceptualized as distinct.  
Table 2. Conditions of human action  
 Feeling of Doing No Feeling of Doing 
Doing Normal Voluntary Action Automatism 
Not Doing Illusion of Control Normal Inaction 
Note. Adapted from Wegner (2002, p. 8). 
 
Here “normal” experiences are illustrated by the downward, left to right 
diagonal. Having a feeling of having done something and seeing the action 
realized results in the least controversial condition of human action, that of 
normal voluntary action, just as not feeling as if one has done something and 
then not seeing any consequent action represents the opposite, normal inaction. 
However, research suggests the existence of more controversial experiences. 
These experiences fall under the upward, left to right diagonal, and are 
indicative of instances illustrating the separation between action and feelings of 
doing.  
Feeling as if one has done something even in cases where they cannot possibly 
have had control breeds the illusion of control (Langer, 1975), as observed in 
Nielson’s (1963) mirror box experiment and in Wegner and Wheatley’s (1999) I 
Spy experiment. In Nielson’s (1963) experiment, a box was modified through 
the placement of a mirror within it, as shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Set up of Nielson’s (1963) mirror box 
Note. Adapted from Wegner (2002, p. 42).  
When individual participants (S in Figure 3) were asked to put one of their 
hands, gloved and holding a pen, into the box, a research assistant (A in Figure 
3), also gloved and holding a pen, inserted their hand into the box. The mirror in 
the box (M 2 in Figure 3) showed the participant the hand of the assistant rather 
than their own. This set up so convinced individual participants that the actions 
of the research assistant were those of their own hand that they corrected their 
arm when the line they had been asked to draw, moved by the research 
assistant, drifted from the instructions. This experiment showed that it is 
possible to feel as if an action is consciously willed when that action is similar to 
what one is consciously engaged in, even if the observed action departs slightly 
from the intended movement, and importantly, even if another is carrying out 
that action. 
In Wegner and Wheatley’s (1999) I Spy experiment, participants worked in pairs 
with a confederate in a more elaborate version of a Ouija board set up, as shown 
in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Set up of Wegner and Wheatley’s (1999) I Spy experiment 
Note. Adapted from Wegner and Wheatley (1999, p. 488).  
They were asked to jointly move a mouse across a computer screen depicting an 
image from an I Spy book with around fifty objects. Participant and confederate 
were given divergent input via headphones as to where to pause the mouse, and 
every time the mouse stopped, mark on a continuum the extent to which they 
felt they had intended to stop in that location or had allowed their partner (the 
confederate) to stop there. Wegner and Wheatley found that the participants 
provided high intentionality ratings even when the confederate was in control 
of the mouse; participants even professed, during post-experimental interviews, 
that they had felt they were searching for an item at times. These studies 
underline the possibility of experiencing the feeling of doing even when another 
causes the action.  
Wegner suggests that automatisms, in which one has no conscious feeling of 
doing, and yet an action results, represent a further controversial separation 
between a causal force and the experience of the will. Examples of automatisms 
include alien hand syndrome and the highly fashionable 19th century spiritualist 
activity of table-turning. Patients who experience alien hand syndrome feel as if 
one of their hands acts of its own accord. This condition is suggested to have its 
roots in damage to a specific region, the middle of the frontal lobe, on the 
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opposite side of the brain to the hand affected (Gasquoine, 1993). The ‘alien 
hand’ is sometimes experienced as behaving without any particular willing on 
the part of the patient, whereas at other times, it is even more alien in that it 
moves counter to the consciously experienced will of the patient. In these 
patients, action can be observed, but the feeling of willing that action is absent, 
again showing a separation between causation and experience of will. With 19th 
century table-turning (Ansfield & Wegner, 1996), a popular parlour activity, 
people would sit around a table, each with two fingers of each hand lightly 
pressing upon the table in front of them. When the table began to turn, the 
group would think a spirit was moving the table. Given that it would require 
more than one person to turn the table using their finger tips, the experience of 
consciously willing the table to move was relinquished. When Faraday (1853) 
ultimately tested the phenomenon of the turning tables, with a device 
measuring the origin of the force, he found that the tables were turning as a 
result of the combined activity of the people sitting around it, rather than an 
interested spirit.20 In both of these situations, even though the individuals 
involved have caused the action, the experience of willing it has been absent.  
3.2.3.1.2 Problematizing the Normal 
Having provided examples of situations in which causation and experiences of 
the conscious will are separated, Wegner’s argument also takes issue with the 
normal diagonal of Table 2 (e.g., ‘normal voluntary action’ occurring when the 
feeling of doing is accompanied by doing; ‘normal inaction’ occurring when no 
feeling of doing is accompanied by not doing). More than just providing two 
examples of human action in which combinations of actions and feelings of 
doing seem to break away from the normal and suggest distinct underlying 
mental systems, Table 2 illustrates which aspects of human action Wegner 
posits as being illusions. For Wegner, the entirety of the column entitled Feeling 
                                                             
20 Wegner (2002, p. 8) adds that this could even be shown through the simple method of using a 
dusty table, with the hypothesis that if the table was moving of its own accord (or that of a 
spirit), the finger marks on the table would be in the opposite direction to the way it turned. This 
would indicate that their fingers stayed still while the table moved, yet it was more likely that 
finger marks would be consistent with the direction of the table movement, suggesting that the 
individuals seated around it had collectively moved it, even if they had experienced no feelings 
of personal causation due to acting as a group. 
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of Doing (e.g., feeling of doing accompanied by either doing or not doing), is an 
illusion as causation and the experience of conscious will are always separate. 
This is supported empirically by studies on brain stimulation and finger 
movement, and theoretically in terms of the conditions that need to be in place 
for us to experience the feeling of consciously willing an action.  
If ‘normal’ human action involves feeling as if one has done an act and then 
witnessing the act being done, Penfield’s (1975) brain stimulation research 
indicates that while it is possible to stimulate the motor structures in a brain so 
that an individual indeed makes and witnesses certain actions, these actions 
will not feel willed to them. In Penfield’s study, participants were given a local 
anaesthetic prior to open head surgery. Penfield had mapped a series of actions 
onto the brain surface. When he stimulated these sections and both he and the 
participants themselves observed the participants’ actions, participants 
remarked that Penfield had caused them, rather than that they had intended 
them, even though their brains had caused the actions. While it could be argued 
that participants considered the outside stimulation as inconsistent with their 
own having caused the actions and were thus unlikely to remark that they 
themselves had caused them, Penfield’s research does suggest that the 
locations of those parts of the brain that are involved in the mental causation at 
least on the level of physical movements are different and independent from 
those that involve the creation of experiences of conscious will. In other words, 
mental causation and the experience of conscious will represent anatomically 
distinct components. 
Further to a physical separation between the cause of action and the experience 
of a feeling of doing, research conducted by Libet and colleagues (Libet, 1985; 
Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983) suggests that these different processes 
may even occur at different times. Libet’s research is based on the ideas of 
readiness potential and movement potential originally explored by Kornhuber and 
Deecke (1965). Kornhuber and Deecke asked each of their participants to 
voluntarily move their right index finger whenever they liked, while the 
researchers explored the electrical activity in each participant’s brain and 
finger. This was done by measuring electrical potentials on the participant’s 
scalp (electroencephalography, EEG) and electromyography (EMG) of their 
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finger muscles throughout the experiment, in which each participants moved 
their finger about a thousand times. Kornhuber and Deecke found that each 
time participants did this, the act was preceded at about 0.8 seconds by 
increasing electrical activity in the brain. This activity peaked at about 0.09 
seconds before the visible action, before decreasing again. This readiness 
potential then translated at about fifty milliseconds before the action into a 
movement potential (Deecke, Scheid, & Kornhuber, 1969), a “more localized 
activation responsible for the specific action just as the action unfolds” 
(Wegner, 2002, p. 50). While Kornhuber and Deecke’s (1965) study seemed to 
suggest that these potentials represented an operationalization of the conscious 
willing of the finger movements, it did not actually provide any information as 
to whether this was the same moment that participants were aware of willing 
their finger to move. As a result, Libet and colleagues (Libet et al., 1983) decided 
to explore what would happen if they asked participants directly to indicate the 
moment when they decided to move their finger.  
Again, participants were prepared for EEG and EMG, and instructed to raise 
their right index finger whenever they wanted. Yet this time, Libet and 
colleagues (1983) asked the participants to, using a more complex version of a 
clock face, point out the exact location of a moving dot that operated as a clock 
hand. They were asked to point out location of the dot the moment they 
consciously willed the movement of their right index finger, the moment they 
were aware of moving it, and the moment that the researchers applied a 
stimulus to their hand. This last request provided an estimate of the time it took 
for signals to be sent from the hand to the brain, and thus each of the other 
times took this process measure (about forty-seven milliseconds) into account 
and was accordingly corrected. Libet found that the order of action started with 
an increasing readiness potential at about five hundred milliseconds before the 
finger moved, which while occurring three hundred milliseconds later than that 
of Kornhuber and Deecke, was likely to have come from Libet’s explicit 
instructions to participants to ensure their finger movement was unplanned and 
spontaneous (Wegner, 2002, p. 54). This was followed by participants becoming 
consciously aware of willing the movement at about 157 milliseconds before the 
finger moved, and awareness of moving their finger at about forty milliseconds 
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  93 
before the finger actually moved. As such, the findings suggest that the action 
has already been initiated in terms of the brain readiness potential before the 
experience of consciously willing and moving the finger. This suggests that it is 
not the conscious will that begins the process of moving the finger, but that 
perhaps conscious will is something that comes in later, during the process.  
Wegner’s argument that conscious will is an illusion in normal human action is 
thus supported by the findings of both Penfield and Libet’s research in that 
mental causation can be observed in the absence of feelings of conscious will 
and that mental causation, as represented by readiness potentials, can be 
considered to occur at a different time to the appearance of a feeling of 
consciously willing an action. Especially taking Libet’s findings into 
consideration, if conscious willing occurs as a later part of the mental causation 
process, there must be occasions on which it does not form a part of the process 
at all. In other words, there must be situations in which mental causation occurs 
without ever activating feelings of conscious willing just as there are situations 
in which it is later accompanied by feelings of conscious willing. This begs the 
question of under what conditions a feeling of conscious will accompanies 
mental causation and under what conditions it might not. Wegner and 
Wheatley’s (1999) Theory of Apparent Mental Causation provides some 
explanations.   
3.2.3.1.3 The Illusion of Conscious Mental Causation  
According to Wegner and Wheatley’s (1999; Wegner, 2002) Theory of Apparent 
Mental Causation, experiencing feelings of having consciously willed actions 
requires that conditions of priority, consistency, and exclusivity are met. The 
priority principle posits that an action will be experienced as consciously willed 
by an individual when the thought of that action is followed by the action: some 
representation of the action must appear in the mind before it appears before 
their eyes for them to feel as if they have caused it to occur. Moreover, the 
thought must not occur too long before or after the action for it to be judged as 
causing the action. This provides the illusion that the thought has created the 
action. However, it is only an illusion because the thought itself, though 
experienced prior to the action, does not necessarily equate to the direct causal 
force behind that action. This reflects the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter 
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hoc.21 As a result, we may “ experience ourselves as agents who cause our 
actions when our minds provide us with previews of the actions that turn out to 
be accurate when we observe the actions that ensue” (Wegner, 2005, p. 23), but 
this does not mean that our conscious will necessarily induced those actions.  
The principle of consistency posits that an action will be experienced as 
consciously willed by an individual when the content of their thought is 
reflected in the content of their action. Vallacher and Wegner (1985) argue that 
the thoughts we perceive as causal include “the name of the act, an image of the 
act, or a reference to its execution, circumstance, or consequence” (Wegner, 
2002, p. 79). While Nisbett and Wilson (1977) also provide suggestions for why 
we are hesitant to concede authorship and ownership of our own actions, such 
that we are unlikely to report that we are, when asked, unwitting of the exact 
reasons for some of our action, Wegner reminds us that there are often 
occasions on which a great idea or solution to a problem arrives, effortlessly and 
fully-formed, into our consciousness. On these occasions, we are willing to 
admit the inconsistency of our thoughts with the actions. We do not know 
where these actions, words, or ideas have come from, and our experience of 
consciously willing them into existence is undermined given that we have had 
no prior, consistent previews of them. Either way, that a thought is consistent 
with an action does not equate to the thought causing the action.  
                                                             
21 It is also similar to Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) notion of the origins of participants’ reports 
about the reasons behind their behavior. Here, participants’ reports are derived from reflecting 
on the action once it has been made, and can be accurate as to the cause of that behaviour, even 
though this accuracy does not come as a result of direct introspection. In the same way, the 
internal conscious thought process can be engaged in to determine the extent to which one feels 
as if they have consciously intended an action, and yet research on the location and timing of 
mental causation and the experience of conscious will suggests that it is not the thought itself 
that has created the behavior. Of course, behavior here may be motivated by either a conscious 
or a non-conscious force (e.g., make a conscious plan to dedicate the next two weeks to studying 
logical fallacies, or be unwittingly influenced by a competitive environment to try to overtake 
your peers), and thus reasons behind behaviors may sometimes be more possible to ascertain 
than others. However, the same claim, that for one to cause an action requires them to think 
about that action before it occurs, and for Nisbett and Wilson that this can be recalled and 
reported remains just that: the conscious experience with no direct causal control or ability for 
introspection. 
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The final principle is exclusivity. This is fulfilled when there is no other likely 
cause for the action. Feeling as if there is potentially another cause for the 
action will reduce the extent to which one feels as if they had consciously willed 
that action. Potential causes that might serve to increase or decrease exclusivity 
and feelings of conscious will include both internal and external causes. For 
example, individuals can be argued to attribute their actions to “emotion, 
impulse, disposition, or habit” (Wegner, 2002, p. 91), such that experiencing 
heightened emotion, being impulsive, deeming behavior as indicative of one’s 
unchangeable disposition or due to habit can lead to feelings that one has not 
consciously willed behavior enacted within the presence of these 
circumstances. External alternative causes may involve other individuals or 
groups or more otherworldly entities, such that one feels a reduced sense of 
consciously willing an action when that action may have been carried out in 
conjunction with another person or persons, such as in the I Spy experiment, or 
attributable to a supernatural force, as in 19th century spiritualist parlour game 
of table-turning. Again, deciding that there is no other likely alternative 
explanation than one’s thoughts regarding an action does not imply that one 
has consciously willed that action.  
Ultimately, each of the three principles involves the comparison of the thoughts 
before the act and the observed action. If a thought occurring just prior to the 
action has a largely similar content and there seem to be no likely alternative 
explanations other than that thought being causal, an individual will tend to 
strongly experience that thought as a sign they have consciously willed the 
action.  
3.2.3.2 Implications for Conceptualizing Achievement 
Goals 
The previous sections have described some of Wegner’s elaborate argument 
distinguishing unconscious mental causation from the illusion of the experience 
of conscious will. In sum, unconscious mental causation has been shown not 
only to occur in an anatomically distinct location from feelings of conscious will 
in brain stimulation studies (Penfield, 1975), but also prior to the conscious 
experience of willing in the finger lifting studies (Libet, 1985; Libet et al., 1983; 
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  96 
Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Furthermore, the feeling of conscious will has 
been shown to occur even in situations where the individual has not carried out 
the action such as in the I Spy (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999) and the gloved hand, 
line-writing experiments (Nielson, 1963). According to the Theory of Apparent 
Mental Causation (Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), feelings of 
consciously having willed an action will arise in situations where individuals 
have previews of the action just prior to the performance of the action, where 
the content of the thought is consistent with the action, and where a lack of 
potential alternative internal or external causes exists for the action.   
Crucially, these latter experiences, as illusions, are at most an estimation of 
“the moment-to-moment…role that our minds play in our actions” (Wegner, 
2002, p. 15), and not indicative of the “real causal sequence” (Wegner, 2002, p. 
27). Methodologically, Wegner’s argument throws up the important question, if 
individuals’ reports about their actions are supposedly based on the experience of 
consciously willing their actions, but conscious will is an illusion, whence are 
individuals drawing their reports?  
Take, for example, an individual who has performed an action. In accordance 
with Wegner’s argument, it may be the case that the individual will have 
experienced a feeling of consciously willing that action. Asking that individual, 
after the action has been performed, why they performed it is likely to result in 
an answer. Normally, it would be assumed that their answer would result from a 
process of introspection, the goal of which is to retrieve the memory of 
consciously creating the intention and then accomplishing the action.  
However, the problem of causality inherent in our inability to “see [our] 
conscious intention causing an action” (Wegner, 2002, p. 13) implies that we are 
never able to do more than infer that our conscious intentions cause our 
subsequent actions. Thus conceptualizing the conscious will as a causal force 
“must always overreach what we can see (or even introspect)” (Wegner, 2002, 
p. 14). Hence, though the individual may form a conscious intention to perform 
an action, they are unable to claim with certainty that it was their intention that 
caused the action. In the same way, it could be suggested that while an 
individual may form a conscious achievement goal, they would be unable to 
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claim with certainty that it was their goal that caused the action. In sum, 
according to Wegner’s arguments, asking an individual about their 
achievement goals may result in responses based not on introspection on the 
actual cause behind their behavior, but on a process of inference taking into 
account the principles of priority, consistency, and exclusivity.  
3.2.4 We Can Nonconsciously Pursue Goals 
At the beginning of this chapter, the following definition was offered for 
conscious mental processes: “mental acts of which we are aware, that we intend 
(i.e., that we start by an act of will), that require effort, and that we can control 
(i.e., we can stop them and go on to something else if we choose…)” (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999, p. 463). Till now we have examined a series of theories and 
findings that challenge the notion that our behavior is always directed by 
conscious awareness and intention and that we can explain our actions with 
accuracy. In this section, we consider work by John Bargh and his colleagues 
that challenges the notion that our behavior and cognitions are also always 
effortful and under our control.  
3.2.4.1 Theory and Empirical Findings  
The work of Bargh and colleagues relies in part on the concept of “limited 
conscious attentional capacity” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 464). This 
concept originates in Baumeister, Tice and colleagues’ (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998) 
investigations of the detrimental effects on performing a second, minor self-
regulatory act (e.g., avoid laughing while watching a funny movie) in an 
unrelated activity after participants have been asked to perform a first, also 
minor self-regulatory act (e.g., do not think about white bears). These 
observations regarding the limits to conscious attentional capacity suggest that 
because even small conscious self-regulatory acts use up this capacity, as little 
as 5% of our daily acts of self-regulation may occur consciously (Bargh & 
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Chartrand, 1999, p. 464). Thus the remainder – the majority – of our mental 
processing is implied to occur on a nonconscious, automatic level.22  
 
Figure 5. (a) Conscious, intentional mediation of goal pursuit within a 
situation and (b) Automatic activation and operation of goals by situational 
features following repeated choice of the same goal 
Note. Adapted from Bargh and Chartrand (1999, p. 470). 
According to Bargh and Chartrand (1999), this automatic behavior is the result 
of a larger process in which a specific situation is presented to the learner, a 
conscious choice is made regarding a response to that situational stimulus, and 
a goal or purpose is decided and then acted upon. With time, the frequent and 
consistent presentation of this situation or situations with similar features results 
in a bypassing through automatization of the conscious choice (Bargh, 1990), 
such that the effortless, unintentional, and unaware perception of the situation 
unconsciously activates the goal, its operation, and its fulfilment. The use of a 
self-report method in such a situation seems problematic. Importantly, this 
automatization, as illustrated in Figure 5 (above), can be intentionally or 
unintentionally acquired.  
                                                             
22 While it could be argued that achievement goals would make good candidates for this 5%, the 
highly similar nature of many academic tasks would suggest the greater likelihood that 
conscious goal decisions are made in the presence of novel or extraordinarily challenging 
academic tasks (see Bongers, 2007), and are absent from the everyday achievement settings 
that achievement goal researchers are generally interested in measuring using self-reports. 
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The possibility for an unintentionally automatized conscious choice raises 
questions for achievement goals, such as when the conscious choice to adopt a 
certain goal is made, and whether students can remember or comment on if it 
was consciously made. Furthermore, in line with the model of how goals are 
cognitively represented, proposed earlier (see Section 2.1.5.2), this process of 
unintentional automatization of conscious choices could support the idea of 
intraindividual stability in terms of paths of activation among relevant nodes 
that are strengthened and more readily activated over time. 
Using priming procedures, Bargh and his colleagues have been able to 
empirically examine this perception-to-action logic in the automatic, that is, the 
unintentional, effortless, and nonconscious, activation of various trait and 
stereotype-related behaviors. For example, Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996, 
experiment 1) primed one group of their participants using words linked to the 
trait of politeness, such as cordially and considerate, another group with words 
linked to the trait of rudeness, such as bother and obnoxious, and did not prime 
the last group, who acted as a control for the other two conditions. When 
participants had completed the priming task, the researchers sent participants 
down a corridor to what they thought was the next experiment. They were told 
that they would meet the researcher in charge of that experiment at the end of 
the hall. When they reached the researcher (a confederate), however, this 
individual was engaged in a conversation. Here the differentiation among the 
groups was revealed: 67% of those primed with words linked to the trait of 
rudeness interrupted the researcher’s conversation, as compared to 38% of 
those in the control group, and only 16% of those in the politeness condition.  
In a second experiment, Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996) found that priming 
students with words stereotypically associated with the elderly, such as 
sentimental and wrinkle, led participants to walk more slowly down a corridor 
after what was presented as the end of the experiment than students who had 
not been primed with such words. In both experiments, when asked, the 
participants were unaware of the primes and of their influence on their 
behavior. The mental representations of the traits of rudeness and politeness 
and the stereotypes surrounding the elderly could be activated outside of the 
individuals’ conscious awareness, direct their behavior without their conscious 
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effort, control, or an act of will, and leave the participant unable to account for 
what had just happened. Bargh has argued that priming traits and stereotypes 
using words in the laboratory can be compared to similar priming, albeit by 
situational cues, outside of the laboratory and that this demonstrates an 
environment to perception to behavior link (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).  
Bargh and colleagues acknowledge that everyday behavior is often goal-
directed, and thus have extended their experiments to explore the role of goals 
within this link. Bargh (1990) has argued that if we conceive of goals as mental 
representations, then as with other mental representations they should be 
capable of being activated by the environment. If goals can be automatically 
activated by the situational cues present in everyday settings, it should also be 
possible to automatically activate goals in a laboratory setting, with the now 
clear implications for self-report.23 Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & 
Trötschel (2001) found that such automatically activated goals share key 
characteristics of general goal pursuit, namely “vigorous acting toward goal 
attainment, persistence in the face of obstacles, and resumption after 
disruption” (Bargh et al., 2001, p. 1016). For example, in their fourth 
experiment, they attempted to prime the behavioral goal ‘to achieve’ in some 
participants and not others, and found that when participants were asked, via 
intercom, to stop working on an activity in which they were given two minutes 
to find and note down as many words as they could using a set of Scrabble tiles, 
57% of those who had been primed with the achievement goal, as opposed to 
only 22% of the control group, continued working so as to obtain a higher score.  
In an experiment examining cognitive goals, Chartrand and Bargh (1996) found 
that unobtrusively exposing participants to synonyms of either the word 
‘memorization’ or ‘evaluation’ in a first activity led them to adopt these goals 
for dealing with a set of unrelated information presented to them later on. This 
replicated, albeit with implicit primes, the results of Hamilton, Katz and Leirer 
(1980), where participants who had been explicitly asked to follow an 
                                                             
23 These are, of course, that if goals are automatically activated, and an individual is asked the 
reason for their behavior, their lack of awareness, control, effort, and intention should lead to 
their response being comprised of post hoc rationalizations. 
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impression-formation goal not only remembered more of the material but also 
gave evidence of having better organized the information in their memory than 
those instructed to memorize the material (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 469). 
Again, in both of these experiments, participants were unaware that they held 
these goals and yet, from their behavior, had evidently acted on them.  
These results suggest that it is possible to nonconsciously activate goals and 
that nonconscious goals share key characteristics with consciously held goals. 
The similarities go further. Gardner, Bargh, Shellman, & Bessenoff (1999) 
investigated brain activity for conscious and nonconscious evaluation goals and 
found that the same structures involved in consciously willed evaluation goals 
are activated when goals are nonconsciously activated by the environment (i.e., 
increased activation of the basal right hemisphere at 650ms after presentation 
of stimulus). Chartrand (1999, experiment 1) has shown that the pursuit of 
nonconscious goals is also similar to that of conscious goals in terms of 
accompanying affective effects: priming some participants with the goal ‘to 
achieve’ and then inducing success or failure led to expected respective 
changes in primed participants’ mood and self-efficacy beliefs but not in those 
of the control participants. Again, primed participants were unable to account 
for these changes.  
3.2.4.2 Implications for Conceptualizing Achievement 
Goals 
These experiments suggest that goals can become automatized processes to 
limit cognitive overload, and can guide cognitive and behavioral responses 
outside of conscious awareness and control, effortlessly, and without an 
initiating act of will. Even unwitting perception of specific environmental 
factors can trigger goal adoption, with the same neurological, behavioral, and 
affective effects as intentional, consciously held goals. Because the process of 
automatization itself is automatic, goals may become automatic and activated 
in situations without our awareness that this has occurred (Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999, p. 469). The implication is that our capacity to comment on such goals is 
seriously undermined.  
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Just as in Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) work, in each experiment, Bargh and his 
colleagues probed participants after they had outwardly pursued the implicitly 
primed goals, as indicated by the researchers’ dependent measures, and found 
them entirely unaware of having done so (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 2005, p. 633). 
These studies directly challenge assumptions that goals are always conscious 
and accessible. When such research is placed alongside common achievement 
goal methods that rely heavily on these assumptions, goal theorists must begin 
to acknowledge the implications conceptually and methodologically. 
3.2.5 The Cognitive Unconscious and the New 
Unconscious 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the presently considered model of nonconscious 
goal pursuit is distinct from the environmental stimulus-response model of the 
behaviorists; here the environmental/situational cues result in behavior via 
nonconscious goals.24 This reflects the more recent models of the unconscious 
that appear in Kihlstrom’s (1987) article entitled The Cognitive Unconscious and 
in Hassin, Uleman and Bargh’s (2005) more recent edited volume, The New 
Unconscious. 
In his seminal 1987 article, Kihlstrom compared the classic information-
processing model for human cognition with the development of more recent 
models such as Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT) and connectionist or 
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP), remarking that such later models 
allowed for the conceptualization of a more potent, and importantly, cognitive, 
unconscious. The classic model had allocated to the unconscious only those 
“unattended percepts and unretrieved memories…[that] make no contact with 
higher mental processes, and thus cannot influence conscious experience, 
thought, and action” (Kihlstrom, 1987, p. 1446), whereas the more recent 
models were compatible with the findings of research on automatic processes, 
subliminal perception and priming, implicit memory, and hypnosis. Indeed, 
                                                             
24 In line with William James’s (1890, see also Berkowitz, 1984) conception of ideomotor action, 
Carver, Gannellen, Froming, and Chambers’s (1983) behavioral schema notion helps to explain 
how priming works, in that “activation will spread automatically from the interpretive to the 
behavioral schema” (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996, p. 233).  
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these findings seemed to suggest that the majority of mental processes are 
occurring unconsciously. Hence, Kihlstrom defined the cognitive unconscious 
as “mental structures and processes that, operating outside phenomenal 
awareness, nevertheless influence conscious experience, thought, and action” 
(1987, p. 1445). Within this conceptualization, consciousness is associated with 
processing that is “slow and sequential” (Kihlstrom, 1987, p. 1446), while 
perceptions of the environment are thought to activate  
preexisting semantic memory structures corresponding to the 
features of the stimulus event, as well as related nodes by virtue 
of spreading activation. If some of these nodes correspond to the 
goals and conditions of various production systems, certain 
procedures will be executed as well…[without] the involvement 
of working memory. (Kihlstrom, 1987, p. 1448) 
In terms of achievement goals, conscious achievement goals would represent 
slow and sequential processing, whereas nonconscious achievement goals 
would operate quickly via spreading activation, reflecting the model of how 
achievement goals are cognitively represented proposed in Chapter 2 (see 
Section 2.1.5.2) and also Bargh and colleagues’ (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) 
finding that goals can be automatically activated by situational features. 
Importantly, the lack of involvement of the working memory suggests that goals 
operating as nonconscious, automatic processes would be inaccessible via self-
report methods.  
Hence already by the late 1980’s, the conception of the unconscious was 
beginning to theoretically shift toward acknowledgment that more cognitive 
processes could be carried out without the need for conscious initiation, 
control, effort, and attention. Furthermore, empirical findings were beginning 
to show that such processes could indeed influence our thoughts and behavior. 
The New Unconscious, edited by Hassin, Uleman, and Bargh (2005) almost 
twenty years following Kihlstrom’s article, emerged at a point in time where the 
power of the unconscious in psychology is not only acknowledged but accepted 
as a premise for further exploration. This volume brings together recent 
empirical work that expands the number of unconsciously operating cognitive 
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processes. It includes research on implicit working memory (Hassin, 2005), 
unintended counterfactual thinking (Roese, Sanna, & Galinsky, 2005), and even 
unconscious self-regulation through implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 
Bayer, & McCulloch, 2005), and suggests a new unconscious, which “is much 
more concerned with affect, motivation, and even control and metacognition” 
(Uleman, 2005, p. 6) than Kihlstrom’s cognitive unconscious could have 
predicted. Crucially, this conception is new not only in comparison to previous 
conceptualizations of the unconscious; it is also new in that the field is still 
“partial, developing” (Uleman, 2005, p. 14), and will require a wealth of 
continued research to further clarify current findings and their implications.  
3.2.6 Section Summary 
The previous sections have reviewed just a few of the many persuasive findings 
regarding the power of the unconscious, and explored the strong implications 
regarding the mental representation, process of activation and pursuit, and 
capacity for accessing and commenting on achievement goals. These sections 
have shown how the concept of the unconscious has developed from a 
philosophical possibility to the Freudian to the behaviorist through to the 
empirically grounded new unconscious that has emerged from explorations of 
consciousness originating in the cognitive revolution. As these studies have 
amassed, researchers have unearthed several key findings regarding 
awareness, acts of will, effort and control. We are often unaware of the reasons 
for our behavior: we fail to recognize a stimulus, our response to it, or even that 
this process has occurred. An act of conscious will is unnecessary in the 
initiation of behavior; the environment can set cognitive goals and behavior in 
motion, and the conscious will is at most an accompanying experience or 
feeling rather than a causal force. Behaviors and cognitions can occur 
effortlessly, as when they are activated outside of our conscious awareness and 
run their course. Furthermore, if one is unaware of the activation and process 
occurring, the element of control over the process disappears. When we respond 
to questions asking us about the reasons behind our behavior, we provide post 
hoc rationalizations based on inferences.  
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The next section of the chapter explores the extent to which these findings have 
been considered within the motivation literature, and where possible, the 
response from achievement goal researchers.   
3.3 The Unconscious and Achievement Goals  
As illustrated in Chapter 2, the vast majority of achievement goal studies rely on 
self-reports in their assessments of students’ achievement goals, either in the 
format of questionnaires, interviews, or through manipulation checks of 
experiments. The use of such methodology implicitly assumes that 
achievement goals are conscious and therefore can be accessed. However, up 
till now, this chapter has presented key findings from literatures on the 
unconscious that suggest individuals’ complex cognitive goals can be activated 
and fulfilled, influencing behavior and cognitions, without an initiating act of 
conscious will, awareness, effort, or control, and leaving the individual unable 
to recognize or comment on the fact that this process has occurred. This section 
explores the extent to which these findings have been considered and even 
addressed within achievement goal research. 
In 1984, Nicholls wrote about Dennett’s (1978) intentional conceptions of 
behavior, likening an achievement goal perspective to this way of 
understanding the predictability of behavior based on the assumptions of goal-
directed behavior and rational means towards attaining those goals. 
Interestingly, he states at this early point in achievement goal theorizing that 
such an intentional conception of behavior “does not imply that individuals are 
always conscious of their goals” (Nicholls, 1984, p. 40). In spite of this, much 
achievement goal research has relied on self-report and implicitly assumed the 
consciousness and accessibility of achievement goals.  
In 2000, Murphy and Alexander conducted a review of motivation terminology 
from a useful outsider’s perspective, and discussed the issue of accessibility. 
One of their findings was that there were fewer studies on younger children’s 
motivation. The reviewers suggested that this might stem from an assumption 
within the field that younger individuals might lack the ability to reflect and 
articulate such concepts when asked (Murphy & Alexander, 2000, p. 32). Given 
the findings discussed in the previous section, this could be extended so that it 
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would apply not only to younger children, but also to all who are asked to report 
on their achievement goals. At the adult level, Murphy and Alexander’s (2000) 
review of the motivation literature did not reveal much explicit discussion of 
accessibility at all. The reviewers interpreted this to be a result of researchers 
having made the assumption that their participants’ motivations are conscious 
and accessible, and therefore not needing to explicitly discuss it. However, the 
reviewers often found the phrases learners’ “beliefs” or “perceptions” (Murphy 
& Alexander, 2000, p. 38) accompanying self-reports, and took these to 
represent the acknowledgement of motivation researchers that human access 
to motivational mechanisms might be limited (Murphy & Alexander, 2000, p. 
39). 
A prominent achievement goal theorist, Pintrich (2000) replied directly, 
addressing and clarifying the issue of accessibility from an achievement goal 
perspective. In his reply, Pintrich distanced goals from unconscious constructs 
such as motives or needs, and emphasized (Pintrich, 2000, p. 96, as have 
others, see Lemos, 1996, p. 151; Elliot & Fryer, 2008) that as goal theory stems 
from the cognitive revolution, it inherits the associated assumptions: goals are 
assumed to be cognitively represented in ways that are consciously accessible. 
Pintrich highlighted these reasons as an explanation for Murphy and 
Alexander’s (2000) limited findings of the explicit discussion of conscious 
accessibility, and suggested that Murphy and Alexander’s (2000, p. 37) 
questions regarding the accessibility of motivation were therefore irrelevant to 
the valid operationalization of goals (Pintrich, 2000, p. 96).  
Each of these three claims can be addressed in turn. In terms of distancing goals 
from motives or needs, it is important to note that authors such as Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977) only use ‘motive state’ in line with developments in motivation 
research up until the time of writing, whereas Murphy and Alexander (2000) 
use it because their review is not only limited to achievement goal research. In 
fact, as the first section of this chapter showed, much more recent research on 
the unconscious suggests that it envelops a greater range of constructs than just 
motives or needs, including cognitive and behavioral goals. Secondly, goal 
theory has indeed emerged from the cognitive revolution, but so has the 
research on the limits of consciousness. Thirdly, the findings of research 
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originating in the cognitive revolution have suggested that the very fact that 
goals are cognitively represented enables them to be nonconsciously activated, 
for example by patterns of spreading activation, such that they are not always 
consciously aware and hence not always accessible. The concerns, therefore, 
remain.  
In a later piece, Elliot and Fryer (2008) seem to agree with Pintrich. They argue 
that a significant aspect of the definition of goals is that they are consciously 
committed to, and that such commitment begins with conscious intention (Elliot & 
Fryer, 2008, p. 246), which the previous section of this chapter has queried. 
However, they simultaneously refer to research conducted by Bargh and his 
colleagues (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001) on 
automatic processing, ceding that “once in place in the cognitive system, goals 
may be activated and may operate in a thoroughly automatic, nonconscious 
fashion” (Elliot & Fryer, 2008, p. 246). This claim is made without discussion of 
its implications. When and how often, for example, must such goals be 
consciously committed to, in order to become part of the cognitive system and 
from then on operate automatically? Is it every time that a new task is provided 
in an achievement setting or can goals that have previously been activated for 
similar tasks become automatically activated given similar environmental 
conditions? Can learners access these automatic, nonconsciously activated 
goals, and report on their activation and adoption within everyday achievement 
settings? Acknowledging research findings on automaticity is interesting here 
not only given the implications of Bargh and colleagues’ many findings for the 
continued use of self-report measures in achievement goal research, but 
considerably more so in terms of the centrality of especially Elliot in producing 
achievement goal self-report measures, coupled with the sustained absence of 
automaticity from the definition and measurement of achievement goals.  
More recently, researchers within achievement goal theory have begun to 
acknowledge findings on the unconscious. Pintrich and Elliot have both 
suggested that exploring the unconscious is a worthwhile avenue of scholarship 
for achievement goal researchers. For example, in 2003, Pintrich outlined what 
a motivational science perspective to studying student motivation might look 
like, and highlighted as one of seven substantive questions facing motivational 
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science researchers, do students know what they want or what motivates them?  In 
this article, Pintrich cites work not only on implicit motives and unconscious 
needs, but also the work of Bargh and colleagues on behavior directed by 
nonconscious goal pursuit, remarking that this latter type of behavior 
“resonates with anyone who has observed students in many classroom 
situations where they seem to proceed in rather habitual and unreflective ways” 
(Pintrich, 2003, p. 678).  Pintrich recommends that achievement goal 
researchers take care to explore the interactions between implicit and 
conscious processes, rather than pitting them against each other (p. 678). In a 
2012 review of achievement goal theory, Murayama, Elliot, and Friedman 
interestingly claim, “few present-day achievement goal researchers would 
argue that all goals are consciously accessible” (p. 201) but do cede that this is 
not entirely apparent when considering how achievement goals are 
operationalized. These authors also cite the work of Bargh and colleagues and 
that of Custers and Aarts (2005) on nonconscious goal pursuit, emphasizing 
that there is a “strong need” (Murayama, et al., 2012, p. 202) for research in 
“disentangling conscious and nonconscious elements of achievement goal 
striving, thereby bringing a richer understanding to the field as a whole” (ibid.). 
The recommendations proffered by Pintrich (2003) and Murayama, Elliot, and 
Friedman (2012) are thus encouraging not only in their acknowledgement of the 
strength of findings on the role of the unconscious, but of their willingness to 
see it explored in terms of achievement goal pursuit. Such a program of 
research requires a dedicated methodology, with a mix of current methods and 
the development of more implicit ones that might be able to tap into 
nonconscious achievement goals. Suggestions for just such a methodology are 
proposed in the next section.  
3.4 Implicit Methods 
Achievement goal researchers who acknowledge the power of the unconscious 
have recommended the study of the interplay between conscious and 
unconscious goals. The methods for studying conscious achievement goals 
have been considered in depth in Chapter 2, so this section focuses mainly on 
several methods that could either access unconscious constructs or aid in 
comparing them with conscious constructs. As such, the following subsections 
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  109 
discuss the Thematic Apperception Test, the Implicit Relational Assessment 
Procedure, Trace Measures, Priming, and the Implicit Association Test, and the 
appropriateness of such methods in exploring nonconscious achievement goals.  
3.4.1 The Thematic Apperception Test 
As mentioned in the beginning of Chapter 2, one of the earliest implicit 
methods was the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT, Morgan & Murray, 1935), 
famously used by McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell (1953) in their work 
on the achievement motive, and recently reconceptualised in the form of 
Picture-Story Exercises (PSEs, Thrash, Maruskin, & Martin, 2012). This 
projective test involves presenting participants with ambiguous picture cards 
and asking them to tell stories about the pictures. Participants’ descriptive 
stories about the pictures are thought to reveal details of their current conscious 
or unconscious states, and the use of projection is argued to decrease the 
likelihood that respondents will use self-presentation strategies. Consequently, 
these measures were deemed appropriate for capturing implicit motives 
(McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989), which were theorized to be 
inaccessible to self-report (e.g., Feather, 1961; McClelland & Liberman, 1949; 
Veroff, Wilcox & Atkinson, 1953).  
Developing a TAT-like test for achievement goals could involve the design of 
images of achievement-related situations. These could be entirely ambiguous, 
thereby allowing for even non-goal-responses, or designed so that specific 
elements visually embody the theorized distinctions between achievement 
goals (performance and mastery) and valences (approach and avoidance). An 
example scene of the latter type could depict a classroom, in which several 
events are occurring simultaneously. In the centre of the image, there might be 
a student scratching her head, who could be interpreted as looking worried or 
concentrated. Nearby might be a pair of students, one working diligently and 
the other looking at their peer’s work. Such an image might evoke stories about 
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task-, self-, and other-based referents, activated by the presentation of an 
achievement setting.25 
This method could provide interesting findings regarding the experiences 
activated in the participant by the presentation of an achievement setting. It 
would provide space for the participant to indicate those aspects most salient to 
them; in this way, their achievement experience would be explored holistically, 
and goals might actually feature less prominently for some than others. Hence, 
there is the benefit of holistic exploration balanced with the potential that 
participants might not even mention achievement goals, which could be 
considered antithetical to the entire programme of ascertaining an individual’s 
goal approach via this method.   
There are also certain lessons to be gleaned from the use of the TAT that impact 
on whether it represents an appropriate exploratory candidate for capturing 
nonconscious achievement goals. In use, findings from the TAT have seldom 
correlated with self-report measures aimed to assess explicit achievement 
motives. This divergence alone is not problematic, but its interpretation has 
been. McClelland and colleagues’ (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989) 
reaction was to argue that explicit, self-attributed motives were statistically 
independent from implicit motives. This was theorized to be a result of the 
different nomological networks of each type of motive, wherein implicit 
motives “appear to develop in early childhood through preverbal, affect-based 
associative learning, respond to task-based or experiential incentives, predict 
spontaneous behavior trends, and are introspectively inaccessible” (Thrash, 
Maruskin, & Martin, 2012, p. 143) in contrast to explicit motives that are 
“thought to develop later in childhood through verbally mediated learning, are 
responsive to social-extrinsic or verbal-symbolic incentives, predict deliberate 
choices, and are accessible in the form of consciously articulated values” (ibid.). 
Others interpreted the lack of correlation as implying that one of the methods 
                                                             
25 This method could also be tried with eye-tracking: where the participant fixates could provide 
clues as to the salience of these elements of the image to the participant’s experience of an 
achievement setting. However, of course, salience does not equate to the goal that the 
participant might pursue in an achievement situation; for example, salience could also imply a 
concern, and thus using eye-tracking would require careful operationalization.  
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was invalid, and this has been particularly harmful. However, Thrash and 
colleagues (2012) have recently highlighted that studies often showed small 
correlations rather than a lack of correlation altogether. Consequently, Thrash 
and colleagues (2012, p. 149) have argued convincingly that these correlations 
could be strengthened if content correspondence between implicit and explicit 
measures was improved and corrections were made for measurement error.  
In meeting the recommendations of goal theorists that unconscious 
achievement goals be explored in how they interact with conscious 
achievement goals, the comparison of findings from unconscious and conscious 
methods is vital. Content correspondence represents a key concern in the 
development of an implicit method to begin exploring students’ nonconscious 
achievement goals. While TAT-like materials might be adaptable to this 
endeavor, their conscious comparator is most likely to be an achievement goal 
questionnaire, to which other implicit methods might more closely correspond 
in content.  
3.4.2 Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
Among the more recent implicit tools that have emerged is the Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, 
Power, Hayden, Milne, & Stewart, 2006). This procedure has its origin in 
Relational Frame Theory (RFT, Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), which 
posits, “the core units of human language and cognition are not associations per 
se, but derived stimulus relations” (Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Stewart, 2010, p. 288). The associated methodology is the Relational 
Evaluation Procedure (REP), in which participants are presented with two 
stimulus items and asked to comment in their own time on the relation between 
them, for example by selecting the word opposite or same (e.g., one would select 
same if the two items were related). The IRAP draws on the content of the REP 
but also the reaction time and block structure of another implicit measure, the 
Implicit Association Test (to be discussed in Section 3.4.5, IAT, Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  
Prior to starting an IRAP, participants are explicitly asked about their relations 
regarding the test subject. Then, during the IRAP, which is administered via a 
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computer programme, participants are presented with statements, words, or 
images and relations. Half of the blocks require the participant to respond in 
line with the relations they expressed prior to the test, and the other half require 
them to respond inconsistently with their pre-experimentally reported 
relations. Participants must respond as quickly as possible, and accurately. As 
such, if a participant responds that the relation between two concepts is similar 
when it is not, a cross will appear in the centre of the screen until the participant 
correctly categorizes the relation between the two concepts as opposite. The 
logic of the IRAP is that the selection of the relation descriptor will be quicker 
the more consistent the participant’s relation between the target and attribute 
stimuli.  
For example, in Barnes-Holmes and colleagues’ (Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2008) study, participants were presented with a 
target stimulus word such as love or murder in the top centre of the screen and 
an attribute stimulus word such as pleasant or unpleasant directly below it. 
Participants were then asked to respond to the relation as being similar or 
opposite, which they could do by pressing the ‘d’ key for similar or the ‘k’ key for 
opposite. Presented with the target word love and the attribute word pleasant, a 
participant would most likely describe the relation as similar, so they would 
press the ‘d’ key and a reaction time would be captured. In this case, 
participants with strong relations between the two concepts should respond 
quicker that love and pleasant are similar. Likewise, participants will take longer 
to ascribe relations inconsistent with their implicit attitudes and beliefs, such as 
love and pleasant with opposite. The relative difference between the response 
times with which participants respond to consistent and inconsistent relations 
gives an indication of the strength of the relation, called the IRAP effect. 
Two important features of the IRAP are that it does not depend on introspective 
access and that participants have to react as quickly as possible so that they do 
not have time to deliberate. Barnes-Holmes and colleagues argue that this 
results in the ability of the IRAP to capture “spontaneous and automatic 
evaluations, whereas explicit measures capture more carefully considered 
reactions” (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010, p. 536). 
Both of these aspects suggest that an IRAP might represent a potential implicit 
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method for capturing achievement goals. A further argument for using the 
IRAP is that it improves on implicit methods that only take associations, rather 
than relations among concepts, into account. Barnes-Holmes and colleagues 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010) have argued that this makes the IRAP more 
revealing. However, research on the IRAP is still in its early stages, with 
researchers still employing known-groups comparisons to determine the 
validity of the IRAP (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). More work will need to be 
done to ascertain how the IRAP could be adapted for accessing achievement 
goals, including decisions on the extent to which a relational rather than an 
associational approach is better suited to early explorations of the potential for 
nonconscious achievement goals.  
3.4.3 Trace measures  
Trace measures represent a very recent implicit method, designed by Winne 
and colleagues in response to questions over the assumption that individuals 
can validly comment on their goals (Winne & Perry, 2000; Winne, Jamieson-
Noel, & Muis, 2002; Zhou & Winne, 2012). Traces can be understood as 
behavioral indicators of students’ achievement goal orientations, and are 
collected by specially designed software while the student engages in learning 
using multimedia content. For example, in a recent study, Zhou and Winne 
(2012) used software called gStudy (Winne et al., 2006), 26 which provides 
students with cognitive tools that they can employ to navigate and enhance 
their study experience. These tools include “making notes, tagging selected 
content, clicking hyperlinks to expose new information, constructing new 
glossary entries, creating and manipulating concept maps to assemble 
information, chatting, searching for information and so forth” (Zhou & Winne, 
2012, p. 414). Using this software, goal orientations were operationalized as tags 
and hyperlinks. For example, students could select content and tag it as 
“Important to know for the test” (Zhou & Winne, 2012, p. 414) or click the 
hyperlink “Find out more information about this” (ibid.). Each time a student 
used these tools, information on how the student was interacting with the tools 
                                                             
26 Winne and colleagues are now using software called nStudy (Winne & Hadwin, 2013; Winne, 
Hadwin, & Beaudoin, 2010).  
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was generated. This trace information reflected the achievement goal that the 
student was endorsing according to the Elliot and McGregor (2001) 2 x 2 
achievement goal model. As such, the aforementioned tag would reflect a 
performance approach goal, while the aforementioned hyperlink would 
represent a mastery approach goal. Figure 6 below is a screenshot depicting how 
the learning activity is represented in the software, and the tools with which 
students might engage with the activity.  
 
Figure 6. An example of what students see when they use gStudy 
Note. Adapted from Zhou and Winne (2012, p. 415). 
Interestingly, when Zhou and Winne (2012) compared the goal traces with 
students’ responses to a self-report goal questionnaire, the Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire (Elliot & McGregor, 2001), they failed to find a relationship 
between the two. However, when they compared both types of methods with 
students’ performance, they found that goal traces correlated with 
performance, whereas self-reported goal orientations did not.  
Studying goal traces represents an implicit method due to the unobtrusive 
means by which the traces are captured. Students are not asked outright about 
their goals, which might otherwise give rise to self-presentation strategies. 
Since asking students about their goals usually takes place either before or after 
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an achievement task, Zhou and Winne (2012, p. 417) also argue that assessing 
goal traces allows for a more in the moment, dynamic assessment that focuses 
not purely on intentions but on realized intentions. In other words, assessments 
of goal traces “can supplement static orientations that are operationally defined 
to be indifferent to the dynamics of learning activities” (Zhou & Winne, 2012, p. 
413). Another strength of the approach, in terms of the discussion of the implicit 
and explicit in this thesis, is the promising potential for content correspondence 
across the goal traces and the self-report questionnaires: the content of the tag 
and hyperlink text was adapted from these very questionnaires, and thus should 
allow for better comparison across the implicit and explicit methods.  
A potential weakness associated with the trace method is that students might 
act differently using the learning software than they would normally. Some may 
generally stop and think in a metacognitive way less than others, but the 
functionalities of the software might influence them to interact more with the 
information. Students may also differ in their interpretations of the tag and 
hyperlink text in the same way that individuals understand achievement goal 
questionnaire items differently from researchers. Indeed, “One learner’s 
interpretation of a tag titled as “Restudy to get the highest marks” may interpret 
“highest” in a normative sense while another interprets [it] in a mastery sense” 
(Zhou & Winne, 2012 p. 414). However, the primary weakness of using traces is 
that the method can only be employed using computer-based learning 
activities. Although it could be argued that much learning now does take place 
in these contexts, it is hard to see how researchers might explore goal traces 
using more typical learning tasks and in more typical learning contexts.  
Given that Zhou and Winne (2012) have already experimented with using trace 
collection software for accessing achievement goals, a pertinent question at 
present is if their method would be appropriate for capturing nonconscious 
achievement goals as they have been conceptualized in this thesis. Zhou and 
Winne (2012) do not suggest that they are capturing the goal itself. Instead they 
are attempting to ascertain indicators of achievement goals: how the individual 
orients their behavior in pursuit of a particular goal. In line with the notion that 
the learning situation activates an achievement goal, which in turn is 
represented by part of a network of nodes with activation spreading to behavior 
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and strategies, the activated goal can set off behavior directed toward its 
fulfilment. Hence, while the goal itself remains implicit, the behavior, through 
its enactment, may become explicit to the individual. In the case of goal traces, 
the individual is not asked to account for their behavior, but only to behave and 
then tag and click hyperlinks in line with that behavior. This makes this method 
compliant with the current theorization of nonconscious achievement goals, 
and an exciting avenue for further exploration.  
3.4.4 Priming 
Another implicit method that may be useful in the exploration of nonconscious 
achievement goals is priming. Priming can be defined as the “temporary 
internal activation of response tendencies” (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000, p. 255). 
This can be done subliminally, so quickly that the participant is unaware of the 
prime, or supraliminally, where the prime is explicit but somewhat hidden in 
plain sight. Researchers often use the unrelated task paradigm when priming. 
As such, a participant is exposed either subliminally or supraliminally to the 
concept the researchers wish to prime on a first task, before their behavior is 
monitored on a second, seemingly unrelated task to determine if the primed 
concept has had an influence.  
For example, Bargh and colleagues use the Scrambled Sentence Test, originally 
employed by Srull and Wyer (1979), as a supraliminal priming technique. This 
task is comprised of twenty-five sentences containing five words each, from 
which participants must construct a correct sentence using four words. Given 
the five words tomatoes, ate, happy, the, she, the participant could construct the 
four-word sentence “she ate the tomatoes,” leaving out the word happy. In an 
experiment, the experimental group receives the Scrambled Sentence Test task 
with synonyms of the construct to be primed appearing in fifteen of the 
sentences, while the other ten sentences are populated with neutral words. 
Those in the other experimental condition will receive the same task but with 
fifteen of the sentences containing words intended to prime a different 
construct. For example, in Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996), the first 
experimental condition was primed with synonyms of ‘politeness’, while the 
second experimental group was primed with words representing ‘rudeness’. 
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Finally, those in the control condition are presented with twenty-five entirely 
neutral sentences. Following this priming procedure, the participants are 
administered an apparently unrelated task, in which differences in behavior 
between the different conditions may play out. Bargh and Chartrand  (2000) 
recommend the use of a funnelled debriefing task once the experiment has 
come to an end. Here, the researchers ask the participants a series of questions 
to assess whether the participants might have been aware of any patterns in the 
Scrambled Sentence Test, or of any influence the task may have had on their 
cognitions, behavior and affect on the later, ostensibly unrelated task. This 
works to rule out any explanations alternative to the prime in the participants’ 
behavior on the second task.  
In terms of representing a possible method for exploring nonconscious 
achievement goals, Bargh and Chartrand (2000, p. 254) observe, “priming and 
automaticity research techniques share a concern with the ways that internal 
mental states mediate, in a passive and hidden manner, the effects of the social 
environment on psychological processes and responses.” However, priming 
differs from the other implicit methods discussed till now in that it would not be 
used to access achievement goals, but to empirically discern whether the finding 
that more general behavioral and cognitive goals can be nonconsciously 
activated and pursued is also applicable to achievement goals. Furthermore, 
priming represents a potentially effective method for exploring the similarities 
and differences in the operation of conscious and nonconscious goals. 
Arguably, much of the correlational evidence base concerning achievement 
goals and achievement-related cognitions and behaviors consists of findings 
about conscious achievement goals, given that conscious, self-report methods 
such as questionnaires have been used in their operationalization. Studies 
exploring nonconscious goals could use priming to attempt to temporarily 
activate these goals nonconsciously in order to assess whether they are 
correlated with the same cognitions, behaviors, and affect, albeit in the absence 
of awareness, control, effort, and an act of will.  
Indeed, studies have come close to priming achievement goals. The study 
conducted by Bargh and colleagues (Bargh et al., 2001), mentioned in Section 
3.2.4.1, involved the priming of the goal to achieve, using words such as 
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“succeed,” “strive,” and “attain,” and resulted in better performance, 
persistence in the face of obstacles, and resumption of interrupted goals for 
those who were primed versus those in a control group. Furthermore, Kawada, 
Oettingen, Gollwitzer, and Bargh (experiment 1, 2004) have attempted to 
prime performance and mastery goals in an exploration of implicit theories of 
intelligence (Dweck, 1999) and implicit projection effects. The researchers used 
an achievement scenario as a prime, and predicted that presenting preselected 
incremental theorists with an achievement scenario would activate a mastery 
goal and cause them to project this goal onto a fictitious character within the 
achievement scenario. In a second study, the researchers tried to clarify if an 
achievement goal had indeed been activated, and thus moved to a supraliminal 
priming procedure. However, here they primed the goal to compete, rather than 
achievement goals per se. In sum, studies have come close to priming 
achievement goals, and as such, priming presents a promising direction for 
exploring the nonconscious activation of achievement goals. 
In using this priming technique to explore achievement goals, a first step might 
be in attempting to prime performance and mastery approach goals, with later 
studies incorporating the 2 x 2, or even the 3 x 2 model. Adapting the Scrambled 
Sentence Test would then involve selecting appropriate performance and 
mastery synonyms, selecting an achievement task, and then comparing the task 
behavior of participants in each of the two experimental conditions and a 
control group. This experimental design would allow for an assessment of 
whether and how achievement goals can be primed, and if so, the comparison 
of the extent to which they might influence on the participant’s behavior and 
appearance in the participant’s consciousness. If achievement goals can be 
successfully primed and result in responses that differentiate across the 
different theorized goal constructs, all the while without the individual’s ability 
to comment on their activation or pursuit, then there is some support for 
nonconscious goal operation and the limitations of currently predominant self-
report methods.  
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3.4.5 The Implicit Association Test 
One of the most widely employed implicit methods is the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). IATs were developed in the 
early 1990’s to meet the perceived need for indirect measures that could access 
those cognitions that self-report measures could not, either due to demand 
characteristics or lack of introspective access (Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, 
Farnham, Nosek, & Mellott, 2002, p. 4). Essentially,	  IATs are computer-
categorization tasks that measure the strength of associations between target 
and attribute concepts by comparing reaction times. IATs are typically used to 
assess attitudes or evaluations such as biases towards (and against) racial 
groups (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), gender and mathematics 
(Cvencek, Meltzoff, & Greenwald, 2011), political party membership and voting 
practices (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012), and self-esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 
2000).  
In a typical IAT, participants are required to categorize stimulus words 
according to two target groups and two attributes over a series of trial blocks. In 
the first block, participants might be presented with a computer screen 
containing the words “Good” and “Bad” at the top left and right of the screen, 
respectively. Stimulus words are presented in the middle of the screen and 
participants have to indicate whether the word is good or bad by pressing the 
“E” or “I” key on the keyboard, respectively. Typical words to be categorized 
include “joy”, “love”, “peace” and “wonderful” as good words, and “awful”, 
“agony”, “terrible”, and “evil” as bad words.  
Once the participant has practiced this categorization, a second set of 
categories is presented, for example, with “African American” and “European 
American” at the top left and right of the screen, respectively. Images of the 
faces of members of these two groups appear in the centre of the screen, and 
participants must very quickly categorize faces as African American using the 
“E” key, or European American using the “I” key. After a similar number of 
practice trials, the third, critical block of the experiment begins. Participants 
allocate stimuli comprised of previously presented good and bad words and 
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faces to combined categories using the same key (i.e., “African American” and 
“Good” pressing the “E” key, “European American” and “Bad”, pressing “I”).  
In the fourth (practice) and fifth (critical) blocks of the experiment, participants 
carry out the same categorization, but with the categories switched around (i.e., 
“African American” and “Bad”, “European American” and “Good”) in order to 
address ordering effects. The presentation of combined category blocks is also 
counterbalanced across participants, such that block three and five are switched 
for half the sample.27 Once complete, the response times for blocks three and 
five are compared, and an IAT score of relative associative strength is 
calculated based on which pairing each participant was quicker at categorizing 
stimulus words to.  
As with the more recently designed IRAP (discussed above, Section 3.4.2), the 
logic behind the IAT is that quicker reaction times imply the two concepts are 
automatically associated and congruent in the participants’ minds. Likewise, 
the longer the reaction time, the less automatic the association, and the greater 
the level of incongruence. So if participants are consistently quicker to 
categorize negative stimulus words to “Bad” when it is paired with “African 
American” than when it is paired with “European American”, the results would 
suggest a preference for European Americans.  
Because the IAT requires very quick response latencies (between 300 – 10,000 
ms), it avoids intervening thoughts and the time to come up with “self-
presentation strategies” (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998, p. 1465), 
which were earlier discussed as some of the problems with interviews, and 
affect, albeit to a lesser extent, anonymous questionnaires. Furthermore, the 
use of IATs has already allowed for the comparison of implicit and explicit 
constructs in a variety of fields. In some cases, IATs have been shown to predict 
spontaneous behavior, while explicit methods predict deliberate actions.28 For 
                                                             
27 In the original IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), there were seven blocks, with 
blocks 3 and 5 described here split into two (i.e., block 3 = originally blocks 3 and 4, block 5 = 
originally blocks 6 and 7).  
28 This has sparked investigations of a ‘dual process’ model, and various patterns in which this 
may occur (Perugini, 2005).  
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example, in Brunstein and Schmitt’s (2004) study of adapting the IAT to access 
implicit achievement motives, they found that the IAT and explicit self-ratings 
were uncorrelated, and that the explicit self-ratings predicted self-reported task 
enjoyment, while the IAT scores successfully predicted participants’ test 
performance. Asendorpf, Banse and Mücke (2002) obtained similar results for 
their shyness IAT, which predicted spontaneous shy behavior such as facial and 
body movements, whereas participants’ explicit self-reports about their shyness 
predicted controlled behaviors such as their “speech and movements 
illustrating speech” (p. 383).  
Given that researchers are necessarily interested in students’ spontaneous 
achievement goals, the adaptation of an achievement goal IAT could help 
determine if implicit and explicit measures of achievement goals predict 
different aspects of achievement. Other researchers have found that implicit 
(IAT) and explicit (self-report) measures sometimes do relate. Indeed, in a 
study on gender identity and attitudes to mathematics, Nosek, Banaji, and 
Greenwald (2002) were interested in exploring whether explicit attitudes, 
implicit attitudes, or both were related to performance in math. Nosek and 
colleagues found that both explicit and implicit attitudes to math were 
significant predictors of math SAT performance. In each of these cases 
(dissociation or related), adapting an IAT for nonconscious achievement goals 
would allow for such a comparison to be made, thereby assisting in the 
exploration of the interplay between explicit and implicit goals.  
Of course, there would be some limitations with using an IAT for accessing 
achievement goals. As with the goal traces measure, an IAT has the limitation 
of being a computer-based task, with its limited ecological validity. Here, as in 
Brunstein and Schmitt’s (2004) adaptation of an IAT for implicit achievement 
motives, calculations of this method’s predictive power in terms of 
achievement behavior may justify its usage. However unlike the goal traces 
measure, an IAT could not represent a dynamic, in the moment exploration of 
achievement behavior. Instead, an achievement goal IAT would be more like an 
achievement goal questionnaire in that it is a one-time measure, and thereby 
would provide a more trait-like picture of the student’s achievement goals. 
However, as with achievement goal questionnaires, IATs could be run in 
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different achievement situations and repeatedly over a period of time to 
provide an idea of the stability or malleability of nonconscious achievement 
goals.  
Another possible limitation with using the IAT to access potentially 
nonconscious achievement goals is that IATs were originally designed to 
portray the strength of relative associations, from which researchers could 
extrapolate bias or preference.29 Achievement goals are not normally conceived 
of as biases or preferences. However, in the same way that goal traces are 
indicators of achievement goals rather than affording access to the achievement 
goals directly, the congruence between competence-related concepts and an 
attribute concept on an IAT for achievement goals could provide an indication 
of the individual’s achievement goal. As such, IATs might be one answer for 
researchers interested in assessing nonconscious achievement goals.  
Indeed, two groups of researchers have more recently begun to draw from IATs 
to design their own implicit methods for accessing achievement goals. Urdan 
and Cafasso (2011) designed a Like Me/Not Like Me measure, with the 
categories Like Me and Not Like Me at the top left and right of the screen, and 
participants had to press a key corresponding to left or right to judge whether 
stimulus words were like them or not. The researchers used eight stimulus 
words each for performance approach (e.g., “Best”, “Surpassing”) and 
avoidance (e.g., “Worse”, “Inferior”) and mastery approach (e.g., 
“Improvement”, “Comprehending”) goals. Two measures emerged: one 
captured whether participants indicated a word was indeed “Like Me” or “Not 
Like Me”, while the other captured the response time for these categorizations. 
However, an IAT works by assessing how closely two constructs are associated 
for an individual by the reaction time, rather than by asking the participant how 
like them a stimulus word is. For this reason, there is a danger that both the 
allocation of the stimulus word and the reaction time within the Urdan and 
Cafasso (2011) Like Me/Not Like Me method represent another version of self-
                                                             
29 In their adaptation of an Implicit Association Test for implicit motives, Brunstein and Schmitt 
(2004) tackled this issue by suggesting that the IAT would tap “motivational preferences that 
exist outside of a person’s awareness but are expressed in her or his behavior in the presence of 
appropriate incentives” (p. 538). 
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report method. This potentially explains why a relationship was observed 
between the reaction times and the performance approach and avoidance 
subscales of the trichotomous PALS questionnaire (both r = -.16, p < .05) when 
Urdan and Cafasso administered the Like Me/Not Like Me method to a sample 
of 162 undergraduates.  
Marzouq, Slade and Carr (2012) have also adapted an IAT-based achievement 
goal measure called the IAT-Type Measure (IAT-T). The IAT-T explores the 2 x 
2 achievement goal model, and employs the combined category method of the 
original IAT. As such, the category labels at the top of the screen are Self and 
Other, and Approach Success and Avoid Failure. The goal-relevant stimuli are 
phrases instead of individual words, and include “succeeding to do” (mastery 
approach) and “doing even better” (performance approach) as Approach Success 
phrases, and “avoid doing less well” (performance avoidance) and “avoid not 
completing” (mastery avoidance) as Avoid Failure phrases.  
In a study with 99 undergraduates who were also administered explicit self-
report questionnaires, Marzouq and colleagues (2012) found the IAT-T to be 
reliable, but did not find a relationship between the IAT-T and self-reports. 
Although this method is more in line with the process of an IAT than Urdan and 
Cafasso (2011), and more in line with the findings of no relationship between 
implicit and explicit methods such as in Brunstein and Schmitt (2004), a 
potential issue with the IAT-T is the departure from having just one word 
appearing in the centre of the screen. Replacing this one word with a phrase 
may result in different lengths of processing time, especially given that these 
phrases include double negatives and different numbers of words, which may 
represent the reason for the difference in reaction time, rather than the 
incongruence or lack of automaticity of the association.  
Given the aforementioned strengths of the IAT in exploring implicit 
phenomena and its amenability to adaptation for achievement goals, Chapter 4 
explores the design of original IAT methods for achievement goals that address 
the weaknesses of the aforementioned attempts. 
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Summary 
An exploration of nonconscious achievement goals in relation to conscious 
achievement goals will inevitably require a mix of implicit and explicit methods. 
Chapter 2 explored current explicit methods while this section has focused on a 
range of possible implicit methods. Each of these methods has been assessed 
for its strengths and weaknesses, as well as for its appropriateness in exploring 
the interplay between conscious and nonconscious achievement goals. Given 
the successful adaptation of an IAT for implicit achievement motives 
(Brunstein & Schmitt, 2004) and attempts to adapt the IAT for achievement 
goals (Marzouq, Slade, & Carr, 2012; Urdan & Cafasso, 2011), in addition to the 
use of priming in the activation of cognitive goals including the goal to achieve 
(Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001) and the projection 
of learning and performance goals (Kawada, Oettingen, Gollwitzer, & Bargh, 
2004), these two methods represent appropriate candidates for the preliminary 
empirical exploration of nonconscious goals in this thesis, as carried out in the 
following chapters.  
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4 Study 1 Exploration of a possible method for capturing 
nonconscious achievement goals: Development, 
design and administration of 2 achievement goal IATs 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have addressed research aims 1, 2, and 3a. They have 
explored definitional issues with achievement goals, how they are currently 
operationalized, and the assumptions underlying them. They have examined 
the findings of literature on implicit cognition and nonconscious goal pursuit 
and the implications of these literatures for how achievement goals might be 
theorized and captured. This chapter addresses aim 3b, which is to assess the 
extent to which the implications of findings on implicit cognition and nonconscious 
goal pursuit apply to how achievement goals are currently theorized through 
designing and running a series of studies to empirically test if achievement goals can 
operate and be captured without conscious awareness. More specifically, this 
chapter focuses on aim 3b(i): developing an implicit method to access achievement 
goals and comparing it with an explicit achievement goal method. In other words, 
can an implicit method for accessing achievement goals be designed? Are there 
differences between what an implicit versus an explicit method can tell us about 
a student’s goals, and if so, what are they?  
This chapter reports on the development of two achievement goal implicit 
association tests, and Study 1 in which these were administered, wherein the 
resulting IAT scores were compared with responses on the explicit, self-report 
Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R, Elliot & Murayama, 2008). 
The chapter begins by documenting the design and administration 
considerations for the two original achievement goal implicit association tests, 
the Self/Other Referent IAT and the Valence IAT. The chapter then moves on 
to the comparative study, in which 40 university students completed the self-
report AGQ-R and, after an interval of at least a week, also completed either the 
Self/Other Referent IAT or the Valence IAT. The main findings were that both 
adapted achievement goal IATs were internally consistent measures, and that 
students’ goal preferences according to the IATs did not correlate significantly 
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with their AGQ-R responses. These findings are then discussed, in particular 
the lack of correlation and its fit with the theorized and empirically supported 
disjunction between explicit self-reports about students’ achievement goals and 
goals that may be operating implicitly. Finally, the scene is set for the next 
study, which goes on to compare these implicit and explicit methods with 
participants’ behavior in an achievement situation.  
4.1 Design of the Achievement Goal IATs 
Chapter 3 drew on the work of Bargh (1990; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) to argue 
that if achievement goals are theorized as mentally represented, hypothetically, 
they can be activated and operate without conscious awareness in certain 
conditions. Empirical work exploring the potential for nonconscious 
achievement goals must equally be able to show nonconscious goals in 
operation and capture them. Capturing nonconscious achievement goals 
requires a devoted method; Chapter 3 suggested how one such method, the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), 
represents an appropriate candidate.  
An introduction to the IAT and the potential to use it to access achievement 
goals was provided in Chapter 3, but given the current task of designing an 
achievement goal IAT, the following section provides greater detail. As 
previously mentioned, the IAT was developed in the 1990’s in line with the 
belief “that [indirect measures] provided access to a cognitive domain that was 
not reached by self-report measures” (Greenwald et al., 2002, p. 4). An IAT is 
essentially a computerized categorization task that relies on response latencies 
and works on the logic that allocating test stimuli, whether words or images, to 
combined categories (i.e., African American and ‘Good’, European American 
and ‘Bad’) using the same response key is quicker when the categories are more 
closely associated in the participant’s mind.  
Although there are other formats for IATs, such as the Go/No Go test (Nosek & 
Banaji, 2001), the typical IAT structure consists of seven blocks. Taking as an 
example Cvencek, Meltzoff, and Greenwald’s (2011) IAT exploring elementary 
school children’s math-gender stereotypes, in the first block, just the bipolar 
target concept is presented at the top left (e.g., Boy) and right (e.g., Girl) of the 
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screen. Stimulus words comprised of boy and girl names will appear one at a 
time in the centre of the screen. The child will need to categorize each name to 
either Boy or Girl, using keys on the left or right of the keyboard (e.g., ‘E’ for 
left, Boy, ‘I’ for right, Girl). This needs to be done as quickly as possible, and 
reaction times (in milliseconds) are recorded by the chosen IAT software. If the 
child allocates the name to the wrong category, a cross will appear in the centre 
of the screen until the child categorizes it correctly, for example, ‘David’ into 
the ‘Boy’ category. In the second block, just the bipolar evaluative attributes are 
presented at the top left (e.g., math) and right (e.g., reading) of the screen, and 
stimulus words are again presented in the centre of the screen, in this case 
words associated with the subjects, such as ‘numbers’, ‘graph’, or ‘books’.  
In the third (practice) and fourth (test) blocks, the formats of the previous 
blocks are combined. ‘Boy’ would appear just above ‘math’ at the top left of the 
screen, and ‘Girl’ would appear just above ‘reading’ at the top right of the 
screen. As before, a stimulus word such as ‘graph’ would then appear in the 
centre of the screen and the child would need to allocate this word to either of 
the two sides of the screen using the keyboard. In the fifth block, just the 
evaluative attributes appear, and this time they have been switched around. 
The child then again categorizes stimulus words. If ‘math’ originally appeared 
on the top left of the screen, it now appears at the top right, and vice versa with 
‘reading’. In the sixth (practice) and seventh (test) blocks, the switched 
evaluative attributes appear just below the target concepts again, and the child 
must allocate stimulus words to the paired categories. The presentation order of 
blocks 3 and 4, and 6 and 7 are counterbalanced across participants. 
The IAT effect is then computed based on the latencies in combined category 
blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7. If the child is quicker (has faster reaction times) at 
allocating math-related words to the combined category of ‘Boy’ and ‘math’ 
(blocks 3 and 4) than to a combined category of ‘Girl’ and ‘math’ (blocks 6 and 
7), then the child is said to have an implicit or automatic Math-Boy preference. 
The actual IAT score is represented as D, a relative index of the strength of the 
association. This is calculated using an improved scoring algorithm tested by 
Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) to take into account problems associated 
with latency measures, such as “speed-accuracy tradeoffs (e.g., Wickelgren, 
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1977; Yellot, 1971), age-related slowing (e.g., Faust, Balota, Spieler, & Ferraro, 
1999; Ratcliff, Spieler, & McKoon, 2000), and spurious responses that appear as 
extreme values (or outliers; [Ulrich &] Miller, 1994; Ratcliff, 1993)” (Greenwald 
et al., 2003, p. 198).30 To arrive at the IAT score D, the below equation is used 
(see Equation 1). All sample means (𝑋) are corrected reaction times in 
milliseconds, crit1 stands for blocks 6 and 7, crit2 stands for blocks 3 and 4, and 
standard deviation (S) is pooled across critical practice and test blocks (3, 4, 6, 
7). 
Equation 1. Calculation of relative index of strength of the association (in 
line with Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 2003) 𝐷 = 𝑋  𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡1  –𝑋  𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡2𝑆  𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡1+ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡2  
If the mean corrected response time in blocks 6 and 7 is less than blocks 3 and 4, 
the overall score will be negative, indicating the participant’s implicit 
preference for the combined category configuration in blocks 6 and 7. The 
further the IAT score is from 0, either positively or negatively, the stronger the 
preference. In other words, IAT scores closer to 0 indicate “implicit 
indifference – no difference in the association strengths between response 
blocks” (Nosek, 2005, p. 570).  
This introduction elucidates several areas where decisions had to be made in 
order to adapt the IAT for capturing achievement goals: which software to use, 
what the target and attribute categories might be, what words could be used as 
the test stimuli, and the number of trials per block. These design decisions and 
their implications for what the resulting IAT scores might mean are discussed 
below. 
                                                             
30 Their improved algorithm completes the following steps in order: uses data from all the 
combination blocks (trial blocks 3 and 6, and test blocks 4 and 7), eliminates trials with latencies 
greater than 10,000ms, eliminates subjects for whom more than 10% of trials have a latency of 
less than 300ms, takes into account the mean correct latencies for each block, computes a 
pooled standard deviation for all practice trials (3 and 6) and test trials (4 and 7), replaces error 
latencies with the block mean + 600ms, averages the resulting values for each of the four 
blocks, computes two differences (B6 – B3, B7 – B4), divides each difference by its associated 
pooled-trials SD, and averages the two resulting quotients (Greenwald et al., 2003, p. 214).  
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4.1.1 Software 
The generic IAT can be configured using software made commercially available 
by Inquisit, while analysis is usually conducted on SPSS. However, Meade 
(2009) has designed a free, open-source version of the IAT called FreeIAT, 
compatible with the Microsoft Windows operating system. This includes a set 
up programme, with which researchers can customize their own IATs using text 
or images, as well as the actual IAT administration programme. Furthermore, 
the FreeIAT reports output to two text files, one of which contains all the raw 
data from IAT trials, and the second which contains data such as each 
participant’s average raw and corrected response times, pooled standard 
deviations, and the overall IAT score using Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji’s 
(2003) improved algorithm. Given that the FreeIAT was indeed free and 
allowed for IAT configuration, administration, and even score calculation, it 
was chosen as the software for adapting the achievement goal IATs.  
The main difference between the procedure of the generic IAT and the FreeIAT 
programme was regarding the combined category blocks. On the generic IAT, 
blocks 3 and 6 are practice trials for critical blocks 4 and 7. On the FreeIAT, 
there are only five blocks, signifying that blocks 3 and 4 have been collapsed 
into a single block. Hence, in the FreeIAT, block 1 introduces the participant to 
the target category, block 2 introduces the participant to the attribute category, 
block 3 comprises the combined categories stage, block 4 switches the sides of 
the attribute categories, and block 5 comprises the switched combined 
categories stage. This difference was not considered problematic in terms of its 
potential impact on the eventual IAT score given that Greenwald and 
colleagues’ (2003) improved scoring algorithm for D takes blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7 
into account. Furthermore, the amount of trials in blocks 3 and 5 can be 
configured as needed. Also, pertinent to computing the IAT score, the pooled 
standard deviation of blocks 3 and 4, and 6 and 7 is retained in the FreeIAT by 
pooling standard deviations from blocks 3 and 5.  
4.1.2 Target, Attribute and Stimuli 
FreeIAT software allows researchers to configure categories as they require. 
Typical IATs have at their core a bipolar target concept forming one category, 
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and a bipolar evaluative attribute concept forming another category, with 
stimuli that fit into each of these categories. As in the example above, of 
Cvencek, Meltzoff, and Greenwald’s (2011) math-gender stereotype study of 
elementary school students, ‘Boy’ and ‘Girl’ represented the target concept of 
gender and ‘math’ and ‘reading’ represented the evaluative attribute of subject 
type. The stimuli words for the gender categories were boy and girl names, 
whereas the stimuli words for the subject categories were topics (e.g., addition) 
or aspects (e.g., books) belonging to that subject. Choosing target and attribute 
categories for the achievement goal IAT involved an attempt to balance the 
contents of explicit achievement goal methods, reflecting the current theory 
and operationalization of achievement goal constructs, with the IAT procedure. 
The target category would of course involve some manifestation of the goal 
construct, while the attribute category was less definite.  
Given the bipolar nature of the target category, and that achievement goal 
frameworks have been dichotomous, trichotomous, 2 x 2, and even 3 x 2, the 
approach selected was to begin with a dichotomous performance and mastery 
goal model, rather than the 2 x 2 model selected by Marzouq, Slade and Carr 
(2012) on their IAT-T. By incorporating the approach and avoidance distinction 
into their IAT-T, Marzouq and colleagues introduced phrases of varying 
numbers of words (e.g., “Accomplishing much,” “Avoid not completing,” 
“Avoid doing less well”) instead of one-word goal stimulus words, thereby 
departing from the procedure of a typical IAT and possibly providing an 
alternative explanation for different reaction times. Hence, it was decided that 
once some initial research had been conducted with dichotomous categories, a 
further study could run multiple IATs with each individual, as in the study by 
Cvencek and colleagues (2011), where one IAT measured gender identity (i.e., 
me with male), one IAT measured the math-gender stereotype (i.e., male with 
math), and one IAT measured math self-concept (i.e., me with math) to give an 
overall picture of math-gender stereotypes. This could be translated for 
achievement goals so that it could take into account the complexity and further 
dimensions of the later achievement goal frameworks. 
In terms of the category labels, one idea was to use the definitions of 
performance and mastery goals, such that performance would be represented 
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by ‘demonstrate competence’ and mastery would be represented by ‘develop 
competence’. Using two-word category titles was not considered problematic 
given the usage of the not me category in IATs assessing self in relation to 
another concept (e.g., Cvencek et al., 2011; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). 
However it was decided that these two categories might not be visually 
disparate enough, especially given the fast responses required of participants. 
Another idea was to use the different goals types, ‘Performance Goals’ and 
‘Mastery Goals’, as category labels. The main focus of the words on 
performance and mastery was considered distinctive enough visually and 
conceptually, in addition to representing two different goal approaches to a 
task.  
In terms of participants’ familiarity with these two category titles, a specific 
feature of the FreeIAT was taken into account. The IAT administration 
programme of the FreeIAT begins with an instruction page that presents all the 
words that will appear during the blocks: four categories and all the stimuli 
words that might be assigned to each. As such, participants would be provided 
with a chance to view and comprehend the distinction between the two 
concepts prior to beginning the IAT. Three other factors were taken into 
account. Firstly, given the structure of the IAT blocks, participants would be 
engaging in a full practice block of allocating stimulus words into either 
category, which would elucidate the distinction. Secondly, the researcher was in 
control of the amount of trials for this block, and could ensure that there were 
more trials to ensure the participants’ correct categorization. And thirdly, 
research has shown that “category labels are clearly of great importance for the 
IAT, but the stimulus exemplars can nevertheless influence the construal of 
those categories. Stimulus exemplars can aid in the definition of the 
superordinate category” (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007, p. 282). Hence, 
participants would be exposed to the category labels as part of the overall IAT, 
rather than just as standalone labels. 
Given the exploratory nature of designing an IAT to capture achievement goals, 
two different approaches were tested out in terms of the evaluative attribute 
category. This resulted in two different IATs but an underlying agreement in 
their aims. The first approach was to use the format of self-esteem IATs, such 
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that participants would categorize stimulus words to a combined category of 
‘Performance Goals’ or ‘Mastery Goals’ with ‘Self’ or ‘Other’, resulting in a 
Self/Other Referent IAT. This would be more in line with the IAT-T designed by 
Marzouq and colleagues (2012), and even the self-comparison of the Like Me 
method designed by Urdan and Cafasso (2011). The logic behind this attribute 
category was that participants with performance goals would be quicker to 
allocate performance and self stimulus words to ‘Performance Goals’ when it 
was paired with ‘Self’ than when it was paired with ‘Other’. Those with mastery 
goals would be quicker at allocating mastery and self stimulus words to ‘Mastery 
Goals’ when paired with ‘Self’ than ‘Other’. The shorter reaction times would 
indicate an implicit, automatic association between their concept of self and the 
goal-related concepts represented by the stimulus words, with the extrapolation 
that those goal-related concepts most closely associated with the concept of self 
would be those implicitly preferred by that individual.  
The second approach was to use ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ as the attribute labels, 
constructing a positive-negative or valence-based IAT, the Valence IAT. The 
logic here was that participants with performance goals would be quicker to 
allocate performance and good stimulus words to ‘Performance Goals’ when this 
category was paired with ‘Good’ than ‘Bad’, and mastery goal participants 
would be quicker to allocate mastery and good stimulus words to ‘Mastery 
Goals’ when this category was paired with ‘Good’ than ‘Bad’. Here, the shorter 
reaction times would indicate an implicit, automatic association between the 
presented goal-related stimuli and their positive or negative valence, with the 
implication that the goal more closely associated with a positive valence would 
be implicitly preferred by that individual. 
Stimulus words were then required to fit into each of the six categories: 
Performance Goals, Mastery Goals, Self, Other, Good, and Bad. Given the 
potential problems inherent in using phrases rather than words (Marzouq et al., 
2012), it was decided that the IATs would have single word stimuli. Previous 
IATs provided examples of these single words for the latter four categories, so 
the exemplars were largely extracted from these. For example, Greenwald and 
Farnham’s (2000) self-esteem IAT provided stimulus words, all in the form of 
pronouns, for self (I, me, my, mine) and other (they, them, their, it). Greenwald, 
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McGhee, and Schwartz’s (1998) original IATs provided some stimulus words for 
good (love, pleasure, peace, happy) and bad (agony, hatred, awful, evil, grief), 
selected from norms reported by Bellezza, Greenwald, and Banaji (1986). 
Selection of the Performance Goals stimulus words was based in part on words 
used in the Scrambled Sentence Test used in the Kawada, Oettingen, 
Gollwitzer, & Bargh (2004, experiment 2) priming study to activate the 
competition goal construct. These were verbs including better, compete, and 
overtake, all representing the normative evaluative referent standard for 
performance goals. Similar Mastery Goals stimulus words were then chosen that 
focused on the self- and task-based development of competence, such as 
understand, persist and learn.  
Across the categories, there were thus four words each for the Self and Other 
categories, six words each for the Good and Bad categories, and six words each 
for the Performance Goals and Mastery Goals categories. The difference in 
number of stimulus words by IAT-type (four words for self/other, six words for 
valence) was not considered problematic given the guidance of Nosek, 
Greenwald and Banaji (2007) that “the magnitude and reliability of IAT effects 
[are] relatively unaffected by the number of stimulus items per category” (p. 
270). Table 3 and Table 4 below illustrate the categories and stimuli words for 
both types of IAT.  
Table 3. Category labels and stimuli for the Self/Other Referent IAT 
Self Other Performance Goals Mastery Goals 
I They Win Learn 
Me Them Better Understand 
My Their Best Comprehend 
Mine Theirs Compete Improve 
  Outperform Progress 
  Overtake Persist 
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Table 4. Category labels and stimuli for the Valence IAT 
Good Bad Performance Goals Mastery Goals 
Joy Agony Win Learn 
Love Hatred Better Understand 
Pleasure Pain Best Comprehend 
Wonderful Awful Compete Improve 
Peace Evil Outperform Progress 
Happy Grief Overtake Persist 
 
Each of these words was then typed into the configuration programme, so that 
the IAT administration programme could be run. The FreeIAT programme 
determined the frequency with which each stimulus word would appear 
randomly such that no single stimulus would be repeated consecutively. In the 
actual IAT programme, all categories and stimulus words began with a capital 
letter. Furthermore, attribute categories and their stimulus words appeared in 
white, while target categories and stimulus words appeared in green. The 
configuration programme did not provide an option to change the color of the 
screen (black) or the words (white/green), but these were not considered 
problematic. However, the size of the categories and stimulus words was small, 
so Microsoft Visual Basics (2013) software was used in editing the source code 
to increase it. An example image of the achievement goal Valence IAT screen 
during the combined category block is shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7. Categories and stimulus words in green and white against the 
black background 
4.1.3 Number of trials and block order  
In deciding on the number of trials per block, the suggestions of the original IAT 
developers were consulted. Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji’s (2003) summary of 
a typical IAT procedure involves 20 trials each in blocks 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, and 40 
trials each in Blocks 4 and 7. As already mentioned, the FreeIAT collapses 
blocks 3 (practice) and 4 (test), and 6 (practice) and 7 (test) of the generic IAT 
into blocks 3 and 5. Taking this into account, the recommendation would thus 
be 20 trials in block 1, 20 trials in block 2, 60 trials in combined categories block 
3, 20 trials in block 4, and 60 trials in combined categories block 5.  
The Self and Other and Good and Bad word stimulus learning trials (block 1) 
were deemed simple enough for the participants to categorize, and were 
assigned 36 trials in each IAT. As the FreeIAT software ensured that no stimulus 
word would appear twice consecutively, 36 trials allowed for the possibility that 
each of the six Good and six Bad words could appear three times, and the 
decision was made to use the same amount of trials for the Self/Other Referent 
IAT so that the IATs would be equal in duration. Acknowledging the argument 
that participants might be less familiar with the distinction between the 
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Performance Goals and the Mastery Goals, 48 trials were presented in block 2 
for each type of IAT to allow participants more practice. Given the combination 
of the practice and test blocks in the FreeIAT, the combined categories blocks 3 
and 5 were given a larger amount of trials, at 108. The reverse word learning 
block 4 was allocated 36 trials to mirror block 1. Nosek, Greenwald and Banaji 
(2007) have more recently recommended (in terms of the generic IAT) 
“changing B5 to 40 response trials as a standard corrective for a persistent 
extraneous influence of task order” (p. 271), in line with the finding of Nosek 
and colleagues (Nosek et al., 2005) that “using 40 response trials in B5 instead 
of 20 significantly reduced the influence” (Nosek et al., 2007, p. 272). Having 36 
trials in block 4 is thus better than 20, and closer to the recommended 40. Table 
5, Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8 below provide a summary of the amount of trials 
per block, for both types of achievement goal IAT. Also, it is to be noted that the 
presentation of blocks 3 and 5 would be counterbalanced across participants; 
hence the terms Condition A and Condition B are assigned.    
Table 5. Schematic overview: Self/Other Referent IAT Condition A  
(Performance Goals paired with Self first) 
Block Left key assignment (E) Right key assignment (I) No. of Trials 
1 Self Other 36 
2 Performance Goals Mastery Goals 48 
3 Self  
Performance Goals 
Other 
Mastery Goals 
108 
4 Other Self 36 
5 Other 
Performance Goals 
Self 
Mastery Goals 
108 
 
Table 6. Schematic overview: Self/Other Referent IAT Condition B 
(Mastery Goals paired with Self first) 
Block Left key assignment (E) Right key assignment (I) No. of Trials 
1 Self Other 36 
2 Mastery Goals Performance Goals 48 
3 Self 
Mastery Goals 
Other 
Performance Goals 
108 
4 Other Self 36 
5 Other 
Mastery Goals 
Self 
Performance Goals 
108 
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Table 7. Schematic overview: Valence IAT Condition A  
(Performance Goals paired with Good first) 
Block Left key assignment (E) Right key assignment (I) No. of Trials 
1 Good Bad 36 
2 Performance Goals Mastery Goals 48 
3 Good  
Performance Goals 
Bad 
Mastery Goals 
108 
4 Bad Good 36 
5 Bad 
Performance Goals 
Good 
Mastery Goals 
108 
 
Table 8. Schematic overview: Valence IAT Condition B  
(Mastery Goals paired with Good first) 
Block Left key assignment (E) Right key assignment (I) No. of Trials 
1 Good Bad 36 
2 Mastery Goals Performance Goals 48 
3 Good  
Mastery Goals 
Bad 
Performance Goals 
108 
4 Bad Good 36 
5 Bad 
Mastery Goals 
Good 
Performance Goals 
108 
 
Once both IATs had been configured, a study was designed to test them out. A 
description of Study 1 and its findings follows.  
4.2 Administration of Achievement Goal IATs and AGQ-R  
4.2.1 Background 
The previous chapters have outlined both the assumptions underlying current 
achievement goal theorization and operationalization and the challenges to 
these assumptions represented by findings on implicit cognition. One of the 
ways in which the exploration of nonconscious achievement goals might begin 
is by examining any differences between implicit and explicit methods. 
Chapters 2 and 3 have overviewed the methods with which conscious 
achievement goals are operationalized and the implicit methods that may be 
helpful for exploring nonconscious achievement goals. In line with the first part 
of aim 3b(i), developing an implicit method to access achievement goals, the 
previous section of this chapter has illustrated the design of two achievement 
goal IATs, the Self/Other Referent IAT and the Valence IAT. This section 
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addresses the second part of aim 3b(i), comparing [the implicit methods] with an 
explicit achievement goal method. As such, this section provides a test of the 
implicit methods in addition to a comparison of their outcomes with those of 
the more commonly used explicit self-report method, the Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R, Elliot & Murayama, 2008).  
The aims of the study are thus to explore the reliability of the IATs and to 
compare the IAT scores with the AGQ-R responses. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the overarching question guiding this research is: Are the 
implications of research on implicit cognition applicable to achievement goal theory? 
(Research Question 3) More specifically, the research question for this study 
was: are there any differences between what implicit and explicit achievement goal 
methods tell us, and if so, what are they?  
4.2.2 Hypotheses 
There were no specific predictions for internal consistency of the newly adapted 
IATs. However, IATs usually display greater reliability values than other 
implicit measures (Teige, Schnabel, Banse, & Asendorpf, 2004; Bosson, Swann, 
& Pennebaker, 2000), with split-half correlations or alphas between .7 and .9 
(Nosek et al., 2007, p. 273), so it was predicted the values would be similar for 
the Self/Other Referent and Valence IATs.  
It was predicted that there might be some dissociation and thus a lack of 
correlation between the implicit and explicit achievement goal methods. This 
prediction was based on the arguments posed in the previous chapters: firstly 
that respondents may use self-presentational strategies in responding to explicit 
methods, and secondly, that goals may operate outside of conscious awareness, 
and may therefore be inaccessible in terms of self-report. Generally, research 
on the nature of the correlation between IATs and self-report methods has 
revealed differing findings over the years, with older studies finding “weak to 
absent” (Nosek et al., 2007, p. 278) relations while later studies have shown 
stronger relations (e.g., Greenwald et al., 2003; Hofmann, Gawronski, 
Gschwender, Le, & Schmidt, 2005; Nosek, 2005).  
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In summary, the predictions for Study 1 were that: 
1. The Self/Other Referent IAT and the Valence IAT will demonstrate 
appropriate reliability.  
2. The IATs will not correlate with the AGQ-R.  
4.2.3 Method 
4.2.3.1 Ethical Approval 
Ethical approval for this study (and all following studies in this thesis) was 
sought and granted by the School of Education Ethics Committee (for an 
example, see Appendix 10.1.1). This was especially necessary given the 
researcher’s interest in exploring nonconscious processes and motivation, and 
resulted in such practices as providing limited information during recruitment 
and the covert measurement of behavior (i.e., response times on the IAT) in 
order to avoid influencing participants’ responses to the achievement goal 
methods (and in later studies, participants’ awareness of achievement goal 
primes or behavior on achievement tasks).  
4.2.3.2 Participants 
Participants were 40 students enrolled in different faculties at a university in 
the northeast of England. There were 20 female and 20 male students in the 
sample. 19 participants were undergraduates (years 1-4), and the remaining 21 
were postgraduates (Masters and PhD students). All participants were 
contacted personally by the researcher and asked if they would like to volunteer 
their participation.  
4.2.3.3 Materials 
4.2.3.3.1 Explicit Method 
The explicit achievement goal method in this study was the Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R, Elliot & Murayama, 2008, see Appendix 
10.1.2). This is comprised of 12 items for four different subscales that match the 
2 x 2 achievement goal model: Performance Approach (“My aim is to perform 
well relative to other students”, 3 items, α = .84), Performance Avoidance (“I 
am striving to avoid performing worse than others”, 3 items, α = .90), Mastery 
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Approach (“My aim is to completely master the material presented in my 
classes”, 3 items, α = .62), and Mastery Avoidance (“I am striving to avoid an 
incomplete understanding of the course material”, 3 items, α = .76).  
Participants were asked to respond to such statements using a 5-point Likert 
scale that ranged from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”. Goal 
statements were shuffled so no two items pertaining to the same underlying 
goal construct appeared consecutively. Given that the participants came from a 
variety of disciplines, an instruction at the top of the questionnaire sheet asked 
that when answering the questionnaire they should think about their goals for 
their classes at university in general, rather than for a specific class. This 
required replacing the phrases “this class” or “this course” which appear on the 
original AGQ-R in items 1 and 7, respectively, with “my classes”.  
4.2.3.3.2 Implicit Method 
For the implicit method, participants completed either the Self/Other Referent 
IAT or the Valence IAT, both described above. Allocation of IAT type and 
condition (A or B) alternated based on the date participants completed and 
returned questionnaires. IATs were presented to participants on a laptop PC 
with a 13.3” (33.8cm) screen in a testing room free from visual or auditory 
disruption. 
4.2.3.4 Procedure 
 
Figure 8. Study 1 methods 
An overview of the procedure is illustrated in Figure 8 above. Each individual 
received a preliminary consent form (see Appendix 10.1.3) and the Achievement 
Goal Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R, Elliot & Murayama, 2008), which they 
took away to complete and return. Out of a total of forty-three questionnaires, 
AGQ-R 
Self/Other  
Referent IAT 
Valence IAT 
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forty were returned (93% response rate). A date and time 1-4 weeks following 
the return of questionnaires was then agreed for the Implicit Association Test, 
so as to eradicate potential priming effects of taking the IAT just after the 
questionnaire. Indeed, Nosek, Greenwald and Banaji (2007) have suggested, 
“performing self-report measures first may increase the accessibility of some 
cognition and affect subsequent IAT performance” (p. 273).31  
When participants arrived to take the IAT, they were provided with a second 
consent form (see Appendix 10.1.4). The researcher then set up the IAT and the 
participant was asked to read the instructions (see Appendix 10.1.5), ask any 
questions, and to begin when they were ready. The researcher remained in the 
room, outside of the participant’s line of vision. Upon completion of the IAT, 
participants were asked for their perceptions of the IAT and the experiment 
before they were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. 
4.2.4 Results 
Analyses were conducted in four phases. As recommended by Meade (2009), 
the internal consistency of the combined IATs was confirmed as r = .64, p < 
.001, calculated by correlating IAT scores at the end of the first half of stages 3 
and 5 (pooled) with their IAT score for the latter half of stages 3 and 5 (pooled). 
When the correlations were examined by type of IAT, both showed satisfactory 
internal consistency: Valence r = .80, p < .001; Self/Other r = .55, p < .05. Next, 
the correlations between AGQ-R subscale scores and IAT scores were 
examined. This involved the standardization of IAT scores in terms of the 
counterbalanced conditions, signifying that a high score on both Self/Other 
Referent and Valence IAT meant the participant had been quicker to respond to 
Performance Goals and Self or Good (block 3), whereas a low score meant a 
quicker response to block 5, Mastery Goals and Self or Good. If the IAT scores 
reflected AGQ-R scores, Performance Approach (PAP) ratings would then be 
expected to correlate positively with overall IAT score, and negatively with 
Mastery Approach (MAP). However, neither correlation was significant (PAP: r 
= .13, p = .44; MAP: r = -.07, p = .68). Given that the IATs were designed to fit a 
                                                             
31 Although Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le and Schmidt’s (2005) meta-analysis of IAT 
studies suggested order (self-report then IAT, IAT then self-report) had little to no effect.  
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dichotomous achievement goal model, the last phase of analysis was to collapse 
PAP and Performance Avoidance (PAV) ratings into a single performance score 
(P_Avg). The same was done for MAP and Mastery Avoidance (MAV) to create 
M_Avg. These combined scores still showed no significant relation with IAT 
scores (P_Avg: r = .09, p = .56; M_Avg: r = -.01, p = .93). 
To assess whether the lack of correlation was possibly a Type II error, a count 
was taken of the number of participants who showed a preference (faster 
reaction time) for Performance Goals or Mastery Goals in their IAT, and 
mapped against their highest ratings in AGQ-R, i.e., MAP or PAP (see Table 9).  
Table 9. Cross-tabulation: Number of participants’ IAT and AGQ-R 
responses 
            Valence IAT 
  Mastery Performance Total Participants 
AGQ-R M_Avg 10 7 17 
P_Avg 12 7 19 
Total  22 14 36 
Note. The table only shows data for 36 participants, as the four remaining 
participants had equivalent performance and mastery averages on the AGQ-R. 
AGQ-R = Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised, M_Avg = mean of mastery 
approach and avoidance subscales, P_Avg = mean of performance approach 
and avoidance subscales, IAT = Implicit Association Test. 
The expected pattern of responding would have been for those who responded 
quickly to Mastery Goals on the IAT to have higher mastery ratings for their 
AGQ-R (and vice-versa for performance). The frequencies in Table 9 suggest 
this did not happen. The only indication of a trend was a slight preference for 
mastery during the IAT (22 versus 14 participants).  
4.2.5 Discussion 
The first research question for this study was, can an implicit method for 
accessing achievement goals be designed? The findings of this study answer yes, an 
implicit method can clearly be designed, in the form of an IAT. However, 
couched within this question are also the questions: is this method reliable and 
to what extent does an IAT score represent validly capturing of an individual’s 
achievement goals?  
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  143 
In terms of the reliability of the two achievement goal IATs, the findings 
showed internal consistency for both measures (Hypothesis 1). The Valence IAT 
was more reliable than the Self/Other Referent IAT, and was also more in line 
with the split-half correlations and alphas ranging between .7 and .9 that were 
suggested by Nosek and colleagues (2007, p. 273). These findings suggest that 
the Valence IAT represents a promising tool to use in continued exploration of 
nonconscious achievement goals. One difficulty inherent in the design of the 
IATs was the potential for certain stimuli words to be interpreted differently by 
participants; for example, some participants revealed informally that they felt 
the word persist pertained more closely to the Performance Goals category. 
Although persistence has been linked with mastery goals (Elliot, McGregor, & 
Gable, 1999), continued piloting should explore more systematically the 
relationship between theorized and participants’ category assignment of goal 
stimulus words. Similarly, an area that might merit further attention is finding 
alternative names for the goal categories, Performance Goals and Mastery 
Goals, given the unfamiliarity of these labels to most participants (but see 
Section 4.1.2). 
The next question is whether what the IATs were measuring was actually 
representative of individuals’ achievement goals. There are certain limitations 
of the IAT when comparing it to how achievement goals have been theorized. 
For example, the IAT is a measure of the relative association between two (goal) 
categories, whereas individuals may pursue multiple goals (Harackiewicz, 
Barron, Pintrich, Elliot, & Thrash, 2002). Additionally, the IAT score is a static 
snapshot rather than a dynamic measure of achievement goals, with the 
implication that the IAT score represents a relatively stable goal association or 
preference. Furthermore, the IAT as an isolated computer categorization task 
lacks ecological validity when considering achievement goals at play in an 
achievement setting. However, the achievement goal IAT research programme 
is at a nascent stage, and with further research to increase the reliability of the 
IAT and assess its predictive power in relation to explicit methods and behavior, 
it will be possible to address each of these points. Multiple IATs presented in a 
row will potentially allow for incorporating approach and avoidance valences, 
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whereas goal manipulations might allow for the exploration of achievement 
goal IAT effect malleability in relation to situational variables.  
At this early point, what is clear is that some individuals are quicker at 
categorizing performance (e.g., better, compete, overtake) and positive (e.g., 
joy, love, pleasure) stimulus words when Performance Goals and Good are 
paired than they are at categorizing mastery (e.g., learn, comprehend, progress) 
and positive words when Mastery Goals and Good are paired (and vice versa for 
mastery). These IAT scores thus show a stronger association between 
Performance Goals, as embodied by the performance stimulus words, and a 
positive valence. Greenwald and colleagues’ (2002) extension of Heider’s 
(1958) balance theory provides a post hoc explanation for IAT effects, 
suggesting, “interconnections among concepts are assumed to self-organize in 
ways that reflect cognitive consistency or balance” (Cvencek, Meltzoff, & 
Greenwald, 2011, p. 767). According to this reasoning and the available data 
from this study, it can be (only loosely) hypothesized that those individuals with 
a stronger Performance Goal-Good association are likely to implicitly prefer 
such behaviors (those embodied by the performance stimulus words) and thus 
pursue these goals in an achievement setting. Actual testing of such a prediction 
is necessary in helping to understand what exactly is represented by the IAT 
score, and is carried out in the next study.  
A further point is how the Self/Other Referent and Valence IATs compare with 
the Like Me/Not Like Me method by Urdan and Cafasso (2011) and the IAT-T 
by Marzouq, Slade and Carr (2012). The IATs designed in this chapter improve 
on these two designs for two reasons. Firstly, in asking participants to assess the 
extent that a stimulus word is like them, Urdan and Cafasso’s method seems to 
be capturing reaction times for essentially self-reported ‘Like Me’ decisions 
rather than implicit associations. Hence, while assessments of similarity to 
oneself, like self-reports, might be internally consistent on a Like Me method, 
they are unlikely to tap the implicit. By collecting reaction times based on 
associations rather than assessments of similarity to oneself, the IATs designed 
in this chapter are truly implicit. Secondly, in trying to address all four goals of 
the 2 x 2 achievement goal framework (Elliot & McGregor, 2001), the method 
designed by Marzouq and colleagues uses phrases, including double negatives 
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and different numbers of words, as the stimuli. Using phrases departs from IAT 
procedure of using single words and consequently presents a potential 
alternative explanation for differences in reaction times. In sum, the Self/Other 
Referent and Valence IATs designed in this chapter are closer in procedure and 
configuration to the original IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), in 
addition to being internally consistent and tapping the implicit. 
The second research question for this study was, are there differences between 
what an implicit versus an explicit method can tell us about a student’s goals, and if 
so, what are they? The study found a lack of significant correlation between the 
IAT score and both the relevant AGQ-R subscale scores (PAP and MAP) and 
combined mean goal scores (i.e., P_Avg and M_Avg), thereby supporting 
Hypothesis 2. This suggests that there are differences between what the IAT 
and the AGQ-R are telling us. This dissociation is in line with earlier IAT studies 
such as Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz (1998), though it differs from the 
findings of Hofmann and colleagues’ (2005) meta-analysis, which showed a 
weak but positive average correlation between IATs and self-reports at r = .24. 
Hofmann and colleagues’ (2005) meta-analysis only considered studies of 
attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, self-concept, and clinical applications (p. 
1373). This study’s finding of a lack of correlation between implicit-explicit 
methods is in line with more similar studies where IATs have been designed to 
assess motives or goals. For example, Brunstein and Schmitt’s (2004) IAT for 
implicit motives was uncorrelated with the self-reported Achievement 
Orientation Scale at r = - .07, and Marzouq, Slade, and Carr’s (2012) IAT-T for 
achievement goals did not correlate with the AGQ-R.  
Exploring this divergence further, there are several potential reasons for the 
lack of correlation between the IATs and the AGQ-R in this study. One of these 
may be that the two methods are tapping into different aspects of the same 
construct. Keeping in mind the proposed conceptualization of the cognitive 
representation of achievement goals as part of a network of spreading 
activation among nodes, the IAT may capture the automatic associations, 
whereas the AGQ-R could capture a pattern among the same nodes but one that 
is slower and more deliberate. This would reflect a dual-process model. 
Accordingly, IATs may predict behavior (Asendorpf, Banse & Mücke, 2002; 
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Brunstein & Schmitt, 2004; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002) or socially 
sensitive issues (Greenwald et al., 2009), while self-report methods may predict 
subjective accounts (Brunstein & Schmitt, 2004) or less socially sensitive issues 
(Greenwald et al., 2009). This would suggest one answer to the second research 
question: IATs may illustrate an account of automatic, spontaneous behavior or 
cognition, whereas the AGQ-R may represent an account of more controlled, 
deliberate behavior. Ultimately, if such an explanation were supported in future 
studies, this would reinforce the value of employing both implicit and explicit 
methods in achievement goal research.  
Another potential reason for the lack of correlation between the IATs and the 
AGQ-R in this study could be that the two methods are actually accessing 
different constructs. This was the approach taken by McClelland (McClelland, 
Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989) to explain the low correlations between implicit 
and explicit motive methods (but see Thrash, Maruskin, & Martin, 2012). A 
possible implication of this reasoning is that only one (or even neither) method 
employed in this study is validly capturing achievement goals. Given the 
argument made in the previous chapter regarding the potential for 
nonconscious achievement goals and the limits to self-report, the IAT may be 
closer to accessing the goals individuals are likely to pursue in achievement 
settings, whereas self-report achievement goal questionnaires may only be 
tapping into a type of conscious account, or achievement narrative. This 
narrative would reflect the conscious experience of achievement situations, 
retain a relative consistency over time and across situations,32 and could be 
drawn on to inform responses to self-report measures on a range of related 
concepts such as use of deep or surface learning strategies, persistence, help-
seeking, and self-handicapping, thereby potentially resulting in the correlations 
that have been observed in self-report achievement goal research (e.g., Elliot, 
McGregor, & Gable, 1999; Midgley & Urdan, 2001; Ryan & Pintrich, 1997; 
Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & McKeachie, 1993). An interesting counterpoint is 
Hofmann and colleagues’ (2005) finding regarding the systematic relatedness 
between IATs and self-report methods in 126 studies. There is clearly a need for 
                                                             
32 Presenting a potential explanation for the strong (e.g., .40-.70) test-retest correlations for 
mastery and performance goals observed by Senko, Hulleman, and Harackiewicz (2011, p. 33).  
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more research exploring the achievement goal IATs, including the testing of 
alternative category titles for performance (e.g. “Appearing Competent” or 
“Comparing Competence”) and mastery goals (e.g., “Improving 
Understanding” or “Developing Competence”), and other implicit methods 
(e.g., visual stimuli showing images of everyday achievement situations such as 
giving a presentation to peers), in comparison with self-reports such as the 
AGQ-R. Such comparison should be especially useful in highlighting how these 
different methods relate to achievement-relevant behavior.  
4.3 Conclusion 
This study showed that both newly designed IATs were internally consistent, 
with the Valence IAT suggested for use in continued exploration of potentially 
nonconscious achievement goals. There were no significant relationships 
between IAT and the AGQ-R. Fine-grained supplementary analysis 
demonstrated that those participants who showed a preference for a goal 
(either mastery or performance) on the IATs did not generally show the same 
preference in their ratings on the AGQ-R.  
Different explanations for these findings were then suggested, but more 
research is required to shed light on which of these may be more likely. 
Ultimately, studies that explore these explanations will have implications for 
how achievement goal researchers can begin to incorporate the notion of the 
unconscious into how they theorize and capture achievement goals. At this 
early point, however, one way in which to investigate these varying 
explanations is by comparing how these implicit and explicit methods relate to 
students’ behavior on an achievement task, as is explored in the next study. 
 	  
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  148 
5 Study 2 Does achievement behavior indicative of 
mastery or performance goals correspond to implicit or 
explicit accounts?  
Introduction 
This chapter follows on from Study 1 in addressing aim 3b of the thesis, to assess 
the extent to which the implications of findings on implicit cognition and 
nonconscious goal pursuit apply to how achievement goals are currently theorized 
through designing and running a series of studies to empirically test if achievement 
goals can operate and be captured without conscious awareness. Specifically, this is 
done in terms of 3b(ii), conducting a comparison between achievement behavior 
and implicit and explicit achievement goal methods. In other words, will an 
implicit or explicit achievement goal method be more consistent with a 
student’s achievement behavior? Study 2 adds achievement behavior into the 
comparison of implicit and explicit methods made in Study 1, in order to assess 
whether one method, both methods, or neither method is related to 
participants’ actual behavior on an achievement task.  
In Study 2, fifty participants completed an induced failure anagrams 
achievement task, reflected on it in terms of their affect and intrinsic 
motivation using self-report questionnaires, and finally completed either the 
explicit Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R, Elliot & Murayama, 
2008) or the Valence IAT designed in Chapter 4. Participants’ persistence on 
the anagrams task was categorized according to a theorized pattern of 
differences between performance and mastery oriented individuals and then 
compared with their affect and intrinsic motivation self-reports, and also with 
their responses to the AGQ-R or the Valence IAT. The findings of Study 2 are 
then discussed before the scene is set for Study 3, which attempts to manipulate 
the goal behavior using a nonconscious priming procedure.  
5.1 Background 
As laid out in Chapter 3, research has shown that when asked about the reasons 
behind their behavior and decision-making, participants often tell more than 
they can know (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wegner, 2002), and tell when they 
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cannot know (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). 
Such findings challenge the assumption that achievement goals are largely 
conscious and accessible, but also imply that achievement goal theory 
researchers may need to use more than just self-report data to fully understand 
students’ goals for studying (Murayama, Elliot, & Friedman, 2012; Pintrich, 
2003).   
Recently, steps have been taken towards developing implicit measures of 
achievement goals. While some have explored the use of traces in online 
learning environments (Winne, 2010; Zhou & Winne, 2012), others have looked 
to achievement goal versions of the Implicit Association Test (IATs, Greenwald, 
Schwartz, & McGhee, 1998), resulting in the design of the Like Me/Not Me 
measure by Urdan and Cafasso (2011) and the IAT-Type achievement goal 
measure by Marzouq, Slade and Carr (2012).  
Study 1 illustrated the design and testing of two original achievement goal IATs, 
the Self/Other Referent IAT and the Valence IAT. The Valence IAT 
demonstrated the greater internal consistency of the two,33 and as such was 
selected for continued methodological study in this thesis. Interestingly, the 
IATs were unrelated to participants’ explicit self-reports about their 
achievement goals collected via the AGQ-R. Possible explanations for this latter 
finding included the suggestion that the implicit and explicit methods might be 
accessing two different aspects of a single underlying construct, or two 
independent constructs. The current study is carried out to begin to shed light 
on which of these explanations might be more likely, and as such compares 
participants’ behavior on an achievement task with their responses to the 
Valence IAT and AGQ-R. Furthermore, it should help elucidate what the newly 
designed IAT is measuring, as well as which method, both, or neither, 
represents a valid means of capturing the achievement goals students pursue on 
achievement tasks.  
The aims of the study are thus to continue exploring the reliability of the 
Valence IAT (Aim 1), to compare participant behavior on an achievement task 
with their Valence IAT score (Aim 2), and to compare participant behavior on an 
                                                             
33 Although both original IATs demonstrated appropriate internal consistency. 
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achievement task with their AGQ-R subscale scores (Aim 3). As mentioned in 
the introduction, the overarching question guiding this research program is: Are 
the implications of research on implicit cognition applicable to achievement goal 
theory? (Research Question 3) Given that one of the implications of research on 
implicit cognition is the limited ability for introspection and self-report, this 
study should provide more information on whether this is the case for 
achievement goals. More specifically, the research question for this study was: 
will an implicit or explicit achievement goal method be more consistent with a 
student’s achievement behavior? 
5.1.1 Selection of an achievement task 
In order to conduct this comparison, it was vital to find a task that could 
adequately represent an achievement situation and elicit participants’ 
achievement goals. One area that has had the same requirement is research on 
priming the goal to achieve. For example, in a study by Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-
Chai, Barndollar, and Trötschel (2001), the researchers were interested in 
whether goals could be nonconsciously activated. They wondered if priming 
participants with the goal to achieve would lead primed participants more than 
non-primed participants to work toward accomplishing an achievement task, 
cause them to persist when encountering obstacles, and push them to continue 
working after disruption. Hence, the researchers needed a task that could 
highlight goal-directed behavior, and specifically, behavior that was consistent 
with achieving. In experiments 4 and 5, Bargh and colleagues (2001) thus 
created a task in which participants were presented with a set of Scrabble tiles 
and told to find and note down as many words as they could within a two-
minute period (experiment 4) or until they could find no more (experiment 5). 
Although not a typical achievement task, it did elicit goal-directed, 
achievement-related behavior. As such, it was deemed appropriate to adopt a 
similarly informal achievement task for the current study.  
However, while Bargh and colleagues’ (2001) studies needed to distinguish 
between whether the participant was clearly goal-driven or not (i.e., did they 
keep working to achieve the highest amount of words even when they were told 
to stop working over an intercom? Did they keep working on an intellectually 
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demanding task after a disruption and given the chance to work on a more 
intrinsically enjoyable task?), the achievement task required for this study 
needed to provide an adequate point of comparison with the implicit and 
explicit methods. This was translated into needing to be able to distinguish 
between performance and mastery goal directed behavior, in line with the 
dichotomous Valence IAT, and the AGQ-R (i.e., PAP subscale score, MAP 
subscale score, combined P_Avg score, combined M_Avg score).  
Early studies of dichotomous achievement goals posited that one way that 
performance and mastery oriented individuals differ is in their responses to 
failure (Diener & Dweck, 1978, 1980; Dweck, 1986). Indeed, Dweck (1986) 
reviewed research showing that while individuals “with learning goals tend to 
use obstacles as a cue to increase their effort or to analyze and vary their 
strategies” (p. 1042), performance oriented individuals’ “confidence in their 
ability needs to remain high to sustain task involvement…[and] they attribute 
errors or failures to a lack of ability…[which] tends to result in defensive 
withdrawal of effort or debilitation in the face of obstacles” (p. 1042). These 
responses to failure were also linked with affect and intrinsic motivation: 
pursuing a performance goal in a failure situation would not allow a 
performance oriented individual to demonstrate their competence and would 
therefore undermine their intrinsic interest and positive affect, whereas the 
expenditure of effort by the mastery oriented individual would be linked with 
feelings of satisfaction and would not undermine their intrinsic interest in the 
task (Dweck, 1986, p. 1042).  
More recent accounts of achievement goals of course distinguish between the 
approach and avoidance valences of achievement goals, with studies such as 
Elliot and Harackiewicz (1996) suggesting that it is the endorsement of 
performance avoidance goals, rather than performance approach goals, that is 
linked with lower intrinsic motivation and maladaptive achievement behaviors. 
However, Senko, Hulleman and Harackiewicz (2011) have ceded that 
performance approach goals may over time indirectly leave individuals 
“vulnerable” to performance avoidance goals, a possibility “first offered by 
Nicholls (1984), who posited that students pursuing performance goals would 
respond to failure experiences by switching to performance-avoidance goals, 
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thus incurring all the educational hazards of the latter goals” (p. 33). Senko and 
colleagues (2011) note that others also seem to endorse this possibility (Bong, 
2005; Brophy, 2005; Kaplan & Maehr, 2007; Midgley et al., 2001; Molden & 
Dweck, 2000; Roeser, 2004; see also experiment 1, Senko & Harackiewicz, 
2005). In a recent meta-analysis, Huang (2012) has indeed linked performance 
avoidance goals with maladaptive strategies such as lack of persistence, while 
in a meta-analysis of achievement goals and emotions, the same author 
(Huang, 2011) found links between mastery goals and positive affect and 
performance avoidance goals and negative affect. As such, the decision was 
made to use an induced failure situation in order to distinguish the persistence, 
affect, and intrinsic motivation responses of those pursuing performance goals 
from those pursuing mastery goals.  
One recent study that has used a failure situation in order to compare 
achievement goals is the study by Sideridis and Kaplan (2011). The researchers 
used a puzzle task of seven wooden pieces that needed to be formed into 
specified geometrical shapes, within a design comprising a series of five 
puzzles: the first three were unsolvable, the fourth was solvable and acted as a 
hope probe, and the fifth was again unsolvable. The researchers found that 
participants who endorsed mastery approach goals on a self-report 
achievement goal questionnaire (Elliot & Church, 1997) persisted significantly 
longer (in terms of amount of time and number of trials) on the first three 
unsolvable anagrams than those who had endorsed performance approach, 
performance avoidance and amotivation goals.34 As such, this task allowed for a 
clear distinction to be made between the overall greater persistence behavior of 
mastery versus performance oriented participants.  
                                                             
34 Sideridis and Kaplan (2011) also found that performance approach oriented individuals 
showed a rebound effect on the fifth puzzle unlike the other groups. The researchers suggested 
this may have been because once performance approach oriented participants had had an 
opportunity to demonstrate their competence on the fourth, solvable puzzle, the time and trials 
they expended on the fifth puzzle reflected their pre-failure persistence. Given that this finding 
was unexpected, and its explanation tentative and requiring further study in a replication, this 
aspect of Sideridis and Kaplan’s (2011) analysis was not included in the current study. 
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  153 
For the current study, it was decided that the puzzles used by Sideridis and 
Kaplan (2011) would be replaced by anagrams, but that the failure paradigm 
would be retained. Anagrams represent a relatively common achievement task 
to assess achievement goal behavior and distinguish between different goals. 
Indeed, Utman’s (1997) meta-analysis of the effects of goals on task 
performance showed other studies that had used anagrams when exploring a 
dichotomous achievement goal framework (e.g., Dyck & Breen, 1974; 
Trzebinski, 1974). More recently, Ciani and Sheldon (2010) employed 
anagrams as their dependent variable when using the letters A and F to prime 
students’ approach and avoidance motivation, while Elliot and colleagues 
(Elliot, Maier, Moller, Friedman, & Meinhardt, 2007) used anagrams as the 
achievement task in a series of experiments testing the effects of priming the 
color red on students’ avoidance-based motivation.  Given the propensity for 
Sideridis and Kaplan’s (2011) failure-inducing puzzle task to distinguish 
between the different goals and the prevalence of using anagrams as 
worthwhile achievement tasks, a task combining induced failure and anagrams 
was selected for comparing mastery and performance goal-directed behavior 
with the Valence IAT and the AGQ-R.  
5.2 Hypotheses 
It was predicted that some participants would persist longer, defined in terms of 
time spent and attempts made on each anagram, and also maintain greater 
intrinsic motivation and positive affect in the face of failure on the anagrams 
task than others. Given the above findings (Dweck, 1986; Huang, 2011, 2012; 
Senko, Hulleman, & Harackiewicz, 2011; Sideridis & Kaplan, 2011), it was 
expected that these individuals would be embodying mastery goal behavior. 
Those persisting for less time and making fewer attempts, in addition to 
reporting lower intrinsic motivation and higher negative affect, would be 
embodying performance behavior.  
Given the potential explanation of the dual process model suggested in the last 
chapter (Study 1), where spontaneous, automatic behavior is theorized to be 
linked with implicit methods, the second hypothesis for this study was that the 
mastery and performance persistence behavior of participants would 
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correspond better with their subsequent Valence IAT scores than with their 
conscious, explicit self-reported AGQ-R (PAP, MAP, P_Avg, M_Avg).  
In summary, the hypotheses for Study 2 were that: 
1. Some participants will persist more (time and attempts) in the face of 
failure than others, embodying a mastery response  
2. Those who persist more (mastery group) will also report higher positive 
affect and intrinsic motivation than those who persist less (performance 
group) 
3. The Valence IAT will be more consistent with participants’ persistence 
behavior than the AGQ-R  
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Participants 
Participants were 50 students enrolled in different faculties at a university in 
the northeast of England. There were 25 female and 25 male students in the 
sample. 12 participants were undergraduates (years 1-4), and the remaining 38 
were postgraduates (Masters and PhD students). All participants were 
contacted personally by the researcher and asked if they would like to volunteer 
their participation.  
5.3.2 Materials 
5.3.2.1 Achievement Behavior Task 
The achievement task, as outlined above, consisted of a series of five anagrams. 
All the anagrams were chosen from a list of difficult anagrams (Remedios, 
2000), so that participants would not easily realize they were unsolvable. The 
four unsolvable anagrams were made unsolvable by adding an extra letter that 
would prevent their solution. The anagrams used are displayed in Table 10.  
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Table 10. Anagrams 
No. Type  Original 
Anagram 
Original 
Solution 
Added 
Letter 
Anagram w/ 
added letter 
1 Unsolvable  EEGBCRI ICEBERG K EKEGBCRI 
2 Unsolvable  ACTIONAR RAINCOAT F ACTIONARF 
3 Unsolvable  CAMMSIEHN MECHANISM D CAMMDSIEHN 
4 Solvable  TOBUNT BUTTON - - 
5 Unsolvable  YRBEREW BREWERY U UYRBEREW 
 
Anagrams were written in capitalized letters using black ink on four-by-one-
inch pieces of white paper that were folded so as to conceal each anagram. On 
the outside of the paper was a small, circled number indicating the place of each 
anagram in the order from anagrams one to five. To access the anagram letters, 
participants needed to open the folded piece of paper. Participants were 
provided with an answer sheet (see Appendix 10.2.1), a pen, and a pile of blank 
A4 scrap paper.  
5.3.2.2 Self-Report Achievement Goal Measure 
As in the previous study, Elliot and Murayama’s (2008) 12-item Achievement 
Goal Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R) formed the explicit, self-report method 
for participants’ achievement goals. As before, the questionnaire comprised 
four subscales: Performance Approach (PAP, 3 items; ⍺ = .92), Performance 
Avoidance (PAV, 3 items; ⍺ = .81), Mastery Approach (MAP, 3 items; ⍺ = .68), 
and Mastery Avoidance (MAV, 3 items; ⍺ = .72). Participants responded on a 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
5.3.2.3 Implicit Achievement Goal Measure 
Also as in the previous study, the Valence Implicit Association Test (Valence 
IAT) represented the implicit measure, with two valence categories, ‘Good’ and 
‘Bad’, and two goal categories, ‘Performance Goals’, and ‘Mastery Goals’. 
Category labels and stimuli were identical to those used in Study 1. As before, 
the IAT was counterbalanced in order to eradicate any potential ordering 
effects. Hence, half of the total sample of participants was presented with the 
‘Performance Goals’ and ‘Good’ pairing in the first combined categories block 
(block 3) and the ‘Mastery Goals’ and ‘Good’ pairing in the second combined 
categories block (block 5), while the other half of the sample received the 
inverse.  
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5.3.2.4 Affect and Intrinsic Motivation  
Further information about the participants’ experience of the achievement task 
was elicited using the brief 20-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988, see Appendix 10.2.2). Participants 
were asked to rate different feelings and emotions (e.g., distressed, enthusiastic, 
irritable, etc.) in terms of the extent to which they experienced them on the 
achievement behavior task. The subscales consisted of Positive Affect (10 
items; ⍺ = .79) and Negative Affect (10 items; ⍺ = .81). Participants responded 
using a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely).  
Participants’ experience of the achievement task was also assessed using their 
responses to the Interest and Enjoyment (7 items; ⍺ = .84), Perceived 
Competence (6 items; ⍺ = .80), and Effort and Importance (5 items; ⍺ = .73) 
subscales of the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI, Ryan, 1982, see Appendix 
10.2.3). Participants rated items such as “I enjoyed doing this activity very 
much” (Interest and Enjoyment), “I am satisfied with my performance at this 
task” (Perceived Competence), and “I tried very hard on this activity” (Effort 
and Importance) on a scale of 1 (not at all true) to 7 (very true). Verbalizations 
were also informally recorded in the form of notes taken by the researcher 
while the participant worked on the task.  
5.3.3 Procedure 
 
Figure 9. Study 2 methods 
An overview of the procedure is illustrated in Figure 9. All participants were run 
individually, in a room free from noise and distractions. After filling out a 
consent form (see Appendix 10.2.4), participants were asked to complete the 
Anagrams PANAS IMI 
AGQ-R 
Valence IAT 
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  157 
series of five anagrams. At this point, the researcher asked if the participant 
knew what an anagram was and clarified for those who were confused or 
wanted to check to be sure. The researcher then pointed out the pile of 
numbered folded pieces of paper with anagrams inside, some blank scrap paper 
on which they could do work if they so desired, and the lines on the answer 
sheet on which they should write solutions to each of the five anagrams. The 
researcher informed participants that they should proceed in order from 
anagrams one to five, that they could spend as much time as they wanted on 
each of the anagrams and move at their own pace, but that once they had closed 
and set an anagram aside, they could not return to it. Participants were told that 
if they arrived at the solution, they should write it down next to its 
corresponding number on the answer sheet, and that if they wanted to move on 
from one that they had been unsuccessful in solving, they could just draw a 
dash next to the number.  
While the participants were working, the researcher surreptitiously timed how 
long participants spent working on each anagram. The researcher noted the 
times that the participant opened and later folded closed again each numbered 
piece of paper on which the anagrams were written. The researcher also wrote 
down any verbalizations made by the participants, starting from when they 
began the anagrams task until they moved on to the post-anagram 
questionnaires.  
Once the participants stated that they were ready to move on from the 
anagrams task, the researcher collected any scrap paper they had used for their 
attempts, and handed them the PANAS and the IMI. They were asked to do the 
PANAS first and then the IMI. Participants were instructed to keep the 
anagrams task in mind while filling out both questionnaires. When participants 
had completed the questionnaires, the researcher administered either the 
Valence IAT or the AGQ-R.  
The question of how to allocate participants to Valence IAT or AGQ-R group 
was carefully considered given that by chance random allocation might result in 
all mastery participants ending up taking the Valence IAT and all performance 
participants ending up in the AGQ-R group. Although this was not crucial to 
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comparing whether the achievement goal method was consistent with the 
persistence behavior, a mix was desired between mastery and performance 
participants and implicit and explicit achievement goal methods.  
One way of dealing with this issue was to assess, during the anagram task, 
whether the participant’s behavior was akin to that observed in Sideridis and 
Kaplan’s (2011) study. Sideridis and Kaplan had found that performance 
participants spent longer on the final anagram in comparison to their time spent 
on each of the first three anagrams and that mastery participants spent less time 
on the final anagram than they had, as they spent less time progressively 
through the anagrams. If an estimate of these goal orientations could be made 
while the participant was working on the PANAS and IMI, the researcher might 
be able to balance out allocation of performance and mastery participants to 
Valence IAT and AGQ-R conditions. However, this procedure was deemed too 
impractical.  
Ultimately, participants were allocated somewhat randomly. Given that 
participants were volunteers and some had a limited amount of time to offer 
(i.e., maximum of 1 hour), the researcher tended to choose the generally quicker 
option (the 12-item AGQ-R) so that these participants could complete the 
experiment and not be unnecessarily inconvenienced as a result of their 
participation in the research. Allocation was therefore loosely randomized (see 
Appendix 10.2.5 for eventual order), in that participants differed by chance in 
terms of how much time they could offer to participate and spent varying 
amounts of time on the anagrams task. In this way, 25 volunteers were 
ultimately allocated to the AGQ-R condition, whereas the remaining 25 
participants completed the Valence IAT.  
When participants finished the explicit self-report or implicit achievement goal 
measure, the researcher debriefed them in full.35 In accordance with 
suggestions made during the ethics review for this study, given the limited 
information provided during recruitment, the covert measurement of 
persistence behavior, and the implicit nature of the measurement on the 
Valence IAT, the researcher explained why this had been necessary (i.e., to 
                                                             
35 For those who had to leave directly after finishing, the researcher sent a full debrief by email. 
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avoid influencing participant persistence behavior). The researcher also 
explained that all but one of the anagrams was unsolvable, and that even the 
solvable one came from a list of difficult anagrams, so no participant would 
leave the room feeling disappointed in their performance. The researcher 
presented participants with the opportunity to access their time per anagram 
and any notes that the researcher had covertly made on their verbalizations 
during the task, and answered any remaining questions participants had. 
Finally, participants were thanked and dismissed.  
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Preliminary Analyses 
5.4.1.1 Reliability of the Valence IAT 
The reliabilities of each of the self-report measures have been reported above 
(in Materials, Section 5.3.2), and largely showed appropriate internal 
consistency. Half of the sample took the Valence IAT. Study 1 described 
calculating the reliability of the IAT by splitting the IAT into two halves and 
assessing the strength of their correlation (Meade, 2009). For this study, in 
which the first aim was to continue to assess the reliability of the Valence IAT, 
the calculation revealed that the Valence IAT was again internally consistent, 
r=.62, p < .01.  
5.4.1.2 Treatment of the Achievement Goal Methods 
Correspondence between persistence and the AGQ-R was carried out using 
Performance Approach subscale means (PAP) and Mastery Approach subscale 
means (MAP). In addition, as in Study 1, performance subscales were averaged 
into a combined performance score (P_Avg), and the same was done for 
mastery subscales (M_Avg). Furthermore, given that the blocks of the Valence 
IAT had been counterbalanced throughout their administration, these were 
now standardized so that a positive and higher IAT effect reflected a 
performance preference and a negative and lower IAT effect reflected a 
mastery preference.  
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5.4.1.3 Treatment of the Persistence Indicators 
There were two measures of persistence behavior. One measure was the time 
each participant spent on each anagram, computed from the times that each 
participant opened and closed each anagram. In terms of total time spent on all 
five anagrams, participants ranged from spending around nine minutes to 
approximately ninety minutes, with a mean time of about twenty-eight 
minutes. The other measure of participant persistence behavior was the amount 
of attempts participants had made on each anagram, derived from the scrap paper 
on which they did their working out. An attempt represented the number of 
times a series of anagram letters was written anew. In terms of total attempts 
made across the five anagrams, participants ranged from making no visible 
attempts to 195 attempts, with a mean of around forty-five. Out of the fifty 
participants, thirty-nine got the fourth anagram (BUTTON) correct, 
representing 78% of the sample.  
Given the achievement task design of three unsolvable anagrams, a solvable 
anagram, and then a final unsolvable anagram, running analyses at the level of 
total time spent on anagrams in order to distinguish persistence behavior 
between participants who reported a performance or mastery orientation on the 
AGQ-R or IAT would not make sense. Sideridis and Kaplan’s (2011) study, from 
which the achievement task procedure was adapted, instead suggested a 
between-trial level analysis. As such, persistence averages were calculated on the 
basis of anagrams 1-3 because all of these anagrams were unsolvable and thus 
allowed for the observation of participants’ responses to a failure situation.  
Furthermore, given that the hypotheses and aims of the study required 
assessing if persistence behavior was linked with affect and intrinsic motivation 
(Hypothesis 2) and corresponded with the achievement goal methods (Aims 2 
and 3, Hypothesis 3), a decision had to be made for how to categorize 
participants’ persistence behavior as performance or mastery. Out of several 
possible ways of conducting this categorization, two ways are used in the 
analysis described here, and another is included in the appendix (see Appendix 
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10.2.6).36 Both of the ways described here involved dividing the sample into 
performance and mastery via a median split. As there were two persistence 
indicators, one median split was conducted based on average amount of time 
spent on anagrams 1-3, and the other median split was conducted based on 
average number of attempts made on anagrams 1-3.  
Beginning with persistence behavior in terms of average time spent on anagrams 
1-3, the median was calculated at 285.33 seconds (almost five minutes). As such, 
the behavior of all participants who spent less time than this on average for 
anagrams 1-3 was categorized as displaying a performance goal. Similarly, the 
behavior of all participants who spent more time than the median on average 
for anagrams 1-3 was categorized as displaying a mastery goal. This median 
split divided the sample neatly in half, such that there were 25 participants in the 
performance group and 25 participants in the mastery group. The means for 
time spent and attempts made on anagrams 1-3 for performance and mastery 
groups are shown in Table 11 below. An independent samples t-test found both 
of the differences in means to be at statistical significance (time spent, t(48) = -
6.591, p < .001, d = -1.86; attempts made, t(48) = -4.524, p < .001, d = -1.28). As 
such, according to this persistence categorization approach, some participants 
persisted statistically significantly longer than others (Hypothesis 1).  
                                                             
36 The analysis laid out in the appendix is the original analysis. The original analysis worked 
backwards, on the basis of whether participants had reported or reacted mastery (group a) and 
reported or reacted performance (group b). These two groups were examined in terms of 
whether there were significant differences across group means for average time spent on 
anagrams 1-3, average attempts made on anagrams 1-3, and PANAS and IMI responses. This 
analysis involved a comparison of means and a factorial ANOVA, and found that no clear 
patterns emerged. Those who endorsed or reacted quickly to mastery spent slightly longer and 
made slightly more attempts on average than those who had endorsed or reacted more quickly 
to performance, but this difference did not reach statistical significance. However, this analysis 
did not seem to directly test whether the implicit and/or explicit method adequately reflected 
the theorized differences in behavior expected of performance and mastery oriented 
individuals (the research question). Hence, the currently described analysis was conducted, 
using a median split, beginning with participant behavior rather than how individuals had 
responded/reacted to the AGQ-R or Valence IAT.  
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Table 11. Mean persistence by group (time persistence median split) 
  Mean Time Spent on 
Anagrams 1-3 
Mean Attempts Made on 
Anagrams 1-3 
Group n M SD M SD 
Performance 25 218.35 47.69 5.25 3.07 
Mastery 25 599.96 285.56 15.05 10.39 
Total 50 409.15 279.65 10.15 9.05 
Note. Group = membership based on median split according to average time 
spent on failure anagrams 1-3, Mean Time on Anagrams 1-3 is in seconds, n = 
number of participants per condition, M = mean, SD = standard deviation. 
Continuing with participant persistence behavior in terms of average attempts 
made on anagrams 1-3, the median was calculated at 7 attempts. As such, the 
behavior of participants who made fewer attempts than this on average for 
anagrams 1-3 was categorized as displaying a performance goal. Again, the 
behavior of all participants who made more attempts than this on average for 
anagrams 1-3 was categorized as displaying a mastery goal. This median split 
divided the sample nearly in half, such that there were 26 participants in the 
performance group and 24 participants in the mastery group. The means for 
time spent and attempts made on anagrams 1-3 for each of these groups are 
shown in Table 12 below. An independent samples t-test found both of the 
differences in means to be at statistical significance (time spent, t(48) = -4.040, 
p < .001, d = -1.13; attempts made, t(48) = -6.329, p < .001, d = -1.76). As such, 
this persistence categorization approach also found that some participants 
persisted statistically significantly more than others (Hypothesis 1). 
Table 12. Mean persistence by group (attempts persistence median split) 
  Mean Time Spent on 
Anagrams 1-3 
Mean Attempts Made on 
Anagrams 1-3 
Group n M SD M SD 
Performance 26 275.18 139.83 4.35 1.97 
Mastery 24 554.29 321.07 16.44 9.54 
Total 50 409.15 279.65 10.15 9.05 
Note. Group = membership based on median split according to average 
attempts made on failure anagrams 1-3, Mean Time on Anagrams 1-3 is in 
seconds, n = number of participants per condition, M = mean, SD = standard 
deviation. 
The subsequent analyses draw on both of these median split approaches in 
exploring whether persistence behavior was in line with the theorized patterns 
of affect and intrinsic motivation (Hypothesis 2), and then whether persistence 
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behavior was more consistent with participants’ reactions on the Valence IAT 
than with their responses on to the AGQ-R (Hypothesis 3). 
5.4.2 Links between persistence behavior, affect, and 
intrinsic motivation  
The second hypothesis for this study was that those whose persistence behavior 
was more indicative of mastery goals would have higher ratings of positive 
affect and intrinsic motivation than those whose persistence behavior was more 
indicative of performance goals. The sections below explore whether this was 
the case according to each of the median split persistence behavior 
categorizations.  
5.4.2.1 Time persistence, affect, and intrinsic motivation 
In order to compare time persistence and affect, the ratings for all positive and 
all negative affect items were summed to create separate positive and negative 
affect subscale scores ranging between 10 (answering 1 for each item) and 50 
(answering 5 for each item). The mean scores for the positive and negative 
affect subscales are presented in Table 13 and displayed in Figure 10.  
Table 13. Affect means by group (time persistence median split) 
 Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Group n M SD M SD 
Performance 25 25.36 6.18 19.24 5.80 
Mastery 25 25.72 5.24 20.56 6.95 
Total 50 25.54 5.67 19.90 6.37 
Note. Group = membership based on median split according to average time 
spent on failure anagrams 1-3, n = number of participants per condition, M = 
mean, SD = standard deviation. 
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Figure 10. Affect means by group (time persistence median split) 
As predicted (Hypothesis 2), the positive affect mean was indeed higher for 
those in the mastery goal group than for those in the performance goal group. 
However, as shown in Table 13, this difference between the performance goal 
group and the mastery goal group was small and failed to reach statistical 
significance when tested using an independent samples t-test (t(48) = -.222, p = 
.825, d = -0.06). Interestingly, the mastery goal group also had a higher negative 
affect mean than those in the performance goal group, the inverse of what was 
predicted according to theorized patterns of response to induced failure. Again, 
however, this difference between the performance and mastery goal groups 
failed to reach significance (t(48) = -.729, p = .469, d =-0.21). As such, according 
to categorization based on average time spent on anagrams 1-3, the findings 
failed to show statistically significant differences in affect for the performance 
and mastery goal groups. 
In order to compare time persistence and intrinsic motivation, the ratings for 
the interest and enjoyment, perceived competence, and importance and effort 
subscale scores were averaged. The means for each intrinsic motivation 
subscale are presented in Table 14, and visualized in Figure 11.  
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Table 14. Intrinsic motivation means by group (time persistence median 
split) 
 Interest/Enjoyment Perceived 
Competence 
Importance/Effort 
Group M SD M SD M SD 
Performance 3.99 1.06 1.85 0.92 5.42 0.63 
Mastery 4.32 0.87 1.43 0.50 5.53 0.89 
Total 4.15 0.97 1.64 0.76 5.48 0.77 
Note. M = mean, SD = standard deviation. 
 
Figure 11. Intrinsic motivation means by group (time persistence median 
split) 
As predicted (Hypothesis 2), the interest and enjoyment and importance and 
effort means were indeed higher for those in the mastery goal group than those 
in the performance goal group (see Table 14). However, neither of these 
differences between the performance and mastery groups reached significance 
(interest and enjoyment, t(48) = -1.209, p =.232, d = -0.34; importance and effort, 
t(48) = -.476, p = .636, d = -0.14).  Interestingly, those in the performance goal 
group reported higher perceived competence than those in the mastery goal 
group, and here the difference in means was at statistical significance (t(48) = 
2.007, p = .05, d = 0.57). As such, according to categorization based on average 
time spent on anagrams 1-3, the findings failed to show statistically significant 
differences in line with the predictions for interest and enjoyment and 
importance and effort for the performance and mastery goal groups. The 
findings did, however, show a statistically significant difference between the 
groups in terms of perceived competence, which departs from the predicted 
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pattern of higher intrinsic motivation for those in the mastery goal group 
(Hypothesis 2).  
5.4.2.2 Attempts persistence, affect, and intrinsic 
motivation 
The means for positive and negative affect across the performance and mastery 
groups according to categorization based on attempts persistence is shown in 
Table 15 and visualized in Figure 12.  
Table 15. Affect means by group (attempts persistence median split) 
 Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Group n M SD M SD 
Performance 26 24.62 6.53 19.88 5.38 
Mastery 24 26.54 4.49 19.92 7.41 
Total 50 25.54 5.67 19.90 6.37 
Note. Group = membership based on median split according to average 
attempts made on failure anagrams 1-3, n = number of participants per 
condition, M = mean, SD = standard deviation. 
 
Figure 12. Affect means by group (attempts persistence median split) 
As predicted (Hypothesis 2), those in the mastery group indeed reported greater 
positive affect than those in the performance group. However, the differences 
in group means across the performance and mastery groups failed to reach 
significance (t(48) = -1.205, p = .234, d = -0.34). The performance and mastery 
groups also had similar means for negative affect (t(48) = -.018, p = .986, d = -
0.01, see Table 15). As such, according to categorization based on average 
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attempts made on anagrams 1-3, the findings were more in line with the 
predictions than categorization according to average time spent on anagrams 1-
3, but failed to show statistically significant differences in affect for the 
performance and mastery goal groups.  
In order to compare attempts persistence and intrinsic motivation, the IMI 
subscale scores were averaged. Means for each subscale are shown for the 
performance and mastery goal groups in Table 16 and Figure 13.  
Table 16. Intrinsic motivation means by group (attempts persistence 
median split) 
  Interest/Enjoyment Perceived 
Competence 
Importance/Effort 
Group n M SD M SD M SD 
Performance 26 3.97 0.96 1.72 0.89 5.38 0.67 
Mastery 24 4.35 0.97 1.54 0.60 5.58 0.86 
Total 50 4.15 0.97 1.64 0.76 5.48 0.77 
Note. Group = membership based on median split according to average 
attempts made on failure anagrams 1-3, M = mean, SD = standard deviation. 
 
Figure 13. Intrinsic motivation means by group (attempts persistence 
median split) 
As predicted (Hypothesis 2), the interest and enjoyment and importance and 
effort means were again indeed higher for those in the mastery goal group than 
those in the performance goal group. However, again, these differences across 
the performance and mastery groups failed to reach significance (interest and 
enjoyment, t(48) = -1.387, p = .172, d = -0.39; importance and effort, t(48) = -
.950, p = .347, d = -0.26).  As in the time persistence categorization, those in the 
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performance goal group reported higher perceived competence than those in 
the mastery goal group, but this difference failed to reach statistical 
significance (t(48) = .844, p = .403, d = 0.24) for this categorization approach. As 
such, according to categorization based on average attempts made on 
anagrams 1-3, the findings failed to show statistically significant differences in 
line with the predictions for all three of the IMI subscales. Although the group 
means for the interest and enjoyment and importance and effort subscales 
moved in the right direction, the group means for perceived competence again 
departed from the predicted pattern of higher intrinsic motivation for those in 
the mastery goal group. 
5.4.2.3 Affect and intrinsic motivation summary 
The findings for affect and intrinsic motivation in terms of performance and 
mastery groups were thus mostly similar according to both median split 
approaches. Both categorization approaches found that those whose 
persistence behavior reflected a mastery goal had greater positive affect, 
interest and enjoyment, and importance and effort ratings than those whose 
persistence behavior reflected a performance goal. These findings were in line 
with Hypothesis 2, but the group differences failed to reach significance. 
Unexpected findings across both categorization approaches were that those in 
the performance group had higher perceived competence and lower negative 
affect ratings than those in the mastery group, although the only difference in 
means to reach statistical significance was that of perceived competence in the 
time persistence analysis. These findings are discussed further in the discussion 
section of this Study (see Section 5.5), along with findings regarding the 
correspondence between persistence behavior and achievement goal methods. 
5.4.3 Correspondence between persistence behavior 
and achievement goal methods  
The performance and mastery groups according to both median split 
approaches were also used to explore Hypothesis 3: whether the mastery and 
performance persistence behavior of participants would correspond better with 
their subsequent Valence IAT scores than with their conscious, explicit self-
reported AGQ-R (PAP, MAP, P_Avg, M_Avg). This prediction was made in line 
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with the potential dual process explanation offered in Study 1, that implicit 
methods might better predict spontaneous behavior, while explicit, self-report 
methods better predict subjective accounts. 
5.4.3.1 Time persistence and achievement goal methods 
To test Hypothesis 3, initially a count was made of the number of participants 
per persistence group who took each achievement goal method. The group sizes 
according to the time persistence median split were uneven, as is shown in 
Table 17. Descriptive statistics for each of the variables of interest by group are 
shown in Table 18.  
Table 17. Participants by group and achievement goal method (time 
persistence median split) 
 Achievement Goal Method  
Group AGQ-R Valence IAT Total 
Performance 8 17 25 
Mastery 17 8 25 
Total 25 25 50 
Note. Group = membership based on median split according to average time 
spent on failure anagrams 1-3, AGQ-R = Achievement Goal Questionnaire-
Revised, IAT = Implicit Association Test. 
Table 18. Achievement goal method means by group (time persistence 
median split) 
Group Variable of Interest n Mean Min. Max. SD 
Performance PAP 8 3.88 2.00 5.00 0.85 
P_Avg 8 3.92 3.00 4.83 0.56 
MAP 8 4.21 2.67 4.67 0.67 
M_Avg 8 3.71 2.83 4.50 0.69 
IAT Score 17 -.0419 -.5376 .5816 0.2985 
Mastery PAP 17 3.39 1.67 5.00 1.06 
P_Avg 17 3.41 1.33 5.00 1.02 
MAP 17 4.39 3.00 5.00 0.54 
M_Avg 17 4.04 2.83 4.67 0.54 
IAT Score 8 -.0892 -.4310 -.3264 0.3131 
Note. PAP = Performance Approach subscale score, P_Avg = mean of 
performance approach and avoidance subscales, MAP = Mastery Approach 
subscale score, M_Avg = mean of mastery approach and avoidance subscales, 
IAT = Implicit Association Test, n = number of participants per condition, M = 
mean, Min. = minimum, Max. = maximum, SD = standard deviation. 
As shown in Table 18, those in the performance group had higher Performance 
Approach (PAP) and combined performance averages (P_Avg) than those in the 
mastery group. Similarly, those in the mastery group had higher Mastery 
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Approach (MAP) and combined mastery averages (M_Avg) than those in the 
performance group. In terms of Valence IAT scores, larger positive scores 
denote a performance preference, whereas more negative scores denote a 
mastery preference (cf. 5.4.1.2). Although the mean Valence IAT score for those 
in the mastery group was more negative than that of the performance group, the 
performance group mean Valence IAT score should have been positive for the 
Valence IAT to correspond with performance persistence. In sum, although 
group sizes were uneven (see Table 17), the AGQ-R subscales of interest were in 
line with the persistence groups, while the mean Valence IAT scores were not 
entirely consistent with persistence groups. This finding of correspondence 
analysis conducted at group level does not support Hypothesis 3, that the 
Valence IAT would be more consistent with persistence behavior. 
To explore this correspondence at the level of the individual participant, an 
assessment was made of how many performance group participants had 
responded with a higher performance average on the AGQ-R or reacted more 
quickly to Performance Goals and Good on the Valence IAT. The same was 
done for participants categorized into the mastery group. The results of this 
analysis are shown in Table 19 below.   
Table 19. Consistency of responses by group and achievement goal 
method (time persistence median split) 
Group   AGQ-R Valence IAT Total 
Performance Consistent 6 7 13 
 Inconsistent 2 10 12 
 Total 8 17 25 
     
Mastery Consistent 10 4 14 
 Inconsistent 7 4 11 
 Total 17 8 25 
     
Total Consistent 16 11 27 
 Inconsistent 9 14 23 
 Total 25 25 50 
Note. AGQ-R = Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised, IAT = Implicit 
Association Test.  
As shown in Table 19, for participants whose persistence (in terms of average 
time spent on anagrams 1-3) signified a performance goal, the combined 
achievement goal measures were consistent with this behavior for 13 out of 25 
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participants. In terms of participants whose persistence signified a mastery 
goal, the combined achievement goal measures were consistent with this 
behavior for 14 out of 25 participants. In total, the combined achievement goal 
methods were consistent with behavior across the sample for 27 participants out 
of a total sample size of 50. Out of these consistent instances, 11 participants 
had taken the Valence IAT, and 16 had taken the AGQ-R. In terms of a median 
split based on average time spent on anagrams 1-3, the achievement goal 
methods were consistent with persistence behavior for just over half the 
sample, with the AGQ-R slightly more consistent than the Valence IAT. This 
finding of correspondence analysis conducted at the individual level also does 
not support Hypothesis 3, that the Valence IAT would be more consistent with 
persistence behavior. 
5.4.3.2 Attempts persistence and achievement goal 
methods 
To test Hypothesis 3 according to attempts persistence, a count was made of the 
number of participants per group who took each achievement goal method. The 
number of participants per condition and achievement goal method was more 
balanced than for the time persistence analysis, and is shown in Table 20. 
Descriptive statistics for each of the achievement goal methods by group are 
shown in Table 21.  
Table 20. Participants by group and achievement goal method (attempts 
persistence median split) 
 Achievement Goal Method  
Group AGQ-R Valence IAT Total 
Performance 14 12 26 
Mastery 11 13 24 
Total 25 25 50 
Note. AGQ-R = Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised, IAT = Implicit 
Association Test. 
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Table 21. Achievement goal method means by group (attempts 
persistence median split) 
Group Variable of Interest n Mean Min. Max. SD 
Performance PAP 14 3.40 2.00 5.00 0.96 
P_Avg 14 3.50 1.83 4.83 0.81 
MAP 14 4.38 2.67 5.00 0.55 
M_Avg 14 3.96 2.83 4.50 0.63 
IAT Score 12 -.0517 -.5376 .5816 0.2984 
Mastery PAP 11 3.73 1.67 5.00 1.07 
P_Avg 11 3.67 1.33 5.00 1.09 
MAP 11 4.27 3.00 5.00 0.63 
M_Avg 11 3.89 2.83 4.67 0.58 
IAT Score 13 -.0620 -.5171 .3264 0.3088 
 Note. PAP = Performance Approach subscale score, P_Avg = mean of 
performance approach and avoidance subscales, MAP = Mastery Approach 
subscale score, M_Avg = mean of mastery approach and avoidance subscales, 
IAT = Implicit Association Test, n = number of participants per condition, M = 
mean, Min. = minimum, Max. = maximum, SD = standard deviation. 
Although the number of participants in each performance or mastery behavior 
group was more evenly spread across the achievement goal methods than in the 
time persistence analysis (see table Table 20), Table 21 suggests that neither the 
AGQ-R subscale means nor the mean Valence IAT scores corresponded with 
persistence behavior. Those who had made more attempts, the mastery group, 
actually had higher Performance Approach (PAP) and combined performance 
averages (P_Avg) than those in the performance group. Similarly, those in the 
performance group actually had higher Mastery Approach (MAP) and 
combined mastery averages (M_Avg) than those in the mastery group. In terms 
of mean Valence IAT scores, the same pattern emerged as in the time 
persistence analysis: those whose persistence behavior denoted a mastery goal 
had more negative mean scores than those whose behavior denoted a 
performance goal. As before, the mean Valence IAT score for those in the 
performance group should have been positive for the Valence IAT to 
correspond with performance persistence. In sum, this lack of correspondence 
based on analysis conducted at group level does not support Hypothesis 3, that 
the Valence IAT would be more consistent with persistence behavior. 
To explore this correspondence at the level of the individual participant, an 
assessment was made of how many performance group participants had 
responded with a higher performance average on the AGQ-R or reacted more 
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quickly to Performance Goals and Good on the Valence IAT. The same was 
done for participants categorized into the mastery group. The results of this 
analysis are shown in Table 22. 
Table 22. Consistency of responses by group and achievement goal 
method (attempts persistence median split) 
Group   AGQ-R Valence IAT Total 
Performance Consistent 5 4 9 
 Inconsistent 9 8 17 
 Total 14 12 26 
     
Mastery Consistent 4 6 10 
 Inconsistent 7 7 14 
 Total 11 13 24 
     
Total Consistent 9 10 19 
 Inconsistent 16 15 31 
 Total 25 25 50 
Note. Group = membership based on median split according to average 
attempts made on failure anagrams 1-3, AGQ-R = Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire-Revised, IAT = Implicit Association Test.  
In terms of participants whose persistence (in terms of average attempts made 
on anagrams 1-3) signified a performance goal, the combined achievement goal 
measures were consistent with this behavior for 9 out of 26 participants. In 
terms of participants whose persistence signified a mastery goal, the combined 
achievement goal measures were consistent with this behavior for 10 out of 24 
participants. In total, the combined achievement goal methods were consistent 
with behavior across the sample for 19 participants out of a total sample size of 
50. Out of these consistent instances, 10 participants had taken the Valence 
IAT, and 9 had taken the AGQ-R. In terms of a median split based on average 
attempts made on anagrams 1-3, although the group sizes were more balanced 
than for the time persistence analysis (see Table 20), the achievement goal 
methods were consistent with persistence behavior for under half the sample 
(see Table 22), with the Valence IAT slightly more consistent than the AGQ-R. 
However, the Valence IAT was not significantly more consistent with the 
behavior than the AGQ-R for correspondence analysis conducted at the level of 
the individual, and therefore this finding does not support Hypothesis 3. 
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5.4.3.3 Summary of correspondence analyses 
In terms of group level analysis, there was greater correspondence between the 
AGQ-R and persistence behavior in terms of the time persistence categorization 
than there was in terms of attempts persistence categorization. Throughout the 
group level analysis, there was correspondence between the Valence IAT 
mastery group persistence, but this correspondence was not apparent with 
performance group persistence.  
In terms of correspondence at the level of the individual, across both median 
split analyses, the achievement goal methods were consistent with persistence 
behavior 46 out of 100 times. On 21 occasions, the Valence IAT was consistent 
with behavior, and on 25 occasions the AGQ-R was consistent with behavior. 
Overall, the achievement goal methods were consistent with achievement 
behavior less than half the time, and the AGQ-R was only slightly more 
consistent with achievement behavior than the Valence IAT (i.e., for 4 more 
participants), leading to a rejection of Hypothesis 3.  
5.4.4 Further Correlational Analyses 
A final exploration of correlations examined the relationships between 
participants’ behavioral persistence, their responses or reactions to the 
achievement goal methods, and their self-reported affect and intrinsic 
motivation. These correlations are illustrated in Table 23.  
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Table 23. Correlations between average persistence, achievement goal 
methods, affect, and intrinsic motivation 
Variables 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Time Anagrams 1-3 .83** -.18 -.02 .29 .05 .19 .14 -.16 .18 
2. Attempts Anagrams 
1-3 
— -.18 .01 .18 .01 .06 .07 -.12 .01 
3. Valence IAT Score  — a a .11 .17 -.24 .20 .10 
4. Performance 
Average 
  — .14 -.09 .38 -.04 -.11 .05 
5. Mastery Average    — .33 .28 .30 -.03 .56** 
6. Positive Affect     — .08 .49** .38** .46** 
7. Negative Affect      — -.16 -.07 .18 
8. Interest and 
Enjoyment 
      — .18 .36** 
9. Perceived 
Competence 
       — .09 
10. Importance and 
Effort 
        — 
Note. **p < .01, a could not be computed as participants either took the Valence 
IAT or the AGQ-R, IAT = Implicit Association Test, AGQ-R = Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire-Revised. 
Table 23 indicates that few significant relationships were observed. In terms of 
achievement goal methods, the only significant relationship observed was 
between a higher mastery average on the AGQ-R and ratings of importance and 
effort on the IMI. This may have occurred as a result of the content 
correspondence in terms of task focus in the mastery items on the AGQ-R and 
the importance and effort subscale of the IMI. However, according to this logic, 
there should also have been a statistically significant relationship between a 
lower mastery average and lower ratings on the importance and effort subscale 
of the IMI, but this did not emerge from the correlational analysis. The Valence 
IAT score failed to correlate significantly with any variable. Furthermore, 
neither achievement goal method correlated significantly with the persistence 
measures (Hypothesis 3).  
A significant relationship was observed between time and attempt persistence, 
suggesting that those who spent more time on the failure anagrams also made 
more attempts during this time, but neither type of persistence was related to 
affect or intrinsic motivation self-reports (Hypothesis 2). Positive affect ratings 
were significantly related to all three intrinsic motivation subscales, suggesting 
a consistently positive affect and intrinsic motivation experience for some 
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participants. However, this positive experience did not extend significantly to a 
higher mastery average or the lower, more negative Valence IAT score that 
denotes a mastery preference.  
The final significant relationship was between the interest and enjoyment and 
importance and effort subscales of the IMI. The lack of significant correlation 
between these IMI subscales and the perceived competence subscale is of 
interest due to the fact that those in the performance group had higher (but not 
significantly) perceived competence ratings than mastery behaving participants 
in both median split categorizations.   
5.5 Discussion 
The research question guiding this study asked will an implicit or explicit 
achievement goal method be more consistent with a student’s achievement behavior? 
Achievement behavior was operationalized in terms of persistence (time and 
attempts) on failure anagrams 1-3. Hypothesis 1 was that some participants 
would persist more than others, the former representing a mastery response to 
failure and the latter a performance response to failure. This was supported by 
the findings of this study in that differences across performance and mastery 
group means reached statistical significance across both median split 
approaches (time split: time persistence: t(48) = -6.591, p < .001, d = -1.86; 
attempts persistence: t(48) = -4.524, p < .001, d = -1.28; attempts split: time 
persistence t(48) = -4.040, p < .001, d = -1.13; attempts persistence: t(48) =             
-6.239, p < .001, d = -1.76).  
Hypothesis 2 was that those whose persistence denoted a mastery goal would 
also report experience greater positive affect and intrinsic motivation than 
those whose persistence denoted a performance goal. The mastery goal group 
in both persistence categorizations indeed reported greater positive affect, 
interest and enjoyment, and effort and importance than those in the 
performance goal group. However, the means comparisons did not find 
significant differences across groups for these variables, and the correlational 
analysis also failed to find a significant relationship between greater persistence 
(time and attempts) and any of the affect or intrinsic motivation subscales. As 
such, the study findings do not support Hypothesis 2.  
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However, a finding of interest regarding affect and intrinsic motivation was that 
for both categorization approaches, those in the performance goal group 
reported higher perceived competence and lower negative affect than those in 
the mastery goal group. Though there was only a significant difference for 
perceived competence in the time persistence median split analysis (t(48) = 
2.007, p = .05), this finding is opposite to what was predicted according to 
theorized patterns for performance participants in repeated failure situations 
(Hypothesis 2). It may have been that those who persisted less in a way 
protected themselves from the negative experience of repeated failure. Indeed, 
by persisting less, they might have been able to retain a higher level of 
perceived competence and less negative affect than those in the mastery group, 
who were exposed to failure for longer by persisting more. However, this 
explanation would suggest that lower persistence should be related to higher 
perceived competence and lower negative affect, but both correlations failed to 
reach statistical significance.  
The study also failed to find statistically significant support for Hypothesis 3, 
that the Valence IAT would correspond better with persistence behavior on an 
achievement task than the AGQ-R. At the group level, the analysis based on 
time persistence categorization showed correspondence between persistence 
behavior and the AGQ-R, while the attempts persistence categorization did not. 
At the group level, both persistence categorizations showed correspondence 
between persistence behavior and the Valence IAT score only for those in the 
mastery goal group. At the individual level, the analysis based on time 
persistence categorization showed correspondence between the persistence 
behavior and achievement goal method for 27 participants (16 AGQ-R, 11 
Valence IAT), out of the total sample size of 50. At the individual level, the 
analysis based on attempts persistence showed correspondence between 
persistence behavior and achievement goal method for 19 participants (9 AGQ-
R, 10 Valence IAT), out of the total sample size of 50. Across both categorization 
approaches, with a total sample size of 100, correspondence was thus only 
observed less than half of the time (46%), and the AGQ-R corresponded with 
persistence behavior on only four more occasions than the Valence IAT. 
Consequently, responses and reactions to the two achievement goal methods 
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seemed to be equally consistent with behavior. However, given that both 
achievement goal methods corresponded less than half the time, neither 
method performed particularly well.  
Two potential explanations offered for this poor performance are that there was 
a problem with the study design such as the operationalization of achievement 
goal behavior, or that these methods are actually not very consistent with 
achievement goal behavior. The finding that the time and attempts persistence 
failed to correlate significantly with any of the other variables is suggestive of 
the former explanation: that there was a problem with the operationalization of 
achievement goal behavior. On one hand, this lack of correlation could have 
resulted from the lack of content correspondence between the persistence 
indicators and the other methods. On the other hand, it is ceded that there was 
a struggle to discern an achievement task that met the requirements of being 
dichotomous in order to be compared with the Valence IAT, and of 
differentiating between achievement goals, given some more positive findings 
for performance approach goals in comparison to performance avoidance goal 
as a result of exploration of the 2 x 2 model (Elliot & McGregor, 2001).  
Future studies might thus explore alternatives such as measuring persistence 
differently (Bouffard, Boisvert, Vezeau, & Larouche, 1995; Elliot, McGregor, & 
Gable, 1999; Pintrich et al., 1993), or focusing on different paradigms such as 
effort (Elliot et al., 1999), deep and surface learning strategies (Elliot et al., 
1999; Entwistle, 1988), help-seeking (Ryan & Pintrich, 1997) or academic self-
handicapping (Midgley & Urdan, 2001). In addition to this, while examining 
persistence behavior, affect and intrinsic motivation may represent a valid 
approach for differentiating between dichotomous performance and mastery 
goals, perhaps the assignment of participants to performance and mastery goal 
groups based on a median split may have played a role in the lack of overall 
correspondence between persistence behavior and achievement goal methods. 
However, this median split approach is only one of what are likely to be several 
ways of allocating participants to mastery and performance persistence groups, 
and as such, other analyses might better help uncover what is going on.  
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The second potential explanation was that these methods are actually not very 
consistent with achievement goal behavior. Given that the Valence IAT is a new 
method, continued investigation will need to contribute towards assessing its 
predictive validity. However, the AGQ-R is a well-established tool. If it fails to 
significantly reflect students’ achievement behavior, this is a problem for 
achievement goal research, and researchers must question what they have been 
measuring. Of course, one study with equivocal findings is not enough to 
undermine findings based on the AGQ-R. As such, more studies exploring the 
links between the AGQ-R and students’ behavior are necessary to assess the 
potential implications of the claim made in Chapter 3, that achievement goal 
questionnaires may only capture post hoc rationalizations of general 
achievement behavior rather than illuminate achievement goals.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This study tried to explore whether implicit or explicit methods correspond 
better with achievement goal behavior. Participants were administered an 
induced failure anagrams task, and then reported on their affect and intrinsic 
motivation, before completing either the Valence IAT or the Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire-Revised. While some participants indeed persisted more than 
others, the study failed to reveal theoretically predicted links between 
persistence on the achievement task and affect and intrinsic motivation. 
Moreover, the Valence IAT and the AGQ-R were equally consistent with the 
persistence behavior, but were only consistent less than half the time. Given 
that a potential reason for these equivocal results may lie in the median split 
categorization of participants into mastery and performance goal groups, in 
Study 3, an attempt is made to manipulate the categorization of persistence 
behavior. This manipulation is done using a priming procedure as Study 3 
explores the potential for nonconscious achievement goals and their influence 
on achievement behavior. 
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6 Study 3 Priming achievement goals? Successful 
nonconscious activation of achievement goals – 
behavioral evidence of nonconscious operation of 
achievement goals? 
Introduction 
As with the previous two chapters, this chapter reports on an empirical study, 
conducted in alignment with aim 3b, to assess the extent to which the implications 
of findings on implicit cognition and nonconscious goal pursuit apply to how 
achievement goals are currently theorized through designing and running a series of 
studies to empirically test if achievement goals can operate and be captured without 
conscious awareness. More specifically, this chapter addresses sub-aim 3b(iii): 
exploring if achievement goals can be nonconsciously activated (primed) and 
subsequently influence achievement behavior. In other words, this study asks, is it 
possible to prime an achievement goal such that it is reflected in achievement 
behavior? To answer this question, the chapter reports on a study that 
attempted to nonconsciously activate performance and mastery achievement 
goals, and then compared the persistence behavior of both primed and non-
primed participants to assess whether the priming had been successful, and 
whether it is thus possible to prime achievement goals.  
The chapter starts off by providing the background to the study, before 
describing the procedure and results. 72 participants were randomly allocated 
to a performance, mastery, or no goal (control) condition. Following a 
supraliminal priming procedure, all participants completed the same anagrams 
task as described in the previous study, and as before, were asked to reflect on 
this task in self-report affect and intrinsic motivation questionnaires. The 
findings from Study 3 set the scene for the final study of this thesis (Study 4), 
which explores the relationship between the nonconscious activation of 
achievement goals and participants’ subsequent responses to implicit and 
explicit achievement goal methods.  
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6.1 Background 
One way of exploring nonconscious achievement goals is to attempt to access 
them and compare these findings with those of self-report methods; another 
way is to explore whether nonconscious achievement goals can be activated to 
influence participants’ goal-driven achievement behavior. While there have 
been many attempts at priming nonconscious goals in general, such as the four 
seminal studies by Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar and Trötschel 
(2001), there have been very few attempts at priming nonconscious achievement 
goals. If some evidence could show that this was possible, it would begin to shed 
light on the possibility that achievement goals, as cognitive representations, can 
operate both consciously and nonconsciously, with implications for how they 
are theorized and accessed.  
There are of course recent studies that explore nonconscious activation and 
achievement goals. In recent priming studies involving achievement goals, for 
example, Elliot and colleagues (2007) explored the effects of priming the color 
red on achievement goals. However, by doing so, it was the color red rather 
than achievement goals that was primed. Similarly, in Ciani and Sheldon’s 
(2010) study of the letters A and F and achievement goals, again, the letters 
were primed, not the achievement goals. Recently, a study by Engeser (2009) 
purported to explore if word class and the explicit achievement motive 
moderate the nonconscious activation of achievement goals. Although finding 
“small but consistent effects of the nonconscious activation of the achievement 
goal” (p. 2), in actuality, Engeser’s study only looked at the goal to achieve rather 
than achievement goals according to Nicholls (1984), Dweck (1986) and 
colleagues. Hence, none of these studies have actually attempted to prime 
achievement goals in order to explore if they can be nonconsciously activated 
and impact on achievement behavior without the conscious awareness of the 
individual. The only studies that have somewhat attempted to do this are a 
series of experiments on projection effects by Kawada, Oettingen, Gollwitzer, 
and Bargh (2004).37  
                                                             
37 This was the only series of studies that attempted to prime achievement goals rather than the 
goal to achieve that could be found at time of writing (2015). More recent studies claiming to 
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Kawada and colleagues (2004) were interested in whether individuals project 
nonconsciously activated goals. As such, in their first experiment, the 
researchers investigated whether presenting participants who espoused an 
entity or incremental theory of intelligence (Dweck, 1999) with an achievement 
scenario would activate a performance or learning goal, respectively, and 
subsequently lead participants to describe a fictional character as possessing 
this goal. For example, they predicted that presenting an entity theorist with an 
achievement scenario would nonconsciously activate a performance goal and 
lead them to project this goal onto the fictional character in that scenario. 
Although the findings supported the researchers’ hypothesis in that there were 
significant differences between the incremental and entity theorists’ projection 
of learning and mastery goals, Kawada and colleagues were not satisfied that 
the findings showed “for sure whether the learning and performance goal 
orientations did indeed become activated by simply presenting participants 
holding either incremental or entity theories with achievement scenarios” 
(2004, p. 548). Hence, they conducted a second study, replacing the 
achievement scenarios with a supraliminal priming task.  
In this second study, Kawada and colleagues (2004) compared implicit and 
explicit goal projection. The researchers began by either explicitly assigning or 
using a supraliminal priming task to activate the goal to compete. The 
researchers then asked primed and control group participants to evaluate the 
competitiveness or cooperativeness of fictional characters in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game. Kawada and colleagues predicted that those primed with the 
goal to compete would be significantly more likely to judge the fictional 
characters in the game as competitive, thereby demonstrating the projection of 
their nonconsciously activated goal. However, although this second study was 
meant to increase the researchers’ confidence in their previous finding by 
assuring that they had “indeed created implicit goal orientations” (Kawada et 
al., 2004, p. 549), the achievement goals that they had attempted to activate in 
Study 1 were now replaced in Study 2 by the goal to compete rather than a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
assess the effects of nonconscious achievement goals on performance and other variables of 
interest also use the latter rather than the former definition when considering achievement 
goals (e.g., Greenlees, Figgins, & Kearney, 2014; Seitchik & Harkins, 2014). 
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learning or performance goal. Consequently, there has not yet been an 
adequate exploration of nonconsciously activated achievement goals.  
The primary aim for Study 3 was thus to assess whether achievement goals can 
be nonconsciously activated. As mentioned in the introduction, the overarching 
question guiding this research was: Are the implications of research on implicit 
cognition applicable to achievement goal theory? This question is tested explicitly 
here, in that research on implicit cognition has shown that goals can be 
nonconsciously activated, and this empirical investigation looks at whether this 
applies to achievement goals. Accordingly, the research question for this study 
was: is it possible to prime an achievement goal such that it is reflected in 
achievement behavior? 
6.1.1 Selection of an achievement goal priming 
procedure 
In a typical priming paradigm, “the concept under study is first primed by 
causing the participant to think about or use it in some way that is unrelated to 
the focal task that comes next in the experiment” (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 2005, p. 
627). As such, the priming task selected for this study was one that would be 
unrelated to the anagram persistence task, which represented the dependent 
variable. Given that Kawada and colleagues (experiment 1, 2004) were not 
satisfied that using an achievement scenario to prime achievement goals had 
definitely activated participants’ achievement goals, and had therefore used a 
Scrambled Sentence Test in their next study, the decision was made to use a 
Scrambled Sentence Test as the priming task in the current study.  
The Scrambled Sentence Test is a commonly employed method of supraliminal 
priming in automaticity research (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000), and originated in 
the work of Srull and Wyer (1979). As the task is presented as a test of language 
ability, the primes are in plain view, rather than subliminally presented, and 
comprise words synonymous with the single construct the researchers are 
trying to activate. By using synonyms, the underlying construct is repeatedly 
activated, comprising the priming manipulation. 
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The instructions for a Scrambled Sentences Test ask participants to unscramble 
25 jumbled sentences, using four out of five of the available words in order to 
create coherent, complete sentences. For example, provided with the five words 
up, time, wake, to, and gold, a participant could construct the four-word sentence 
time to wake up. In a typical study, participants in the experimental group are 
presented with different synonyms of the construct to be primed in ten of the 
scrambled sentences, while the remaining fifteen sentences contain only 
neutral words. Those in the comparison group are only presented with neutral 
words (i.e., all 25 sentences are neutral). So, for example, in a priming study by 
Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (experiment 1, 1996), the researchers were 
interested in priming the trait constructs of politeness and rudeness, in 
comparison to a neutral condition, to see whether these impacted on 
participants’ likelihood and frequency of interrupting a conversation. Those in 
the politeness condition were presented with words such as polite, respect and 
considerate, while those in the rudeness condition were presented with words 
such as impolite, rude, and obnoxious, and participants in the neutral condition 
had entirely unrelated words. 
Adapting the Scrambled Sentence Test to prime achievement goals involved 
creating three conditions: one for performance goals, one for mastery goals, 
and one neutral, no achievement goal condition (i.e., only using non-
achievement-related words). Drawing from the normative comparison, 
competence-based words used by Kawada and colleagues (experiment 2, 
Kawada et al., 2004), the sentences presented to the experimental group in the 
performance goal condition contained 10 performance approach goal 
scrambled sentences, with words related to the normative comparison criteria 
of performance goals, such as win, compete, overtake, better, and best, and were 
interspersed with 15 neutral sentences. Words focusing on the development of 
competence against an intrapersonal or absolute task standard were used for 
the mastery goal experimental condition. Hence, on the mastery version of the 
Scrambled Sentence Test, there were 10 mastery goal scrambled sentences, 
containing words such as understand, learn, improve, progress, and persist, 
alongside 15 neutral sentences. The Scrambled Sentence Test for the control 
group featured 25 neutral sentences, neutral in that they made no reference to 
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achievement-related terms or ideas, and should therefore fail to result in any 
achievement-related priming. Complete versions of the priming tasks for each 
condition can be found in the appendix (see Appendices 10.3.1, 10.3.2, and 
10.3.3).  
Engeser (2009) has recently suggested that a potentially key difference 
between neutral condition and achievement priming conditions is the use of the 
verbs in the latter conditions. Engeser theorized that using verbs may be linked 
to greater activation power than the nouns that are sometimes used in the 
neutral conditions. Engeser’s (2009) analysis ultimately did not find an effect 
of word type on the effectiveness of activating nonconscious achievement-
related goals. However, in the current study, as the words chosen for the 
performance and mastery goal priming conditions were verbs, it was decided 
that the words used in the scrambled sentence for the neutral condition would 
also be verbs. 
6.2 Hypotheses 
The overall hypothesis for Study 3 was that achievement goals could be 
nonconsciously activated to influence subsequent behavior on an achievement 
task. This prediction was based on the wealth of priming studies that have 
suggested the successful activation, fulfilment, and accompanying affect of 
processing and behavioral goals (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Bargh et al., 
2001; see also Section 3.2.4). Furthermore, this prediction was based on the 
posited model of achievement goals as cognitive representations that can 
equally be activated by conscious control as by environmental features (see 
Section 3.3).  
In order to determine whether the nonconscious activation of achievement 
goals had been successful, a series of more directly testable hypotheses were 
produced. Firstly, different achievement goal primes would need to lead to 
different achievement goal-led behavior, and possibly even affect and intrinsic 
motivation. Given that this study employed the same anagram achievement 
task as the previous study (see Section 6.3 below), the first hypothesis for the 
study was that those who were primed with a nonconscious mastery goal would 
persist longer both in terms of time spent and attempts made on the anagrams 
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task than those in the performance goal prime and the no prime conditions. No 
predictions were made about the persistence behavior of those primed with a 
performance goal in comparison with those in the no prime condition. 
It was predicted that those who were primed with mastery goals would report 
greater positive affect, lower negative affect, and higher intrinsic motivation 
than those in the performance goal prime condition. Given that the 
performance prime would be activating an achievement goal and that the 
situation was characterized by failure, it was predicted that this would 
negatively impact performance-primed participants’ affect and intrinsic 
motivation more than it would impact those in the no prime group. Indeed, in a 
series of studies Chartrand and Bargh (Chartrand, 1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 
2002) found that task difficulty was linked to mood for those primed with the 
goal to achieve, and not for those who had not been primed. Hence, those who 
had a nonconsciously activated goal to achieve were either in a better mood 
after an easy task or in a worse mood after a difficult task without knowing why, 
resulting in the term “mystery moods” (Chartrand, 1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 
2002).  
In summary, the hypotheses for Study 3 were that: 
1. Those primed with a mastery goal will persist longer than those in the 
performance goal and neutral conditions 
2. Those primed with a mastery goal will report the highest positive affect, 
followed by the neutral and then performance goal conditions 
3. Those in the neutral condition will report the lowest negative affect, followed 
by the mastery goal and then performance goal conditions 
4. Those primed with a mastery goal will report the highest intrinsic 
motivation, followed by the neutral and then performance goal conditions 
6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Participants 
Participants were 72 students enrolled in different faculties at a university in the 
northeast of England. There were 36 female and 36 male students in the 
sample. 36 participants were undergraduates (years 1-4), and the remaining 36 
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were postgraduates (Masters and PhD students). All participants were 
contacted personally by the researcher and asked if they would like to volunteer 
their participation.  
6.3.2 Materials 
6.3.2.1 Priming Task 
The priming task used was the Scrambled Sentence Test, as described in 
Section 6.1.1. 
6.3.2.2 Achievement Behavior Task 
In a typical priming study, the next task is presented as ostensibly unrelated. 
For this study, the task needed to elicit achievement behavior and also 
distinguish between performance and mastery goals. Hence, drawing on 
Sideridis and Kaplan (2011), as well as other achievement studies using 
anagrams (Ciani & Sheldon, 2010; Elliot et al., 2007), the anagrams task from 
the previous study was used again.  
As before, this task was used to induce a failure experience that could 
distinguish between performance and mastery responses. Also as before, 
anagrams were chosen from a list of difficult anagrams (Remedios, 2000), and 
an extra letter was added to make them unsolvable. Presentation of anagrams 
was identical to the procedure followed in the previous study (see Section 
5.3.2.1). The five anagrams used in this study are displayed in Table 24.  
Table 24. Anagrams 
No. Type  Original 
Anagram 
Original 
Solution 
Added 
Letter 
Anagram w/ 
added letter 
1 Unsolvable  EEGBCRI ICEBERG K EKEGBCRI 
2 Unsolvable  ACTIONAR RAINCOAT F ACTIONARF 
3 Unsolvable  CAMMSIEHN MECHANISM D CAMMDSIEHN 
4 Solvable  ICDHL CHILD - - 
5 Unsolvable  YRBEREW BREWERY U UYRBEREW 
 
6.3.2.3 Affect and Intrinsic Motivation 
As in Study 2, further information about the participants’ experience of the 
achievement task was elicited using the brief 20-item Positive and Negative 
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Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The subscales 
consisted of Positive Affect (10 items; ⍺ = .85) and Negative Affect (10 items; ⍺ = 
.83).  
Participants’ experience of the achievement task was also assessed using their 
responses to the Interest and Enjoyment (‘I enjoyed doing this activity very 
much’, 7 items; ⍺ = .90), Perceived Competence (‘I think I am pretty good at 
this activity’, 6 items; ⍺ = .73), and Effort and Importance (‘It was important to 
me to do well at this task’, 5 items; ⍺ = .81) subscales of the Intrinsic Motivation 
Inventory (IMI, Ryan, 1982).  
6.3.3 Procedure 
 
Figure 14. Study 3 methods 
An overview of the procedure is illustrated in Figure 14. All participants were 
run individually in a room free from noise and distractions. On arrival to the 
room, participants were invited to sit at a desk with the consent form (see 
Appendix 10.3.4) and an envelope on it. Once they had completed the consent 
form, they were instructed to pick any one piece of folded paper randomly from 
the envelope and complete it. The envelope contained the Scrambled Sentence 
Tests for all three conditions (performance, mastery, and neutral). Once 
participants had finished the Scrambled Sentence Test, they were instructed to 
fold it and put it to the side. This process ensured that the researcher was blind 
to the participants’ condition.  
Next, participants were administered the anagrams task, following the same 
procedure as in the previous experiment. As such, each anagram was written 
inside a folded slip of paper, and numbered on the outside with its number (i.e., 
Scrambled Sentence Test 
(Performance or Mastery 
goal, or Neutral) 
Anagrams PANAS IMI 
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1-5). Scrap paper and a pen were provided. Again, participants were instructed 
that they must answer the anagrams in numerical order, that they could only 
have one slip open at a time, and that once they had moved on from one slip, 
they could not return to it. Participants were told that they could spend as long 
as they wished on the anagrams and that once they had completed the 
anagram, they should write the solution on an answer sheet. If they wanted to 
move on from one that they had been unsuccessful in solving, they could just 
draw a dash next to the number. While the participants worked on this task, the 
researcher surreptitiously noted the start and end times for each anagram, 
measured from the time the participant opened the folded slip until they closed 
it and put it aside. Verbalizations were also informally recorded in the form of 
notes taken by the researcher while the participant worked on the task. 
Once the participants indicated that they were ready to move on from the 
anagrams task, the researcher collected any scrap paper they had used for their 
attempts, and handed them the PANAS and the IMI. They were asked to do the 
PANAS first and then the IMI. Participants were instructed to keep the 
anagrams task in mind while filling out both questionnaires.  
When these were complete, the researcher engaged each participant in 
funnelled debriefing (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000, p. 285) to determine whether 
they had become aware of any patterns in the Scrambled Sentence Test, and 
any relations between the Scrambled Sentence Test and the anagrams task. 
More specifically, the funnelled debriefing method tried to ascertain what the 
participants thought the aim of the experiment was, if they were suspicious 
about any aspects of it, whether they thought the tasks were related, and 
whether they noted any theme recurring throughout the study (see Appendix 
10.3.5 for questions).  
When the funnelled questioning was complete, the researcher debriefed each 
participant in full.38 As with Study 2, in accordance with suggestions made 
during the ethics review, given the limited information provided during 
recruitment, the use of a cover story for the priming task, the nonconscious 
                                                             
38 Again, for those who had to leave directly after finishing, the researcher sent a full debrief by 
email. 
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activation, and the covert measurement of persistence behavior, the researcher 
explained why this had been necessary (i.e., to avoid influencing participant 
persistence behavior). The researcher also explained that all but one of the 
anagrams was unsolvable, and that even the solvable one came from a list of 
difficult anagrams, so no participant would leave the room feeling disappointed 
in their performance. The researcher presented participants with the 
opportunity to access their time per anagram and any notes that the researcher 
had covertly made on their verbalizations during the task, and answered any 
remaining questions participants had. Finally, participants were thanked and 
dismissed. 
6.4 Results 
On the basis of having to pick out a Scrambled Sentence Test from the envelope 
at the beginning of the experiment, all participants were allocated to one of 
three priming conditions (performance, mastery, and control), with a total of 24 
participants in each group. The funnelled debriefing procedure suggested that 
none of the participants were suspicious about the influence of the Scrambled 
Sentence Test on their performance on the anagrams task. The research 
question for this study asks, is it possible to prime an achievement goal such that 
achievement behavior reflects the primed goal? The following sections cover the 
analysis of whether the primes impacted on persistence behavior, affect, and 
intrinsic motivation.  
6.4.1 Priming and Persistence 
In order to determine if the priming had been successful, the analysis began by 
examining the achievement behavior. As in Study 2, the achievement behavior 
was characterized by persistence on the anagrams task, both in terms of the 
time spent on each anagram and attempts made. Time spent on each anagram 
was computed from the times that each participant opened and closed each 
anagram. One participant did not follow the instructions of closing the anagram 
when putting it to the side, so their time per anagram could not be calculated, 
and they were excluded from persistence calculations in terms of time spent on 
anagrams. In terms of total time spent on all five anagrams, participants ranged 
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from spending around 4 minutes to approximately 70 minutes, with a mean 
time of about 26 minutes.  
As in Study 2, the attempts made on each anagram were derived from the scrap 
paper on which participants did their working out. An attempt represented the 
number of times a series of anagram letters was written anew. In terms of total 
attempts made across the five anagrams, participants ranged from making one 
attempt to 133, with a mean of 48. Out of the 72 participants, 63 got the fourth 
anagram (CHILD) correct, representing almost 88% of the sample. Of the nine 
who failed to solve this anagram, five participants had been primed with 
performance, while two had been primed with mastery, and two had not been 
primed with a goal. 
Also as in Study 2 (see Section 5.4.1.3), persistence averages were calculated on 
the basis of anagrams 1-3 because these anagrams were unsolvable and thus 
allowed for the examination of participants’ responses to a failure situation. 
Table 25 shows the means and standard deviation for time spent and attempts 
made on anagrams 1-3 across performance, mastery, and neutral prime 
conditions, while Figure 15 and Figure 16 illustrate the difference in means 
across priming conditions.  
Table 25. Means and standard deviations of average amount of time and 
attempts on anagrams 1-3 by priming condition 
 Mean Time on  
Anagrams 1-3 
Mean Attempts on  
Anagrams 1-3 
Priming 
Condition 
n M SD n M SD 
Performance 24 329 212 24 8.29 6.55 
Mastery 23a 464 245 24 14.57 9.53 
Neutral 24 429 232 24 11.82 7.39 
Total 71 406 233 72 11.56 8.23 
Note. a Time per anagram could not be computed for one mastery goal-primed 
participant, Mean Time on Anagrams 1-3 is reported in seconds, n = number of 
participants per condition, M = mean, SD = standard deviation. 
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Figure 15. Mean time spent on anagrams 1-3 by priming condition 
 
Figure 16. Mean attempts made on anagrams 1-3 by priming condition 
As predicted (Hypothesis 1), on average, participants primed with a mastery 
goal spent longer and made more attempts than those in the performance and 
neutral prime conditions. There had not been a specific prediction for how 
performance goal-primed and neutral group would compare in terms of 
persistence, but as shown in Table 25, performance goal-primed participants 
spent even less time and made fewer attempts on anagrams 1-3 than those who 
had not been primed with a goal at all.  
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A one-way ANOVA was then conducted to test if there were differences in 
means across two dependent measures. The findings revealed a statistically 
significant difference between groups for persistence in terms of mean attempts 
on anagrams 1-3, F(2,69) = 3.79, p = .028, ηp2 = 0.10, but not for mean time spent 
on anagrams 1-3, F(2,68) = 2.18, p = .12, ηp2 = 0.06 (see Table 25, Figure 15, and 
Figure 16). A post hoc Tukey test revealed that the mean attempts on anagrams 
1-3 was statistically significantly lower at p < .05 for those in the performance 
goal prime group compared to those in the mastery goal prime group. There 
were no statistically significant differences in mean attempts on anagrams 1-3 
between the neutral group and the two goal priming conditions (p = .28).  
Further exploration using the independent samples t-test procedure showed the 
differences between the performance and mastery goal primed conditions to be 
at significance for both time spent (performance M = 329 seconds, mastery M = 
464 seconds, t(45) = 2.015, p = .05, d = -0.59) and attempts (performance M = 
8.29, mastery M = 14.57, t(46) = 2.659, p = .01, d = -0.77). Comparisons of 
persistence in terms of both time spent and attempts made between the neutral 
condition and each of the goal prime conditions were non-significant (time: 
performance and neutral p = .13, mastery and neutral p = .62; attempts: 
performance and neutral p = .09, mastery and neutral p = .27).  Hence, there was 
a greater difference in for both types of persistence between performance and 
mastery goal conditions, but no statistically significant differences between the 
control group and either of the experimental conditions. This suggests the trend 
for differences by condition in persistence behavior on the anagrams task was 
moving in the right direction, and partially supports Hypothesis 2.  
6.4.2 Priming and Affect 
In order to determine if the priming had been successful, the analysis also 
examined group differences in reported affect. The ratings for all positive and 
all negative affect were summed to create separate positive and negative affect 
subscale scores ranging between 10 (answering 1 for each item) and 50 
(answering 5 for each item). Table 26 lists, while Figure 17 visualizes, the 
average positive and negative affect scores across conditions.  
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Table 26. Means and standard deviations of positive and negative affect by 
priming condition 
 Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Priming Condition n M SD M SD 
Performance 24 25.42 7.04 18.04 6.12 
Mastery 24 25.33 6.68 20.00 6.69 
Neutral 24 22.92 5.45 19.12 6.73 
Total 72 24.56 6.44 19.06 6.47 
Note. n = number of participants per condition, M = mean, SD = standard 
deviation. 
 
Figure 17. Positive and Negative affect means by priming condition 
As shown in Table 26, the findings regarding positive and negative affect across 
priming conditions did not support either Hypothesis 2 or Hypothesis 3. Instead 
of the expected pattern of mastery, then neutral, then performance group for 
highest positive affect, those in the performance goal-primed condition 
reported slightly higher positive affect than those in the mastery goal-primed 
condition, followed by those in the neutral condition. This finding potentially 
suggests that having a goal seemed to be related with greater positive affect 
than not having a goal on the failure inducing achievement task. Next, instead 
of performance, then mastery, and then neutral group as expected for highest 
negative affect, those in the mastery goal-primed condition had the highest 
negative affect, followed by the neutral and then only the performance goal-
primed condition.  
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A one-way ANOVA was conducted to assess if there were differences in means 
across the two dependent measures. The group differences listed in Table 26 
failed to emerge as statistically significant for both positive affect (F(2,69) = 
1.172, p = .316, ηp2 = 0.03) and negative affect (F(2,69) = .544, p = .583, ηp2 =0.02). 
The findings of independent samples t-tests also failed to find any significant 
differences across the priming conditions (all p’s > .18).  
6.4.3 Priming and Intrinsic Motivation  
In order to determine if the priming had been successful, the analysis also 
considered group differences in reported intrinsic motivation. The ratings for 
each of the IMI subscales were averaged, giving three subscale scores 
(interest/enjoyment, perceived competence, and importance/effort). Next, the 
means across the priming conditions were compared, as listed in Table 27 and 
visualized in Figure 18 below.  
Table 27. Means and standard deviations of intrinsic motivation subscales 
by priming condition 
 Interest/Enjoyment Perceived 
Competence 
Importance/Effort 
Priming 
Condition 
M SD M SD M SD 
Performance 4.16 1.26 2.17 0.95 4.87 1.07 
Mastery 4.24 1.15 1.78 0.62 5.08 1.20 
Neutral 3.69 1.04 1.87 0.65 4.65 0.82 
Total 4.03 1.16 1.94 0.76 4.86 1.04 
Note. M = mean, SD = standard deviation. 
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Figure 18. Intrinsic motivation means by priming condition 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that failure would not undermine the intrinsic 
motivation of the mastery goal-primed participants as badly as it would affect 
those in the performance goal-primed condition, and this hypothesis was 
supported in the interest and enjoyment findings. Although it had been 
predicted that by having a goal and not being able to fulfil it, the participants in 
the performance goal-primed condition would have lower intrinsic motivation 
generally than those in the neutral condition, the inverse emerged in the 
interest and enjoyment findings.  
In terms of perceived competence, there were no explicit predictions, as all 
participants were expected to have low ratings due to the induced failure of the 
anagrams task. Ultimately, the findings shown in Table 27 revealed that despite 
having failed on the same amount of anagrams, there were differences in the 
group means. Participants in the performance goal priming condition had the 
highest perceived competence ratings, followed by those in the neutral 
condition, and then those in the mastery goal priming condition. This is an 
interesting finding given that it mirrors, albeit in the inverse, the pattern of 
persistence on the anagrams task (i.e., performance goal-primed participants 
spent the least time and made the fewest attempts on average, followed by the 
neutral group, and then the mastery goal-primed participants), suggesting that 
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perhaps the more a participant persisted, the worse (and more realistic) their 
perceived competence.  
In terms of importance and effort, it was predicted that those in the mastery 
goal-primed condition would have the highest ratings, followed by those in the 
neutral condition, and then those in the performance goal priming condition. 
The findings shown in Table 27 indeed reflected mastery goal-primed 
participants’ high mean ratings, in line with the finding that they had persisted 
for longer and made more attempts than those in the other two conditions. 
Interestingly, despite persisting less than those in the neutral group, 
performance goal-primed participants reported higher mean importance and 
effort.  
The differences across the group means for all three subscales and priming 
conditions were small, so when subjected to a one-way ANOVA, none emerged 
as statistically significant (interest/enjoyment F(2,69) = 1.607, p = .208, ηp2 = 
0.05; perceived competence F(2,69) = 1.770, p = .178, ηp2 = 0.05; 
importance/effort F(2,69) = 1.001, p = .373, ηp2 = 0.03). The findings of 
independent samples t-tests also failed to find any significant differences across 
the priming conditions (all p’s > .08). 
6.4.4 Further Correlational Analyses 
A post hoc correlational analysis was conducted to further examine the 
relationships between participants’ behavioral persistence and their self-
reported affect and intrinsic motivation. As such, there were no hypotheses. 
The correlations are illustrated in Table 28.  
Table 28. Correlations between average persistence, affect, and intrinsic 
motivation  
Variables 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Time Anagrams 1-3 .81** .14 .08 .16 -.05 .35** 
2. Attempts Anagrams 1-3 — .10 .11 .12 -.10 .37** 
3. Positive Affect  – -.03 .70** .42** .43** 
4. Negative Affect   – -.15 -.24* .10 
5. Interest and Enjoyment    – .36** .41** 
6. Perceived Competence     – .11 
7. Importance and Effort      – 
Note. *p < .05 level, **p < .01 level.  
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  198 
As shown in Table 28, there were several statistically significant correlations. 
For example, the two behavioral indicators of persistence, average time and 
attempts, were highly related (r = .81, p < .01). There was also a positive 
relationship between average time spent and attempts made on anagrams 1-3 
and importance and effort ratings on the IMI (time spent: r = .35, p < .01; 
attempts made: r = .37, p < .01). A positive relationship was also observed 
between the positive affect subscale of the PANAS and higher ratings on all 
three of the IMI subscales (interest/enjoyment, r = .70, p < .01; perceived 
competence, r = .42, p < .01; importance/effort, r = .43, p < .01), suggesting a 
consistently positive affect and intrinsic motivation experience for some 
participants. A negative relationship was only observed between negative affect 
and perceived competence (r = -.24, p < .05), suggesting that higher negative 
affect was linked with lower perceptions of competence. Finally, there were 
some statistically significant relationships among the three IMI subscales in 
that the interest and enjoyment subscale was positively related to ratings for 
both perceived competence (r =.36, p < .01) and importance and effort (r = .41, p 
< .01).  
6.4.5 Summary of Findings 
To summarize the findings of Study 3: 
1. Statistically significant support for Hypothesis 1: those primed with a 
mastery goal persisted more than those in the performance and neutral 
conditions.  
2. No support for Hypothesis 2: performance goal primed participants had the 
highest positive affect ratings, followed by the mastery and then neutral 
conditions, although none of these differences reached significance.  
3. No support for Hypothesis 3: mastery goal primed participants had the 
highest negative affect ratings, followed by the neutral group, and then the 
performance goal primed group, even though these differences failed to reach 
significance.  
4. Limited support for Hypothesis 4: mastery goal primed participants 
reported the highest interest and enjoyment and importance and effort 
ratings, but performance goal primed participants reported the highest 
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perceived competence; furthermore, all intrinsic motivation differences 
across groups failed to reach significance.  
6.5 Discussion 
The research question guiding this study asked is it possible to prime an 
achievement goal such that it is reflected in achievement behavior? Evaluating 
whether this question was answered by the current study requires defining 
firstly what evidence of a successful prime might look like, and secondly 
deciding if the study provided enough evidence to suggest that the constructs 
primed were likely to actually have been achievement goals. In this study, 
evidence that the priming procedure had been successful was defined in terms 
of reliable behavioral differences across priming conditions and the exclusion 
of alternative explanations. Support that achievement goals had been primed 
was defined in terms of the alignment of these behavioral, as well as affect and 
intrinsic motivation, differences with predictions about performance and 
mastery goals according to achievement goal theory. The study found 
preliminary support for both of these requirements, suggesting that 
achievement goals can indeed be nonconsciously activated.  
In terms of evidence that the priming procedure had been successful, the study 
found important differences in persistence behavior across the priming 
conditions. Those who were exposed to synonyms of mastery goal-related 
words on the Scrambled Sentence Test consistently persisted longer in the face 
of failure than those in the neutral condition, followed by those in the 
performance goal priming condition. This was especially the case with the 
persistence measure of average attempts made on anagrams 1-3, and to a lesser 
extent also found with average time spent. In terms of threats to the internal 
validity of the priming and behavioral variable link, one potential question is 
whether participants may have pursued a goal different to the one implied by 
the priming procedure. This was a criticism made of experimental 
manipulations of achievement goals in Chapter 2, where researchers tried to 
induce an achievement goal and examine its impact on behavior (Elliot & 
Harackiewicz, 1996). However, for this study, this is likely to have influenced 
the achievement behavior, and yet the study found a consistent pattern of 
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  200 
behavior differences across all groups. A somewhat linked question is whether 
some participants may have been harder to prime than others. However, due to 
the random allocation of priming conditions, such individual attributes are 
likely to have been divided equally across conditions. A further potential threat 
to the internal validity of any priming study is the possibility that participants 
may have become aware of a connection between the priming task and the 
achievement task presented by the researcher as ostensibly unrelated. 
However, during the funnelled debriefing procedure, none of the participants 
reported suspicion of any influence of the Scrambled Sentence Test on the 
anagrams task, which Bargh and colleagues (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) 
have suggested is crucial to the findings as “diametrically opposite effects on 
judgments are obtained if the participant is aware versus not aware of a possible 
influence by the priming stimuli” (p. 237). Ultimately, these arguments suggest 
that the differences in the contents of the Scrambled Sentences Test are likely 
to have explained the differences in participants’ persistence achievement 
behavior on the anagrams task. In other words, the priming procedure is likely 
to have been successful.  
In terms of answering then whether the priming procedure was successful in 
nonconsciously activating achievement goals, two related questions need to be 
considered: whether what was primed was a goal, and whether it was an 
achievement goal. Firstly, it is likely that the construct primed in this study was 
a nonconscious goal. Support for this comes from research by Bargh and 
colleagues. In a series of experiments by Chartrand and Bargh (1996), the goals 
of impression formation and memorization were nonconsciously primed to 
replicate the results of an earlier study that asked participants explicitly to 
follow these goals (Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980). Similarly, in the first 
experiment of Bargh and colleagues’ (Bargh et al., 2001) series of studies 
exploring nonconscious goal pursuit, those participants who were primed with 
achievement related words found more words in a word puzzle task than those 
who were not primed with achievement related words. While the former study 
demonstrates that evidence of nonconsciously activated goals can be gleaned 
from whether participants “move in the direction of one versus the other 
specified outcome” (Bargh et al., 2001, p. 1016), the latter study demonstrates 
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that evidence of nonconsciously activated attainment goals can be gleaned 
from engagement in “content-free features, such as vigorous acting toward goal 
attainment, persistence in the face of obstacles, and resumption after 
disruption” (2001, p. 1016).39  
In the current study, participants in the two priming conditions indeed moved 
in the directions of the specified performance and mastery goal outcomes, and 
participants in the mastery goal priming condition indeed seemed to act toward 
goal attainment and pursue the goal in the face of the obstacle represented by 
the induced failure paradigm. Furthermore, control group participants reported 
lower positive affect than both goal-priming conditions; although the group 
differences for this finding did not reach significance, the suggestion is that 
perhaps something goal-related was activated. Interestingly, where Bargh and 
colleagues’ study (experiment 1, Bargh et al., 2001) showed that participants 
who had been primed with the goal to perform did better than those in the 
neutral condition, the current study showed a distinction between the two 
priming conditions in that while mastery goal-primed participants persisted 
longer (M = 464 seconds) and made more attempts (M = 14.57) than those in the 
neutral condition (time spent M = 429 seconds; attempts made M = 11.82), 
performance goal-primed participants, although behaving differently from 
those in the neutral condition, actually persisted for less time (M = 329 seconds) 
and made less attempts (M = 8.29). Furthermore, this occurred without any 
negatively valenced words in the Scrambled Sentence Test that that might have 
inhibited achievement behavior.  
The pivotal difference here may be the use of an induced failure procedure, 
resulting in the different responses from the two priming conditions. 
Interestingly, these different achievement responses were in line with the 
patterns expected according to achievement goal theory. The findings thus 
suggest that achievement goals were successfully primed. The findings also 
support the utility of the using the Scrambled Sentence Test to prime 
                                                             
39 The findings of the third study in this series also provide support that “the priming effects on 
task performance…were unlikely to have been mediated by an activated perceptual, 
nonmotivational construct” (Bargh et al., 2001, p. 1021).  
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achievement goals, and the failure inducing anagrams task in differentiating 
across priming conditions. While the persistence findings are a promising 
beginning to exploring nonconscious achievement goal activation and 
operation, they are only tentative. Continued exploration might illuminate 
these behavioral findings further, for example by replicating the first study by 
Bargh and colleagues (Bargh et al., 2001), but adding in a second goal priming 
condition where failure on the achievement task is induced.  
Adding to the tentativeness of the current findings are questions remaining 
about the participants’ self-reported affect and intrinsic motivation. Indeed, it 
had been predicted that the pattern for highest positive affect would be mastery 
goal condition, neutral condition, and then performance goal condition, 
mirroring the pattern for highest persistence behavior. For highest negative 
affect, the predicted pattern was performance goal condition, mastery goal 
condition, and then neutral condition, as the latter condition had no goal 
activation and thus would have less reason for a negative “mystery mood” 
(Chartrand, 1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002). There was only a slight difference 
in positive affect reported by performance and mastery goal primed 
participants (performance M = 25.42, mastery M = 25.33), and both of the priming 
conditions reported higher positive affect than those in the neutral group 
(neutral M = 22.92). In terms of negative affect, the observed pattern showed 
greater differences in mean ratings: participants in the mastery goal priming 
condition gave the highest ratings (M = 20.00), followed by those in the neutral 
group (M = 19.12), and then only those in the performance goal priming 
condition (M = 18.04). Though the group means did not differ significantly, the 
observed trend in affect begs explanation.  
One possibility is that in persisting less on the anagrams task than those in the 
neutral and mastery goal priming conditions, those in the performance goal 
priming condition may have protected themselves from becoming too 
negatively affected by the continued failure experience. Not only did those in 
the performance goal prime condition have similar positive affect ratings and 
lower negative affect than those in the mastery goal priming condition, they 
also reported similar interest and enjoyment to those in the mastery condition 
(performance M = 4.16, mastery M = 4.24), and had the highest perceived 
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competence ratings (performance M = 2.17, neutral M = 1.87, mastery M = 1.78). 
Hence, although those in the performance goal priming condition were unable 
to accomplish their goal to demonstrate competence, their experience was not 
as negative as it could have been had they expended more effort and still been 
unable to demonstrate competence. This might suggest why those in the 
mastery goal condition, who had spent longer persevering in the face of failure, 
and were similarly unable to attain their goal of developing competence, 
experienced greater negative affect and lower perceived competence than 
either those who did not have a goal (neutral condition) and those in the 
performance goal priming condition. Although a potentially reasonable 
explanation, no significant correlation was found in the post hoc correlational 
analysis between persistence and affect: greater persistence on the anagrams 
task was not statistically significantly related to increasing negative affect, nor 
was less persistence statistically significantly related to increasing positive 
affect. Similarly, no significant relationship emerged between persistence and 
interest and enjoyment or perceived competence. 
Another more methodological reason for the divergence between the predicted 
and observed pattern of affect and intrinsic motivation across priming 
conditions may be the difference in the types of measures. While the 
nonconscious prime was consistent with the behavioral persistence in that 
neither was self-reported, the affect and intrinsic motivation ratings may have 
failed to show the predicted differentiation along priming condition lines 
because they relied on conscious self-report. The exception here was the 
importance and effort subscale of the IMI, which showed a statistically 
significant positive correlation with time persistence (r = .35, p < .01) and 
attempts (r = .37, p < .01). However, this subscale differs from the other self-
report measures in this study in that it relies solely on an estimation of one’s 
easily perceivable outward behavior, with items such as “I put a lot of effort into 
this”, “I didn’t put much energy into this”, rather than assessments of one’s 
internal states (affect, interest and enjoyment, and perceived competence). 
Hence, the overall disjunction between conscious and nonconscious methods 
may suggest that goals that are nonconsciously pursued may impact behavior 
but not become explicit enough for participants to comment on them in self-
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report questionnaires, possibly reflecting the operation of a dual process model 
between consciously and nonconsciously pursued and experienced goals (see 
Section 4.2.5). Although Bargh and colleagues (Bargh et al., 2001) note that just 
because participants are found to be unaware of the activation of a certain goal 
“does not necessarily mean that they were not aware of its operation” (p. 1017), 
when they tested this possibility, Bargh and colleagues (study 2, Bargh et al., 
2001) failed to find evidence that participants did become aware of the 
operation of the nonconsciously activated prime. As such, this may represent an 
explanation for the convergence between the expected and observed patterns 
for nonconscious prime and behavior and the divergence with the majority of 
self-reported ratings.  
6.6 Conclusion 
This study showed that priming performance and mastery goals led to different 
persistence behaviors on an induced failure task: on average, mastery goal-
primed participants spent longer and made more attempts than those in the 
neutral group, followed by those primed with performance goals. There were 
significant differences in persistence across groups in terms of average attempts 
made. For persistence in terms of average amount of time spent, the trend was 
in the right direction as suggested by significant differences across performance 
and mastery groups. Although this latter result renders the overall finding 
tentative, further studies should help to explore the influence of achievement 
goal priming on behavioral persistence at achievement tasks. Overall, this study 
should be taken as providing some very preliminary support for the possibility 
of nonconsciously operating achievement goals.  
One of the interesting possibilities that stems from this study and also fits with 
the potential explanations of the first study comparing implicit and explicit 
achievement goal methods, is that while priming may be linked with non-self-
reported methods, there may be a disjunction between these two nonconscious 
methods and self-report methods. While the stories we tell ourselves about our 
achievement are undoubtedly important in guiding our conscious achievement 
behaviors, the majority of our everyday achievement behavior is unlikely to be 
consciously initiated and controlled, as argued in Chapter 3. As such, 
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achievement goal researchers must continue to explore what cognitively 
unconscious achievement goal-driven behavior may look like. Given the 
possibility suggested by this study that achievement goals can be 
nonconsciously activated and influence achievement behavior without turning 
up in conscious reports (either in the funnelled debriefing or the affect and 
intrinsic motivation measures), the next study attempts to explore the 
possibility of a line of consistency across implicit methods in contrast with 
explicit methods by priming participants and then providing them with either 
an implicit or an explicit achievement goal method.  
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7 Study 4 Which achievement goal method captures 
primed achievement goals? 
Introduction 
This chapter completes the preliminary series of empirical explorations 
assessing the extent to which the implications of findings on implicit cognition and 
nonconscious goal pursuit apply to how achievement goals are currently theorized 
through designing and running a series of studies to empirically test if achievement 
goals can operate and be captured without conscious awareness (Aim 3b of the 
thesis). So far, three studies have been conducted to explore the nature and 
possibility of the nonconscious operation and measurement of achievement 
goals. Study 1 indicated that both achievement goal-adapted IATs were reliable 
but that the explicit, self-report statements endorsed by participants did not 
correlate with their IAT reaction times. Study 2 indicated that while the Valence 
IAT was again reliable, it was no more consistent with achievement behavior in 
terms of persistence than the AGQ-R, and persistence behavior was not 
accompanied by theorized differences in affect and intrinsic motivation. In 
Study 3, priming participants with achievement goals was found to be consistent 
with behavior on a subsequent achievement task, but not with self-reported 
affect and measures of intrinsic motivation.  
In summary, the first study compared implicit and explicit achievement goal 
methods, the second study implicit and explicit achievement goal methods and 
achievement behavior, and the third study priming, achievement behavior, and 
general achievement-relevant explicit methods. In this fourth study, 
achievement goals are primed and goal condition is compared directly with 
explicit and implicit achievement goal methods (see Table 29). As such, this 
fourth study addresses aim 3b(iv) by conducting a comparison between 
nonconscious activation and implicit and explicit achievement goal methods, and 
asks does nonconscious activation of achievement goals lead to consistent responses 
on achievement goal methods? 
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Table 29. Summary of methods compared in the empirical studies of this 
thesis 
 Implicit Method Explicit Method Priming Behavior 
Study 1     
Study 2     
Study 3     
Study 4     
 
This chapter starts off by providing the background to Study 4, before 
describing the procedure. 32 participants were randomly allocated to 
performance or mastery priming conditions and primed using the same 
supraliminal priming task as in Study 3, the Scrambled Sentence Test. Following 
the priming procedure, half of the sample completed the Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R, Elliot & Murayama, 2008) while the other half 
completed the Valence IAT designed and tested in Studies 1 and 2. The results 
are presented and discussed, before the thesis moves on to a general discussion 
and conclusion in the next chapter. 
7.1 Background 
In this thesis, it has been argued that achievement goal researchers should 
begin to consider the implications of findings on implicit cognition. These 
findings suggest that people often tell more than they can know, that conscious 
will is more an experience than a causal force, and that goals can be activated, 
pursued and fulfilled without conscious awareness. The experiments in this 
thesis have begun to explore the extent to which the implications of these 
findings apply to achievement goals in two ways. The first two experiments in 
this thesis explored how nonconscious goals might be captured, thereby 
providing a tool which may aid in their exploration, whereas the latter two 
experiments examine the potential for nonconscious activation of achievement 
goals, with the implication that if they can be activated outside of awareness, 
achievement goal researchers need to reconsider their definitions and 
operationalizations. 
The findings of Study 3 suggest that achievement goals, like other cognitive 
representations studied by Bargh and colleagues (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; 
Bargh et al., 2001), can indeed be activated outside of conscious awareness to 
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influence behavior. However, the findings are also dissimilar to those of Bargh 
and colleagues (Chartrand, 1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002) who found that 
assigning a difficult task to those who have been nonconsciously primed with 
the goal to achieve can result in the experience of negative ‘mystery moods’. 
Translating this latter ‘mystery moods’ finding to Study 3, and in line with the 
study’s predictions for achievement goal responses to induced failure, the 
pattern for lowest negative affect should have been topped by those in the 
neutral group: they had nothing specific to accomplish, so the induced failure 
should not have made them experience any more negative affect than those 
who had been primed with an achievement goal. Of these latter groups, in 
terms of negative affect, next would follow those in the mastery goal condition 
who should experience a slightly negative affect due to being unable to develop 
their competence, but not an extremely negative affect given that they had 
exerted a significant and satisfying amount of effort. Those with the highest 
negative and lowest positive affect should be those in the performance goal 
priming condition, as they had not been able to demonstrate their competence 
and also could not feel satisfaction given that expending effort and still failing 
would demonstrate even lower competence. However, even if these patterns 
were experienced, they were not reported as such on the self-report affect and 
intrinsic motivation subscales.  
One potential explanation offered was that in persisting less, performance goal 
primed participants might have protected their affect, interest and perceptions 
of competence. However, given that the study failed to find a significant 
relationship between either of the persistence variables and affect and intrinsic 
motivation, with the exception of importance and effort, an alternative 
hypothesis was presented. This potential explanation was methodological and 
could be tested, and as such, it is tested in this study.  
This alternative explanation is that perhaps the expected group differences 
failed to emerge because the methods operate along different dimensions of the 
implicit and explicit. In other words, affect and intrinsic motivation were both 
accessed using explicit, self-report methods, whereas both the priming and 
persistence indicators were implicit and did not rely on self-report. As such, this 
distinction between explicit and implicit, or self- and non-self-report methods, 
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would imply that an achievement goal could be nonconsciously activated and 
influence behavior, as perceived by the researcher who was blind to condition 
membership. Simultaneously, however, the effects of the goal on the 
participants’ behavior would be unperceivable to the participant and thus fail to 
emerge on the self-report questionnaires. Indeed, a study by Bargh and 
colleagues (experiment 2, Bargh et al., 2001) found that primed participants did 
not become aware of the operation of the nonconsciously activated prime.  
To begin exploring this issue, the current experiment employs the priming 
procedure from Study 3. Once participants have completed the priming task, 
they complete either an implicit or an explicit achievement goal method. In this 
way, it is possible to assess the correspondence between priming condition and 
the achievement goal the participant either implies on the implicit method or 
endorses on the explicit method. This study also further explores whether the 
priming that elicited statistically significant behavioral differences in the 
previous study was indeed activating an achievement goal. As Study 1 suggested 
that implicit and explicit achievement goal methods breed divergent findings, 
Study 4 should help to explore which method, both, or neither might capture a 
nonconsciously activated goal. Given that Study 2 suggested persistence 
behavior on an achievement task was only captured by the achievement goal 
methods about half of the time, and similarly across the implicit and explicit 
methods, each method should be consistent with the priming condition for half 
of the sample in the current study. However, if the potential explanation about 
the consistency of implicitly collected, non-self-report methods is likely, the 
priming in this study should be consistent with the implicit method, the Valence 
Implicit Association Test, more than it is consistent with an explicit method, the 
Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R, Elliot & Murayama, 2008).  
Hence, the primary aim of the current study was to conduct a comparison 
between the independent variable of randomly allocated goal priming and the 
dependent variable of an achievement goal method (i.e., AGQ-R responses or 
Valence IAT score). As mentioned in the introduction, the overarching question 
guiding this research is: Are the implications of research on implicit cognition 
applicable to achievement goal theory? Given that Study 3 suggested it is possible 
to prime achievement goals so that they influence participants’ persistence 
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behavior on an achievement task outside of conscious awareness, the current 
study explored the methodological ramifications of this finding by asking the 
specific research question does nonconscious activation of achievement goals lead 
to consistent responses on achievement goal methods? 
7.1.1 Possible Outcomes for Study 4 
There were four possible outcomes for this study, shown in Table 30, but no 
hypotheses. The first possible outcome was that the nonconsciously primed 
goal would be consistent with participants’ Valence IAT scores and with 
participants’ subscale scores on the AGQ-R. This outcome would suggest that, 
on the Valence IAT, a participant primed with a performance goal would more 
quickly categorize positive and performance stimuli to the combined category 
of Performance Goals and Good than positive and mastery stimuli to the 
combined category of Mastery and Good on the Valence IAT. This outcome 
would also suggest that, on the AGQ-R, a participant primed with a 
performance goal would rate items from the performance subscales more 
highly than the items on the mastery goal subscales. This finding would 
replicate partially the finding of Study 2 where both methods captured the 
achievement goal. The remaining question would be whether the achievement 
goal methods were consistent with the prime more than they were inconsistent 
with the prime.  
Table 30. Possible outcomes for Study 4: Consistency with primed goal 
Outcome AGQ-R Valence IAT 
1 ✔ ✔ 
2 ✖ ✔ 
3 ✔ ✖ 
4 ✖ ✖ 
 
As shown in Table 30, the second possibility was that the nonconsciously 
primed goal would be consistent with the Valence IAT scores and not with the 
AGQ-R. This possibility would provide support for the hypothesis offered in the 
previous study, that nonconscious achievement goals are unavailable to 
conscious self-report, while exerting an influence on behavior. This would be in 
line with the finding of Bargh and colleagues (experiment 2, Bargh et al., 2001) 
that participants who had been primed were unaware of both the activation and 
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operation of the primed goal. The remaining possibilities were that the primed 
goal would be consistent with the AGQ-R and not the Valence IAT, or 
inconsistent with both achievement goal methods. 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 32 students enrolled in different faculties at a university in the 
northeast of England. There were 27 female and 5 male students in the sample. 
All participants were undergraduate (years 1-4) volunteers, recruited from 
lectures in the School of Education and School of Applied Social Sciences at 
which the researcher advertised the study during brief pre-lecture calls for 
participants. 
7.2.2 Materials 
7.2.2.1 Priming Task 
The priming task was the Scrambled Sentence Test (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; 
Kawada, Oettingen, Gollwitzer, & Bargh, 2004; Srull & Wyer, 1979) as in the 
previous study. Given that significant differences were found between the 
performance and mastery goal primed groups, and not between either of these 
two groups and the neutral condition, in addition to the focus of the current 
experiment on ascertaining whether the primed goal matched the captured 
goal, only the performance and mastery goal versions of the Scrambled 
Sentence Test were employed. As before, the performance goal version had 25 
scrambled sentences, 10 of which included a performance word such as 
compete, win, or outperform, while the mastery goal version included words such 
as learn, improve, and progress. Once again, the task instructions led participants 
to believe they were completing a test of language ability, and asked them to 
construct complete, coherent, grammatically correct sentences using four out 
of the five available words.  
7.2.2.2 Achievement Goal Methods  
As achievement goal methods, the Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised 
(AGQ-R, Elliot & Murayama, 2008) represented the explicit, self-report 
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measure, while the Valence IAT was used as the implicit measure. The Valence 
IAT was used instead of the Self/Other Referent IAT because the former 
showed greater internal consistency when tested in Study 1 (see Chapter 4, 
Valence r = .80, p < .001; Self/Other r = .55, p < .05).  
7.2.3 Procedure 
 
Figure 19. Study 4 methods 
An overview of the procedure is illustrated in Figure 19. All participants were 
run individually in a room free from noise and distractions. On arrival to the 
room, participants were invited to sit at a desk with the consent form (see 
Appendix 10.4.1) and an envelope on it. Once they had completed the consent 
form, they were instructed to pick any one piece of folded paper randomly from 
the envelope and complete it. The envelope contained the Scrambled Sentence 
Test for the two goal priming conditions (performance and mastery).  
Once participants had finished the Scrambled Sentence Test, they were 
instructed to fold it and put it to the side. This process ensured that the 
researcher was blind to the participants’ condition. Though priming condition 
was randomly assigned by picking a Scrambled Sentence Test out of the 
envelope on the table, the assignment of AGQ-R or achievement goal Valence 
IAT was conducted by administering the former to the first 16 participants and 
the latter to the remaining 16 participants. As in Study 1 and 2, presentation of 
the Valence IAT was counterbalanced in order to correct for any ordering 
effects.  
Once participants had completed their assigned achievement goal method, the 
researcher engaged each participant in funnelled debriefing (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000, p. 285) to determine what the participants thought the aim of 
the experiment was, if they were suspicious about any aspects of it, whether 
Scrambled Sentence Test  
(Performance or Mastery goal) 
AGQ-R 
Valence IAT 
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they thought the tasks were related, and whether they noted any theme 
recurring throughout the study (see Appendix 10.4.2). The researcher then 
provided each participant with a full debrief in accordance with suggestions 
made during the ethics review, given the limited information provided during 
recruitment, the use of a cover story for the priming task, the nonconscious 
activation, and the covert measurement of response times by the IAT. The 
researcher further described the purpose of the experiment within the research 
programme, answered any questions participants had, and presented 
participants with the opportunity to revisit the priming task they had completed 
and their IAT score. Finally, participants were thanked and dismissed. 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Priming Condition and Achievement Goal Method: 
Consistent or Inconsistent? 
Given that each of the 32 participants picked either a performance or mastery 
Scrambled Sentence Test out of the envelope at the beginning of the 
experiment, each priming condition contained 16 participants. The first sixteen 
participants completed the AGQ-R and the remaining 16 were administered the 
Valence IAT, so that the eventual composition of each group was roughly equal, 
as shown in Table 31 below.  
Table 31. Participants by priming condition and achievement goal method 
 Achievement Goal Method  
Priming Condition AGQ-R Valence IAT Total 
Performance 9 7 16 
Mastery 7 9 16 
Total 16 16 32 
Note. AGQ-R = Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised, IAT = Implicit 
Association Test. 
Subscale means were calculated for each of the AGQ-R scales (PAP, PAV, MAP, 
MAV) and then, to match the dichotomous goal model configurations of both 
the priming procedure and the Valence IAT, the performance subscales were 
averaged into a single performance average (P_Avg). The same was done to 
create a single mastery average (M_Avg). Because the presentation of the 
Valence IAT had been counterbalanced, the scores were standardized so that a 
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positive score represented a performance preference, whereas a negative score 
represented a mastery preference. The group means for each priming condition 
in terms of performance and mastery averages on the AGQ-R and standardized 
Valence IAT scores are presented in Table 32.  
Table 32. Achievement goal method means by priming condition 
Priming Condition Variable of Interest n Mean Min. Max. SD 
Performance P_Avg 9 3.00 1.00 5.00 1.26 
M_Avg 9 3.56 2.50 4.50 0.62 
IAT Score 7 .0672 -.3865 .7125 0.37 
Mastery P_Avg 7 3.29 2.33 3.67 0.46 
M_Avg 7 3.76 3.50 4.17 0.25 
IAT Score 9 .0153 -.4074 .5491 0.31 
Note. M_Avg = mean of mastery approach and avoidance subscales, P_Avg = 
mean of performance approach and avoidance subscales, IAT = Implicit 
Association Test, n = number of participants per condition, M = mean, Min. = 
minimum, Max. = maximum, SD = standard deviation. 
The data in Table 32 show that those in the performance priming condition who 
took the AGQ-R did not (on average) rate performance items more highly than 
they rated mastery items. Those in the mastery priming condition who took the 
AGQ-R did however rate mastery items more highly on average than 
performance items. Concerning Valence IAT scores, across the entire sample, 
those in the mastery priming condition had lower IAT scores than those in the 
performance priming condition. This finding suggests consistency between the 
primed goal and the Valence IAT, with the lower, more negative scores 
representing quicker responses to the second combined category (i.e., Mastery 
Goals paired with Good), and positive, higher scores representing a preference 
for the first combined category (i.e., Performance Goals paired with Good). 
However, although the mean IAT scores for those in the mastery goal priming 
condition were lower than for those in the performance condition, they 
remained positive and were thus indicative of a slight performance preference. 
Independent samples t-tests comparing each of the achievement goal method 
scores  (see Table 32) across the two priming conditions failed to reach 
significance (all p’s > .3640). In sum, there was correspondence between the 
                                                             
40 Cohen’s d for each of the t-tests (calculated in the direction performance then mastery): 
Priming Condition by P_Avg: d = -0.31; Priming condition by M_Avg: d = -0.42; priming 
condition by IAT score: d = 0.15.  
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responses of those who were primed with mastery and took the AGQ-R and 
those who were primed with performance and took the Valence IAT.  
In order to answer the research question of whether the nonconscious 
activation of achievement goals led to consistent responses on the achievement 
goal methods, a count was taken of how many participants primed with each 
achievement goal reported or reacted consistently with this goal on the AGQ-R 
or the Valence IAT. The results of this count are shown in Table 33 below. 
Table 33. Consistency of responses by priming condition and achievement 
goal method 
Priming Condition  AGQ-R Valence IAT Total 
Performance Consistent 3 5 8 
 Inconsistent 6 2 8 
 Total 9 7 16 
     
Mastery Consistent 5 6 11 
 Inconsistent 2 3 5 
 Total 7 9 16 
     
Total Consistent 8 11 19 
 Inconsistent 8 5 13 
 Total 16 16 32 
Note. AGQ-R = Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised, IAT = Implicit 
Association Test.  
Overall, priming condition and achievement goal method were consistent for 
19 participants out of the total 32, suggesting that the achievement goal 
methods were consistent with the priming condition for almost 60% of the 
participants. Out of these instances of consistency, the Valence IAT was slightly 
more consistent than the AGQ-R. The Valence IAT was consistent a total of 11 
times (5 times in the performance condition, 6 times in the mastery condition) 
while the AGQ-R was consistent a total of 8 times (3 times in the performance 
condition, 5 times in the mastery condition). There was greater consistency for 
those who were primed with a mastery goal (11 consistent versus 5 inconsistent) 
than for a performance goal (8 consistent and 8 inconsistent). However, when 
Chi-Square tests were run to assess whether the consistency was dependent on 
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either priming condition or achievement goal method, neither result reached 
statistical significance (χ2 [1, N = 32] = 1.17, p = .28).41   
7.3.2 Reliability 
These consistency findings must be taken with care, as reliability for both of the 
achievement goal methods was low. Although the Valence IAT had been shown 
to be reliable in both Study 1 and Study 2, in the current study the internal 
consistency coefficient for the Valence IAT was much lower than before, failing 
to reach significance at r = .43, p = .10.42 The reliability of the AGQ-R was 
similarly affected, with acceptable alphas for both performance subscales (PAP, 
3 items, α = .93; PAV, 3 items, α = .80), but considerably lower alphas for both 
mastery subscales (MAP, 3 items, α = .44, MAV, 3 items, α = .24). Possible 
reasons for these low reliability coefficients, as well as why this study was 
retained in the thesis despite the low reliability of its methods, are presented in 
the discussion.  
7.4 Discussion 
The current study was conducted to answer the question does nonconscious 
activation of achievement goals lead to consistent responses on achievement goal 
methods? Two phases of analysis were carried out to answer this question, each 
with a different way of defining consistency.  
The first definition of consistency between the primed goals and the 
achievement goal methods was at the level of predicted group differences. 
Consistency would be observed if those in the performance goal prime 
condition had higher average performance ratings on the AGQ-R or Valence 
IAT scores that reflected quicker responses to the Performance Goals and Good 
combined category, and vice versa for mastery goal primed participants. The 
findings using this definition of consistency suggest that on the AGQ-R, 
nonconscious activation of achievement goals was only consistent with the 
                                                             
41 Both sets of groups had the same expected, observed, degrees of freedom, and chi-square 
results (AGQ-R: 8 consistent, 8 inconsistent; IAT: 11 consistent, 5 inconsistent; Performance 
Prime: 8 consistent, 8 inconsistent; Mastery prime: 11 consistent, 5 inconsistent).  
42 Again, this is calculated by correlating IAT scores at the end of the first half of stages 3 and 5 
(pooled) with their IAT score for the latter half of stages 3 and 5 (pooled). 
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responses provided by those mastery goal primed participants. Indeed, those 
primed with mastery goals rated mastery items more highly on average than 
performance items, while those primed with performance goals actually 
reported higher average ratings for mastery, instead of the predicted higher 
average ratings for performance items.  
On the Valence IAT, the findings using this definition of consistency suggest 
that the nonconscious activation of achievement goals was only consistent with 
the IAT scores of those primed with performance goals. Indeed, those primed 
with performance goals had IAT scores that were higher and positive, while 
those who were primed with mastery goals had IAT scores that, despite being 
lower than those of the performance goal primed participants, remained very 
slightly positive, instead of the negative scores that characterize a mastery 
preference (i.e., quicker reactions in block 5, Mastery Goal and Good). 
According to this definition of consistency, then, each method was only 
consistent with one of the primed achievement goals: the AGQ-R with mastery 
goals and the Valence IAT with performance goals. At the group level, the 
consistency observed partially reflects both possible outcomes 1 (consistent-
consistent) and 4 (inconsistent-inconsistent), discussed in Section 7.1.1.   
The second definition of consistency between the primed goals and the 
achievement goal methods was at the level of each individual participant. Here 
consistency would be observed if each participant who had been primed with a 
performance goal rated performance items more highly than mastery items on 
the AGQ-R, or emerged with a larger, positive IAT score, and vice versa for 
mastery goal primed participants. The findings using this definition of 
consistency suggest that the nonconscious activation of achievement goals was 
consistent with the findings of the combined achievement goal methods for 
more than half of the participants. Although the following differences failed to 
reach significance, greater consistency was observed for those primed with 
mastery goals and those who completed the Valence IAT than for those primed 
with performance goals and those who completed the AGQ-R.  
The finding that more consistency between the priming condition and 
achievement goal method was observed for those taking the Valence IAT than 
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the AGQ-R is in line with possible outcome 2 (see Section 7.1.1). As such, this 
finding is in line with the alternative explanation proposed in the discussion of 
Study 3, that nonconscious goal activation is more likely to be captured by non-
self-report methods. However, given that the difference between greater 
consistency on the Valence IAT than on the AGQ-R failed to reach significance, 
more research will be needed to explore this further, with a larger sample size 
that will not mask a potentially significant difference in consistency between 
priming condition and self-report and non-self-report methods.  
One underlying but crucial issue with this study was the low reliability for the 
mastery subscales and the Valence IAT. On one hand, this may be seen as less 
problematic in terms of the first definition of consistency: at the group level, an 
assessment of consistency could be made using the average performance 
ratings, as the performance subscales showed appropriate reliability. As such, 
consistency could be explored for half of the sample: those who took the AGQ-
R. Accordingly, on the basis of the performance subscales, performance goal 
primed participants would be predicted to have higher performance ratings 
than mastery goal primed participants, and mastery goal primed participants 
would be predicted to have lower performance ratings than performance goal 
primed participants. However, this pattern did not emerge in the current study, 
and mastery goal primed participants had higher performance ratings than 
performance goal primed participants. On the other hand, the low reliability 
was problematic at this level of consistency analysis in that no confident 
comparison could then be made for the other half of the sample, between the 
priming condition and the IAT scores, as this measure did not show appropriate 
internal consistency. In terms of the second definition of consistency, assessed 
at the individual level, the low reliability is problematic across the entire 
sample. Judgments of consistency between priming condition and achievement 
goal method for each participant were based on, for example, whether a 
performance goal primed participant had a higher performance average than 
mastery average, or had a positive rather than a negative IAT score. Such 
comparisons thus required reliable mastery averages as well as a reliable IAT, 
and these were unfortunately not achieved in this study. 
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Future studies could work towards replicating this study and exploring the 
reasons for this low reliability in order to better answer if nonconsciously 
activated achievement goals lead to consistent responses on achievement goal 
methods. It is possible that the participants in this particular sample may have 
had some problem in understanding the mastery items on the achievement goal 
questionnaire, leading to a greater variance in their responses to different items 
from the same achievement goal subscale. However, this does not explain why 
the IAT also lacked appropriate internal consistency.  
A possible explanation for the low reliabilities is the small sample size. In this 
study only 16 participants completed each achievement goal method. However, 
an interesting point to note, and part of the reason this study was retained 
despite its low reliabilities, is that the second study of this thesis did not find low 
reliability coefficients for either the mastery subscales or the Valence IAT 
despite having just fewer than ten participants more in each goal method 
condition (i.e., 25 completed AGQ-R, 25 completed Valence IAT). As such, and 
perhaps the main reason this study is included despite its low reliabilities, there 
is also a possibility that the priming procedure may have impacted on the 
reliabilities of the two goal methods, such that being primed with a 
performance goal might elicit erratic responses on mastery subscale items, and 
vice versa. The results of this analysis, based on splitting the sample by priming 
condition to assess whether there were differences in reliability of the AGQ-R 
and the Valence IAT, are reported in the appendix (see Appendix 10.4.3). 
Crucially, splitting the sample by priming condition resulted in even smaller 
sample sizes (i.e., only 9 out of the performance goal primed participants took 
the AGQ-R), so no confident findings can be reported. Future studies with a 
greater sample size should help to explore this possibility of a sort of 
interference from priming on capturing achievement goal methods.  
An approach that could be used to explore the possibility that the priming 
procedure impacted on the reliability of the achievement goal methods is the 
inclusion of a neutral condition in future studies. This would aid in isolating 
whether the low reliabilities observed in this study are linked with the priming 
of achievement goals or were just a feature of the current sample. As such, the 
reliabilities for achievement goal methods completed by those in each of the 
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primed conditions could be compared with the reliabilities of achievement goal 
methods completed by those not primed with an achievement goal. As stated in 
the methods section (see Section 7.2.2.1), a neutral condition was not included 
in the design of the current experiment because the previous study had shown 
significant behavioral differences between the two goal priming conditions. 
Furthermore, the current experiment only tried to assess whether those who 
were primed with a specific achievement goal also responded in line with this 
goal on an achievement goal measure. Including a neutral condition in future 
studies will be especially important given that the priming procedure in Study 3 
failed to produce the same low reliabilities on the self-report affect and intrinsic 
motivation methods. Further studies should therefore help in highlighting 
whether the low reliabilities observed in this study may have resulted from the 
shared focus on achievement goals of both the priming procedure and the 
outcome methods (AGQ-R, Valence IAT).  
7.5 Conclusion 
This study showed that nonconsciously activated achievement goals were on 
the whole more consistent than inconsistent with responses to achievement 
goal methods. Specifically, primed achievement goals and responses to the 
achievement goal methods were more consistent for those who had been 
primed with mastery goals and for those who completed the Valence IAT than 
for those who had been primed with performance goals and for those who had 
completed the AGQ-R. This provides some support for the hypothesis that an 
implicit method is more likely to capture an implicitly activated goal. However, 
due to the lack of a significant differences and the low reliability of the mastery 
subscales of the AGQ-R and the Valence IAT, the confidence in the findings of 
Study 4 is also low. Further studies should thus continue to explore not only 
whether nonconscious activation of achievement goals is more consistent with 
non-self-report methods, as suggested by Study 3, but also whether priming 
achievement goals systematically impacts on students’ responses to implicit 
and explicit achievement goal methods.  
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8 General Discussion and Conclusion 
Introduction 
The current chapter consists of a general discussion followed by an overall 
conclusion. The discussion section summarizes the main arguments and then 
considers the findings from each of the empirical chapters, outlining their 
limitations, discussing their implications for achievement goal research, and 
recommending directions for further study. Following this summary of the 
thesis, the chapter underlines the overall contributions to knowledge that are 
made by this thesis. The chapter and this thesis then conclude in answering the 
final, forward-looking research question, given the implications of research on 
implicit cognition, and a reasoned argument and evidence from a series of empirical 
studies on their applicability to achievement goals, are there any changes that might 
need to be made to how achievement goals are theorized and the methods used to 
capture them?  
8.1 General Discussion 
As laid out in the introduction of this thesis, the primary aim of the current work 
has been to explore the nature and methodological implications of the 
possibility for nonconscious achievement goal pursuit. The guiding objectives 
have been to: 
1. Understand current operationalizations of achievement goals and the 
assumptions underlying them (Chapter 2); 
2. Examine the literature on implicit cognition and nonconscious goal pursuit 
and identify the key implications of these literatures for the definition and 
operationalization of achievement goals (Chapter 3); 
3. Assess the extent to which the implications of findings on implicit cognition 
and nonconscious goal pursuit apply to how achievement goals are currently 
theorized through  
a. reasoned argument (Chapter 3); 
b. designing and running a series of studies to empirically test if 
achievement goals can operate and be captured without conscious 
awareness by: 
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i) developing an implicit method to access achievement goals 
and  comparing it with an explicit achievement goal method 
(Chapter 4) 
ii) conducting a comparison between achievement behavior and 
implicit and explicit achievement goal methods (Chapter 5) 
iii) exploring if achievement goals can be nonconsciously 
activated (primed) and subsequently influence achievement 
behavior (Chapter 6) 
iv) conducting a comparison between nonconscious activation 
and implicit and explicit achievement goal methods (Chapter 
7) 
4. Finally, to suggest any potential changes to the model of achievement goals 
based on the arguments and findings resulting from the previous aims 
(Current chapter).  
8.1.1 Defining and operationalizing achievement goals 
The first aim, Understand current operationalizations of achievement goals and 
the assumptions underlying them, was primarily addressed in Chapter 2. Chapter 
2 explored the origins of achievement goals before considering current issues in 
their definition and measurement. Achievement goals were shown to draw 
from the achievement motivation work of Murray (1938), McClelland 
(McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953), Lewin (Lewin, Dembo, 
Festinger, & Sears, 1944), Atkinson (1957, 1964) and Weiner (1972, 1974). 
Within this work, the explanation for achievement behavior developed from a 
stable, dispositional construct that was reactive and deficit reducing to a 
proactive motive, focused on the directedness of behavior. Later approaches 
incorporated the idea of approach and avoidance motivation, mathematical 
calculations of the tendency to approach success and avoid failure, the potential 
to pursue goals based on previous performance, and ideas about what 
individuals attribute their success and failure to. The early theories of 
achievement motivation mostly assumed that the various motivational 
constructs should be accessed using indirect, projective methods, implying 
some lack of possibility for introspection and instead the need for trained 
markers, but also to a smaller extent, self-reports (e.g., motive to avoid failure, 
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Test Anxiety Questionnaire), which seem to suggest otherwise. Achievement 
goals were discussed as having resulted from critiques of this work, which 
stressed that individuals’ achievement behavior could not be entirely explained 
by dispositional motives and attribution, and that more attention should be paid 
to the role played by cognition and specific contexts. From this later, cognition-
based work emerged the central competence-focused concepts of mastery and 
performance goals, which soon progressed from a dichotomous framework into 
a trichotomous, then a 2 x 2, and more recently, a 3 x 2 model.  
Chapter 2 then went on to explore how, despite a vast theoretical and empirical 
literature, definitions of achievement goals are not always clearly elaborated: 
researchers often implicitly differ in how they define goals, construing them as 
purposes, orientations, or competence-focused aims. Further definitional issues 
have included what constitutes an achievement goal with regard to work 
avoidance, extrinsic, and social goals, whether an achievement goal includes 
the reason for the goal, whether an achievement goal is best conceptualized as 
trait-like or state-like, and how goals are cognitively represented. The 
overarching conclusion of this first section was that achievement goal theory as 
a field has struggled with consistently and consensually defining achievement 
goals. Although debate and disagreement are healthy features of research, a 
lack of acknowledgement of these issues in empirical work43 has been 
problematic in terms of masking differences in assumptions underlying 
achievement goal methods. As a result, it has been more difficult to assess the 
cumulative results of achievement goal research and determine how this 
research can be used to improve learning and pedagogical practice.  
Chapter 2 then critically examined how achievement goals have been 
operationalized and what these operationalizations have implied about 
researchers’ assumptions regarding achievement goals. These methods have 
ranged from think aloud methods: real time, dynamic explorations of students’ 
verbalizations on specific achievement tasks, which has valued individuals’ 
motivation-related cognitions, but where researchers have ultimately derived 
                                                             
43 As of course, has been well documented more generally by writers such as Senko, Hulleman, 
and Harackiewicz (2011) and Elliot and Murayama (2008).  
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  224 
the enacted achievement goal, to attempts at experimentally inducing goals 
through task descriptions that allude to normative or task-based evaluations of 
competence, which focus on the behavioral enactment of achievement goals in 
an attempt to avoid subjectivity and bias from self-report. More recent methods 
have included questionnaires, reflecting a greater interest in measuring rather 
than manipulating achievement goals, and interviews, which have been 
employed as a means for avoiding researcher-defined goals, enabling 
individuals to relay the achievement goals most pertinent to them. Both of these 
methods value individuals’ input but assume that they have coherent 
achievement goals, that they know what their goals are, and that there is a 
mutual understanding between researchers and respondents regarding what 
achievement goals are. The weaknesses of each of these methods were 
highlighted, ranging from a lack of ecological validity to researcher-defined 
goals, from misunderstanding questionnaire items to impression management, 
and even the potential that individuals may not know or be conscious of what 
their achievement goals really are. 
Chapter 2 thus provided an exploration and critique of current achievement 
goal assumptions and operationalizations. The findings of this endeavor are 
that there exist important underlying differences in the definitions and 
assumptions underlying achievement goal research. As such, methodologies 
can sometimes be in conflict with theory, lessening the quality of the evidence 
base and the overall utility of achievement goals as a construct. To advance 
more productively, achievement goal researchers need to be more explicit in 
how they are defining and purporting to access achievement goals, and to begin 
to acknowledge the weaknesses and assumptions underlying their methodology 
to ensure that what they are assessing is likely to be an achievement goal.  
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Table 34. Aim 1 summary 
Aim Findings Future directions 
-Understand current 
operationalizations of 
achievement goals and 
the assumptions 
underlying them 
Underlying differences in:  
-Definitions (purpose, 
orientation, aim),  
-Operationalizations 
(causal experiments, 
correlational 
questionnaires, 
ecologically valid 
interviews), and  
-Assumptions 
(accessibility of goals, 
trait versus state, reasons 
versus goal complex) 
-Make explicit all 
definitions, 
operationalizations, and 
assumptions 
-Ensure better 
correspondence 
between all definitions, 
operationalizations, and 
assumptions 
-Better translation of 
achievement goal 
research into 
improvements for 
pedagogy and practice 
 
8.1.2 Research on implicit cognition and its implications 
for achievement goals 
Chapter 3 addressed each of the first three aims: to understand the assumptions 
underlying current operationalizations of achievement goals (Aim 1), to examine 
the literature on implicit cognition and nonconscious goal pursuit and identify the 
key implications of these literatures for the definition and operationalization of 
achievement goals (Aim 2), and to assess the extent to which the implications of 
findings on implicit cognition and nonconscious goal pursuit apply to how 
achievement goals are currently theorized through reasoned argument (Aim 3a).  
Chapter 3 introduced current definitions of conscious and automatic mental 
processes in terms of awareness, intention, effort and control (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999), before outlining the key findings on implicit cognition. In line 
with work by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), it was argued that we often tell more 
than we can know, basing our responses about the motivations for our behavior 
not on the fruits of introspection but on post hoc rationalizations. Referencing 
work by Wegner (2002), it was suggested that our experience of a conscious, 
causal will is an illusion, and that our accounts of our intentioned behavior are 
instead based on principles of priority, consistency, and exclusivity (Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999). Furthermore, from the findings of research on automaticity, it 
was suggested that the frequent and consistent presentation of similar 
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situations can result in a bypassing of conscious choice, such that individuals 
can pursue and accomplish complex, nonconsciously activated behavioral and 
cognitive goals without being aware or able to comment that this process has 
taken place (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Taken together, these key findings 
imply that if achievement goals are conceptualized as cognitively represented, 
then they, like other cognitive representations, can be activated to operate 
nonconsciously, such that any subsequent explanatory attempts can only be 
based on post hoc rationalizations. The further implication is that if this is 
possible, then achievement goals will be activated not only by experimentally 
manipulated nonconscious priming procedures, but also by facets of the 
achievement environments they encounter. 
Chapter 3 then examined three phases of responses to such research from 
achievement goal theorists. Early responses were shown to be defensive, 
arguing that the question of conscious accessibility is irrelevant as achievement 
goals are unlike unconscious desires or motives in that they originate in the 
cognitive revolution (Pintrich, 2000; cf. Murphy & Alexander, 2000). Later 
responses seemed to approach a halfway point, in arguing that the definition of 
achievement goals requires that they are consciously committed to, but 
acknowledging research on implicit cognition by ceding that once they have 
been cognitively committed to, achievement goals can then be activated and 
operate without awareness (Elliot & Fryer, 2008). While these responses did not 
explore the implications of such a position, for example by questioning when 
conscious commitment occurs and how current self-report methods might 
access them, the latest responses have progressed by calling for research on the 
potential for nonconscious causal achievement goals and the interactions 
between conscious and nonconscious accounts (Murayama, Elliot, & Friedman, 
2012; Pintrich, 2003). The implications of such calls are vast: they open up a 
theoretical space for further explorations. These explorations should involve 
not only whether (and how) achievement goals might be pursued and fulfilled 
nonconsciously, but also pivotal questions on how the cognitive representation 
of achievement goals might accommodate both conscious and nonconscious 
achievement goals. Furthermore, such explorations should examine 
methodological concerns over the validity of currently predominant self-report 
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methods, and discern how implicit methods can be adapted and validated to aid 
in the measurement of achievement goals.  
In line with these calls, the final section of Chapter 3 examined several different 
implicit methods that could be used in the exploration of nonconscious 
achievement goals. While possibilities presented included projective tests such 
as the Thematic Apperception Test (Morgan & Murray, 1935; or more recently, 
Picture-Story Exercises, Thrash, Maruskin, & Martin, 2012), the Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, 
Power, Hayden, Milne, & Stewart, 2006), and the assessment of goal traces 
using specially designed learning software (e.g., Zhou & Winne, 2012), the two 
methods that were within the scope of a doctoral thesis and more readily 
adaptable comprised goal priming (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, 
Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001) and the Implicit Association Test (IAT, 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). These methods were hence the focus 
of the current empirical exploration of whether the implications of research on 
implicit cognition are applicable to achievement goals, but future work should 
carefully investigate the potential utility of a variety of implicit tools.  
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Table 35. Aim 1, 2, and 3a summary 
Aim Findings Future directions 
-Understand 
assumptions underlying 
current 
operationalizations of 
achievement goals (2nd 
part of Aim 1) 
-Examine the literature on 
implicit cognition and 
nonconscious goal 
pursuit and identify the 
key implications of these 
literatures for the 
definition of and 
operationalization of 
achievement goals (Aim 
2) 
-Assess the extent to 
which the implications of 
findings on implicit 
cognition and 
nonconscious goal 
pursuit apply to how 
achievement goals are 
currently theorized 
through reasoned 
argument (Aim 3a) 
 
-Definitions of conscious 
and automatic cognitive 
processes 
-We often tell more than 
we can know (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977) 
-Our experience of a 
conscious, causal will is 
an illusion (Wegner, 
2002) 
-Behavioral and 
cognitive goals can be 
nonconsciously 
activated and pursued 
till fulfilment (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999) 
-Achievement goals are 
cognitively represented, 
should have the capacity 
to be nonconsciously 
activated and pursued 
-Limits of introspective 
ability, responses about 
motivation based on 
post hoc rationalization 
-Already existing implicit 
methods can be 
adapted to explore 
nonconscious 
achievement goals 
-Exploration of possible 
nonconscious operation 
of achievement goals 
-Comparison of implicit 
and explicit methods for 
accessing achievement 
goals 
-Examine cognitive 
representation of 
achievement goals 
-Reassess purely 
conscious models, 
definitions, and 
operationalizations of 
achievement goals 
 
 
8.1.3 Empirically Exploring the Applicability of Implicit 
Cognition Implications to Achievement Goals 
The rest of the third aim was addressed across empirical Chapters 4 through 7 
and was, to assess the extent to which the implications of findings on implicit 
cognition and nonconscious goal pursuit apply to how achievement goals are 
currently theorized through designing and running a series of studies to empirically 
test if achievement goals can operate and be captured without conscious awareness 
(Aim 3b). These chapters sought to answer the research question, Are the 
implications of research on implicit cognition applicable to achievement goal theory? 
Each chapter also had more specific research questions, as described in the 
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following sections. Two approaches were taken to answering this overarching 
question. One approach was based on the idea that there may be aspects of 
achievement goals that may not emerge via conscious, self-report methods, and 
involved the adaptation of an implicit method for assessing achievement goals. 
As such, the first two empirical chapters adapted and administered an implicit 
method and then compared its findings firstly with those of an achievement 
goal questionnaire and later, with behavior on an achievement task. The second 
approach was based on the finding of automaticity research, that goals can be 
pursued without conscious awareness, intention, control, or effort, and 
involved examining the potential for achievement goals to be primed to operate 
outside of conscious awareness and accessibility. As such, the second two 
empirical chapters attempted to prime achievement goals before comparing 
priming conditions firstly with behavior, affect, intrinsic motivation, and then 
with both implicit and explicit achievement goal methods.   
8.1.3.1 Chapter Four: Study 1 
Chapter 4 described the design decisions involved in adapting two achievement 
goal implicit association tests, the Valence IAT and the Self/Other Referent 
IAT, and also reported on a study comparing participants’ responses to an 
Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R, Elliot & Murayama, 2008). 
This chapter specifically asked, can an implicit method for accessing achievement 
goals be designed? Are there differences between what an implicit versus an explicit 
method can tell us about a student’s goals, and if so, what are they? Once the 
achievement goal IATs had been adapted in line with recommendations for IAT 
design (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007), the comparison study allowed for 
an assessment to be made of their internal consistency. Although both methods 
achieved appropriate reliability, the Valence IAT emerged with a stronger 
internal consistency than the Self/Other Referent IAT, and was thus advanced 
as the implicit method to be used in other studies within the thesis. The study 
also found that the IATs and the AGQ-R did not correlate.  
Two potential explanations for this divergence were advanced: one suggested 
the two methods were tapping differing aspects of a single underlying 
construct, while the other posited that the two methods could be accessing 
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different constructs. The first suggestion implies that IATs may represent an 
account of automatic, spontaneous behavior or cognition, whereas the AGQ-R 
represents an account of more controlled, deliberate behavior. An implication 
of this suggestion is that future achievement goal studies should employ both 
methods, building up an idea of what situations an implicit or explicit method 
might be more helpful in. A potential implication of the second suggestion is 
that only one of the methods, or neither, validly accessed students’ 
achievement goals. Given the potential for nonconscious achievement goals 
and the limits to self-report, it was suggested that the IAT might be closer to 
accessing the goals individuals are likely to pursue in achievement settings, 
whereas self-report achievement goal questionnaires might only be tapping into 
a type of coherent, conscious account, or achievement narrative (see 4.2.5). 
Continued research should explore the predictive and concurrent validity of 
both methods. In sum, the findings alone could not indicate which of these 
explanations was more likely, and as such it was decided that a further study 
comparing both methods with participant behavior on an achievement method 
might help to determine if the methods were capturing relevant features of 
achievement goals or not.  
Ultimately, Study 1 showed that it is possible to adapt an implicit method to 
assess achievement goals, but more research needs to be done to discern the 
validity of the Valence IAT. Such research needs to continue to explore what a 
Valence IAT score means, for example by asking if there are different degrees 
of preference or association, and to what extent a preference or association is 
representative of an individual’s achievement goal or the likelihood that they 
will enact this goal in an achievement situation. Furthermore, continued 
research on the Valence IAT should explore the incorporation of approach and 
avoidance valences,44 and even the 3 x 2 model, in addition to honing the 
                                                             
44 For example, although Marzouq, Carr, and Slade’s (2012) IAT-Type method is designed to 
capture reaction times for all four of the 2 x 2 achievement goal framework in one IAT, this 
requires the use of phrases as stimuli for categorization, representing a departure from the use 
of single words as stimuli on the original IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In 
future, the current Valence IAT could be developed to take into account approach and 
avoidance valences, and even the 3 x 2 model, using a multiple IAT administration approach 
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components of the present configuration. Such amendments might include 
increasing the number of trials in block 4 to the recommendations of Nosek and 
colleagues (Nosek et al., 2007), decreasing the number of trials in blocks 3 and 
5, finding alternatives to the current category titles ‘Performance Goals’ and 
‘Mastery Goals’, and continued pilot testing of stimuli words to assess their 
membership of the competence development and demonstration categories. In 
terms of implicit methods and achievement goals more generally, continued 
research should explore alternatives that are not just verbal, but visual and even 
situational in an attempt to improve ecological validity and better approximate 
the achievement situation. 
Table 36. Aim 3b(i) summary 
Aim Findings Future directions 
-Developing an implicit 
method to access 
achievement goals and 
comparing it with an 
explicit achievement goal 
method (Aim 3bi) 
-Self/Other Referent IAT 
and Valence IAT both 
internally consistent 
implicit achievement goal 
methods 
-Valence IAT greater 
internal consistency 
-No correlation between 
original IATs and 
Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire-Revised 
 
-Continued fine-tuning of 
configuration and testing 
of achievement goal IATs 
-Explore potential for 2 x 
2 IAT measurement 
-Comparison of implicit 
and explicit methods with 
behavior 
-Explore reasons for 
divergence (tapping 
single underlying 
construct or different 
constructs) 
-Design decisions for 
original achievement goal 
IATs potentially useful for 
other psychological 
constructs 
 
8.1.3.2 Chapter Five: Study 2 
Chapter 5 conducted the study suggested by the findings of the previous study, 
asking will an implicit or explicit achievement goal method be more consistent with 
a student’s achievement behavior? There was initially a struggle to find an 
achievement task that might adequately differentiate behaviorally between 
achievement goals. On one hand, most of the recent research linking 
                                                                                                                                                                             
similar to that of Cvencek, Meltzoff, and Greenwald (2011), in which one IAT examined self and 
gender, another examined gender and math, and a last examined self and math. 
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achievement goals with behavior operates at the 2 x 2 achievement goal level, 
and the current study required comparison with the Valence IAT, which at 
present only operates at the dichotomous level. On the other hand, there was a 
struggle because of the often-varying correlational findings between 
achievement goals and behaviors, resulting from different assumptions 
underlying achievement goal operationalizations (i.e., whether performance 
goals should be operationalized in terms of demonstrating ability or 
outperforming others, Senko, Hulleman, & Harackiewicz, 2011). An induced 
failure anagrams task was selected, as it presented two behavioral persistence 
indicators that had been shown to correlate differently with performance and 
mastery goals (Sideridis & Kaplan, 2011). Collecting affect and intrinsic 
motivation ratings, which had also been shown to correlate differently with 
performance and mastery goals (Huang, 2011), provided further evidence of 
which of these goals participants had pursued. Both these behavioral and self-
report indicators were then compared with either the Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire-Revised or the Valence IAT.  
The findings suggested that while some participants indeed seemed to persist in 
line with either a mastery goal or a performance goal, these persistence 
differences were not accompanied by the theoretically predicted links with 
affect and intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, across two methods of analysis, 
the implicit and explicit methods were found to be consistent with behavior on 
the anagrams task for slightly less than half the time, but did not differ 
significantly in their consistency with the persistence behavior. The implication 
of this study is that neither method was especially effective at capturing the 
achievement goal enacted by the individual. As such, the answer to the research 
question was that both methods were equally consistent with the students’ 
achievement behavior.  
However, that the methods were only consistent with less than half the sample 
is of concern. While the Valence IAT is a new method and will require 
continued investigation of its predictive validity, the AGQ-R is a well-
established tool. If it fails to significantly reflect students’ achievement 
behavior, this is a problem for achievement goal research, and researchers must 
question what they have been measuring. In line with the argument made in 
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Chapter 3, one possibility is that achievement goal questionnaires only capture 
post hoc rationalizations of general achievement behavior, thereby only tapping 
into a more general achievement narrative (cf. Section 4.2.5), rather than 
illuminating achievement goals. Another possibility is that the paradigm used to 
assess achievement behavior in this study was problematic, for example in the 
way that participants’ persistence behavior was categorized as representing 
performance or mastery goals using a median split. Future studies will need to 
explore this possibility by using different behavioral paradigms for which 
achievement goals are differential predictors. Some clearer examples could 
potentially be found in alternative paradigms for capturing persistence 
(Bouffard, Boisvert, Vezeau, & Larouche, 1995; Elliot, McGregor, & Gable, 
1999; Pintrich et al., 1993), paradigms that focus on effort (Elliot et al., 1999), 
deep and surface learning strategies (Elliot et al., 1999; Entwistle, 1988), help-
seeking (Ryan & Pintrich, 1997) or academic self-handicapping (Midgley & 
Urdan, 2001).   
Table 37. Aim 3b(ii) summary 
Aim Findings Future directions 
-Conducting a 
comparison between 
achievement behavior 
and implicit and explicit 
achievement goal 
methods (Aim 3bii) 
-Mastery persistence 
participants reported 
greater positive affect, 
interest and enjoyment, 
and importance and 
effort ratings (all non sig.) 
-Performance 
persistence participants 
reported greater 
perceived competence 
(sig.) and lower negative 
affect ratings (non sig.) 
-AGQ-R and Valence 
IAT similarly consistent 
(non sig.), combined 
consistency less than 
half the time (46%) 
-Improve on achievement 
task and categorization 
approach used to 
operationalize 
achievement behavior as 
performance or mastery 
-Further study of Valence 
IAT and behavior 
-Further study of AGQ-R 
and behavior 
 
 
8.1.3.3 Chapter Six: Study 3 
Given that the priming procedure in Study 3 would provide groups across which 
persistence could be compared, the same task was used as in Study 2. Study 3 
attempted to nonconsciously activate achievement goals and determine if 
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participants’ achievement behavior, affect, and intrinsic motivation reflected 
the primed goal. This chapter specifically asked is it possible to prime an 
achievement goal such that it is reflected in achievement behavior? This study 
showed that priming performance and mastery goals indeed led to different 
persistence behaviors on an induced failure task. On average, those primed 
with mastery goals spent longer and made more attempts than those in a no 
prime control condition, followed by performance goal-primed participants. 
There were significant differences in persistence across groups in terms of 
average attempts made. For persistence in terms of average amount of time 
spent, the trend was in the right direction as suggested by significant 
differences across performance and mastery groups, indicating that 
performance goal-primed participants persisted less than mastery goal-primed 
participants. Importantly, none of the participants reported becoming 
suspicious of the influence of the priming task on the achievement task. 
Although tentative, this finding is promising, implying some very preliminary 
support for the possibility of nonconsciously operating achievement goals.  
Given the aforementioned struggles with this particular achievement task, 
continued research using a different achievement task is recommended to 
replicate the priming effect, helping to build up a body of research on the 
possibility that nonconsciously activated achievement goals can influence 
achievement behavior. The eventual implication of such findings is that if it is 
possible to nonconsciously activate achievement goals within a laboratory 
setting, it may be possible that features of ordinary achievement settings also 
activate individuals’ achievement goals, influencing their achievement 
behavior in ways that are outside of their conscious awareness and capacity to 
comment. Further research exploring this implication is warranted, and should 
also elucidate the extent to which implicit or self-report methods may be more 
pertinent in reflecting the achievement goals that operate in everyday 
achievement situations.  
Another interesting finding from this study was the lack of predicted 
relationships between persistence behavior and affect and intrinsic motivation 
self-reports, with the resultant possibility that, while priming may be linked to 
non-self-reported methods, there may be a disjunction between these two 
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nonconscious elements and self-reports. More research on this finding is 
merited, as it, too, would imply that nonconsciously activated achievement 
goals do not emerge in self-report methods. Indeed, while the stories we tell 
ourselves about what motivates our achievement are undoubtedly important in 
guiding our conscious achievement behaviors, the majority of our everyday 
achievement behavior is unlikely to be consciously initiated and controlled, as 
argued in Chapter 3. As such, achievement goal researchers must continue to 
explore what cognitively unconscious achievement goal-driven behavior may 
look like.  
Table 38. Aim 3b(iii) summary 
Aim Findings Future directions 
-Exploring if achievement 
goals can be 
nonconsciously activated 
(primed) and 
subsequently influence 
achievement behavior 
(Aim 3biii) 
 
 
-Mastery goal primed 
participants persisted 
significantly more than 
performance goal primed 
participants 
-No sig. differences in 
affect and intrinsic 
motivation across 
conditions 
-No participants became 
aware of priming 
-Replication with 
different achievement 
behavior task  
-Compare potentially 
linked non-self-report 
methods with self-report 
methods 
 
 
8.1.3.4 Chapter Seven: Study 4 
A preliminary attempt at exploring whether nonconscious methods would be 
inconsistent with self-report methods was made in the final study of the thesis, 
Study 4. This study specifically asked does nonconscious activation of achievement 
goals lead to consistent responses on achievement goal methods? The study used the 
AGQ-R and the Valence IAT as explicit and implicit achievement goal methods, 
respectively. In terms of consistency between the achievement goal priming 
conditions and the combined achievement goal methods, the findings indicated 
that the methods were consistent for the majority of the time (60%). 
Furthermore, though the differences failed to reach significance, there was 
greater observed consistency for those primed with mastery goals and those 
who completed the Valence IAT than there was for those primed with 
performance goals and those who completed the AGQ-R. While this trend is in 
line with the suggestion that implicit methods may indeed be more likely than 
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explicit methods to capture an implicitly activated, and therefore 
nonconsciously operating, achievement goal, the fact that the study failed to 
reveal significant differences and appropriate mastery subscale and Valence 
IAT reliabilities requires that additional studies are done to explore this 
hypothesis further.  
Continued research is also needed to understand why the mastery subscales 
and the Valence IAT demonstrated such low reliability, and understand if this 
resulted from the small sample size45 or an as yet unknown influence of the 
achievement goal priming procedure on responses to achievement goal 
methods. Indeed, future studies should improve upon the limitations of the 
current study regarding small sample size and the lack of a neutral comparison 
group. The sample size of this study was particularly small due to a low take up 
in participants despite numerous recruitment attempts (a problem that 
persisted throughout the empirical studies in this thesis). A further limitation 
was the lack of a neutral control group, which might have aided in isolating 
whether it was the priming of achievement goals or just the specific sample that 
resulted in the low reliability of the AGQ-R and the Valence IAT.  
Table 39. Aim 3b(iv) summary 
Aim Findings Future directions 
-Conducting a 
comparison between 
nonconscious activation 
and implicit and explicit 
achievement goal 
methods (Aim 3biv) 
 
 
-AGQ-R and Valence 
IAT consistent for 
majority of time (60%) 
-Greater consistency for 
mastery-primed 
participants and Valence 
IAT than performance 
goal-primed participants 
and AGQ-R (all non. sig) 
-Low reliability on AGQ-
R mastery subscales, 
Valence IAT 
- No participants became 
aware of priming 
-Replication with larger 
sample size and added 
neutral priming condition 
-Continue to compare 
potentially linked non-
self-report methods with 
self-report methods 
-Explore if priming 
achievement goals leads 
to interference with 
explicit and implicit 
achievement goal 
methods 
 
 
                                                             
45 For example, due to high variation in the sample and greater measurement error (Nichols, 
1999). 
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8.1.3.5 Summary 
In summary, although affected by a range of limitations, the studies in this 
thesis constitute an important starting point in the nascent exploration of the 
nature and methodological implications of the possibility for nonconscious 
achievement goal pursuit. Given the vastness of the area of possible studies in 
this field, there remain other paradigms and methods that could have worked 
for which there was neither time nor resource to conduct. However, against a 
strong and persuasive background of research on the unconscious, the 
empirical studies in this thesis provide preliminary information regarding 
possibilities for investigating the potential for nonconscious achievement goals 
and throw up some promising areas for continued research.  
8.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
The contributions to knowledge made by the arguments and studies conducted 
in this thesis are both theoretical and methodological.  
8.2.1 Theoretical Contributions 
In terms of theory, this thesis has begun to explore the theoretical space opened 
up by achievement goal researchers who are beginning to acknowledge that 
research on the implicit may have implications for achievement goal theory 
(Pintrich, 2003; Murayama, Elliot, & Friedman, 2012). The thesis has argued in 
support of a connectionist cognitive representation of achievement goals, in 
which nodes form a network, parts of which are activated in different situations, 
and would represent achievement goals (Pintrich, 2000, p. 98). This 
representation is more dynamic than a schema-theoretic representation in that 
it draws from both the situation and the individual. As such the representation 
is a marriage of the dispositional and the context-specific, importantly allowing 
for intraindividual stability (Pintrich, 2000, see Section 2.1.5.2) and the 
accommodation of the multiple goal perspective (see Section 2.1.4.3), but also 
not requiring consciousness for the goal to operate. The thesis has also 
contributed to theoretical knowledge in marrying the findings of automaticity 
research with achievement goal theory, such that achievement goals, as 
cognitive representations and like other cognitive representations, should have 
the capacity to become activated and operate nonconsciously (Bargh, 1990).  
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Finally, the thesis has contributed to theoretical knowledge by suggesting, 
maybe somewhat controversially, that the implication of potentially 
nonconscious achievement goals is the limited validity of using predominantly 
self-report methods in achievement goal research (cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Wegner, 2002). This implication must be addressed in future theorizing, 
measurement, and interventions focusing on achievement goals with the aim of 
improving students’ motivation and educational achievement.  
8.2.2 Methodological Contributions 
In terms of methodology, this thesis has contributed to knowledge in different 
ways. These contributions include the longitudinal nature of mapping the AGQ-
R to the IATs, the first real attempt at priming achievement goals to explore if 
they can be nonconsciously activated to influence behavior like other 
behavioral and cognitive goals, and the comparison of a variety of goal methods 
– behavioral, self-reported, and implicit – within one study, which supersedes 
the current largely questionnaire-based corpus of achievement goal research.  
The last methodological contribution made by this thesis is its design, 
development, and administration of two original, internally consistent 
achievement goal IATs. When the thesis was started, there were no 
achievement goal IATs, but in its duration the Like Me (Urdan & Cafasso, 2011) 
and IAT-T (Marzouq, Slade, & Carr, 2012) have been developed. As such, this 
thesis cannot claim to make the methodological contribution of the first or only 
achievement goal IAT. However, the Valence and Self/Other Referent IATs 
designed in this thesis are considerably different from the other achievement 
goal implicit methods, and at the same time, closer in procedure and 
configuration to the original IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
Instead of using phrases that might affect the reaction times (Marzouq et al., 
2012), these IATs use single words, with the potential for exploring more 
complicated achievement goal frameworks (i.e., 2 x 2, 3 x 2) in later, multiple 
IAT administration studies. Furthermore, instead of asking participants to 
decide how much a stimulus word is “like them” (Urdan & Cafasso, 2011), the 
IATs designed in this thesis are truly implicit in collecting reaction times based 
on associations rather than assessments of similarity to oneself. As such, while 
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assessments of similarity to oneself, like self-reports, might be internally 
consistent on a Like Me method, they are unlikely to tap the implicit. Thus the 
methodological contribution made by the two IATs in this thesis is that they are 
true to IAT procedure, internally consistent and tap the implicit.  
The Valence and Self/Other Referent IATs designed in this thesis may undergo 
replications, further validation procedures, and possibly be used in future 
research elucidating why, how and in what situations achievement goal pursuit 
may be conscious at times and nonconscious at others. This process may be 
especially helpful considering Pintrich’s (2003) point that nonconscious goal 
pursuit is reflective of “students learning in many classroom situations where 
they seem to proceed in rather habitual and unreflective ways” (p. 678). 
Furthermore, the description of considerations for adapting this implicit 
method may be useful for those studying other, similar social psychological 
constructs, for which the implications of the limits to self-report methodology 
that this thesis explores are likely to be equally relevant. 
8.3 Conclusion 
Having considered the findings of research on implicit cognition, the potential 
for cognitive representations of achievement goals to incorporate a 
nonconscious dimension, and the preliminary results of the empirical studies 
conducted within this thesis, the next step is to determine whether there are any 
changes that need to be made in defining and operationalizing achievement 
goals. Although the research within this thesis has thrown up some interesting 
areas for continued research, it is still too early to conclude that achievement 
goals can and do operate implicitly. However, given the growing evidence base 
for the cognitive unconscious, the strong implications of research on implicit 
cognition for the nonconscious activation and operation of goals in general 
(rather than achievement goals per se), in addition to the findings of the third 
study in this thesis, it is a distinct possibility that achievement goals, as 
cognitive representations, and potentially operating within a connectionist 
model, may also be activated and operate nonconsciously. From a 
methodological standpoint, the research on telling more than we can know and 
the illusion of the conscious will, in addition to the findings of the second and 
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fourth studies in this thesis, suggests that there is also a distinct possibility that 
self-report methods may be limited in what they can tell researchers about 
students’ achievement goals. As such, the claim here is that using self-report 
methods as the sole method within achievement goal studies or as the 
predominant method within the field is distinctly limiting for a motivational 
construct as potentially powerful and influential in educational settings as 
achievement goals.  
In terms, then, of concluding whether changes need to be made to how 
researchers define and operationalize achievement goals, there are two 
suggestions. The first suggestion is that researchers tentatively incorporate in 
their definitions of achievement goals the possibility for implicit achievement 
goals. This does not require a change to how a consciously pursued 
achievement goal, the only one at present, is defined, but requires the creation 
of a working definition of a similarly operating, albeit implicit, achievement 
goal. The development of this latter definition is fundamentally based on the 
second suggestion, which is that achievement goal researchers investigate the 
limitations of self-report methodology while further exploring the potential for 
nonconscious achievement goals. Studies exploring the utility of self-report 
measures of achievement goals should progress from predominantly 
correlational investigations to causal investigations (cf. Murayama, Elliot, & 
Friedman, 2012), and should involve comparisons with behavioral indicators 
and implicit methods. Studies exploring the potential for nonconscious 
achievement goals should include replications of the studies conducted within 
this thesis and follow its suggestions for future studies to clarify the current 
findings, in addition to exploring new approaches to asking these questions.  
Ultimately, achievement goals have the potential to represent a powerful and 
influential motivational construct for learners and educational practice. Indeed, 
very early on, Nicholls (1978) suggested that the study of achievement goals 
might lessen current inequalities of motivational opportunity, arguing that “if 
we are committed to the fullest possible development of intellectual skills in all 
children we must accept individual differences in achievement, but we must 
also seek to maintain motivation in all children, not just the high achievers” (p. 
811). The influence of an individual’s motivation on their academic success and 
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subsequent life opportunities is vast; research on achievement goals could lead 
to interventions that one day aid those students with maladaptive motivational 
patterns to overcome these, and to reap the same learning and achievement 
benefits, in addition to a full range of accompanying mental, emotional, and 
social benefits, open to those of their peers who are more likely to seek help 
when in need, persist in the face of difficulty, take risks, and engage in 
challenging tasks.  
However, at present, achievement goals as a construct are not meeting this 
potential. While some researchers have used the findings of achievement goal 
theory to develop in-school interventions to improve student motivation (e.g., 
Ames, 1990; Anderman & Young, 1994; Maehr & Midgley, 1996; Meece, 1991; 
Urdan & Midgley, 2003), Elliot and Murayama (2008) have suggested that the 
true potential of achievement goal research to cumulatively advance theory and 
enhance educational practice and student achievement is undermined by often 
unclear, and importantly, unmatched definitions and operationalizations (see 
also Senko, Hulleman, & Harackiewicz, 2011). As this thesis has suggested, 
further challenges have come in the form of suggestions about the limits of self-
report and the potential for nonconscious achievement goals within a context of 
mounting evidence of an increasingly powerful cognitive unconscious. 
Supporting these theoretical suggestions, the empirical studies carried out in 
this thesis imply that achievement goals may at times operate nonconsciously 
to influence student achievement behavior, and that implicit methods may be 
helpful in studying nonconscious achievement goal pursuit. Continued research 
in this area has the potential not only to irreversibly transform how we conceive 
of and attempt to access achievement goals and a host of similar psychological 
constructs, but how we frame our pedagogy and student learning. In order for 
achievement goal theory to fulfil its powerful and influential potential to 
improve educators’ practice and students’ learning experiences, researchers 
must do their utmost to meaningfully address the issues presented in this thesis.  
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10 Appendices 
10.1 Study 1 Exploration of a Possible Method for Capturing 
Nonconscious Achievement Goals: Development, design 
and administration of 2 achievement goal IATs 
10.1.1 Example Ethics Application and Approval (for 
Study 4) 
10.1.1.1 Application 
Durham University 
School of Education 
Research Ethics and Data Protection Monitoring Form 
Research involving humans by all academic and related Staff and Students 
in the Department is subject to the standards set out in the Department Code 
of Practice on Research Ethics. The Sub-Committee will assess the research 
against the British Educational Research Association's Revised Ethical 
Guidelines for Educational Research (2004). 
It is a requirement that prior to the commencement of all research that this 
form be completed and submitted to the Department’s Research Ethics and 
Data Protection Sub-Committee.  The Committee will be responsible for 
issuing certification that the research meets acceptable ethical standards and 
will, if necessary, require changes to the research methodology or reporting 
strategy. 
A copy of the research proposal which details methods and reporting 
strategies must be attached and should be no longer than two typed A4 
pages. In addition you should also attach any information and consent form 
(written in layperson’s language) you plan to use. An example of a consent 
form is included at the end of the code of practice. 
Please send the signed application form and proposal to the Secretary of the 
Ethics Advisory Committee (Sheena Smith, School of Education, tel. (0191) 
334 8403, e-mail: Sheena.Smith@Durham.ac.uk).  Returned applications 
must be either typed or word-processed and it would assist members if you 
could forward your form, once signed, to the Secretary as an e-mail 
attachment. 
Name:       Course:  
Laura da Costa      PhD Education 
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Contact e-mail address:     Supervisor:  
lauradacosta@gmail.com     Dr Richard Remedios
     
Title of research project:  
Do Self-Report and/or Implicit Achievement Goal Methods Capture 
Nonconsciously Primed Achievement Goals?  
Questionnaire:  
  YES NO  
1. Does your research involve living human subjects? Y  
IF NOT, GO TO 
DECLARATION AT 
END 
2. 
Does your research involve only the 
analysis of large, secondary and 
anonymised datasets? 
 N 
IF YES, GO TO 
DECLARATION AT 
END 
3a 
Will you give your informants a 
written summary of your research 
and its uses? 
 N 
If NO, please provide 
further details and go 
to 3b 
3b 
Will you give your informants a 
verbal summary of your research 
and its uses? 
Y  If NO, please provide further details 
3c Will you ask your informants to sign a consent form? Y  
If NO, please provide 
further details 
4. 
Does your research involve covert 
surveillance (for example, participant 
observation)? 
 N If YES, please provide further details. 
5a Will your information automatically be anonymised in your research? 
Y (see further 
details)  
If NO, please provide 
further details and go 
to 5b 
5b 
IF NO 
Will you explicitly give all your 
informants the right to remain 
anonymous? 
  If NO, why not? 
6. 
Will monitoring devices be used 
openly and only with the permission 
of informants? 
Y  If NO, why not? 
7. 
Will your informants be provided with 
a summary of your research 
findings? 
 
Y (option is 
given, if 
interested) 
 If NO, why not? 
8. 
Will your research be available to 
informants and the general public 
without restrictions placed by 
sponsoring authorities? 
Y  If NO, please provide further details 
9. 
Have you considered the 
implications of your research 
intervention on your informants? 
Y (see further 
details)  
Please provide full 
details 
 
10. Are there any other ethical issues arising from your research?  N 
If YES, please provide 
further details. 
     
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  262 
Further details 
• 3a/b/c: Priming entails non-conscious activation of goals. Therefore, 
students will not have access to a full theoretical explanation of the 
research before they begin. I will be providing a written information sheet 
with the consent form, assuring participants of the confidentiality of their 
responses and that they may withdraw participation at any time during the 
task. Participants will be debriefed in full after the completion of the 
experiment. Participants will also have the option to provide their email 
address (on the consent form) if they would like further information, to be 
involved in future research, or to be kept updated with the progress of the 
research (and research findings).  
• In relation to 5a, participants will be given a participant ID number, which 
I will have saved in a password-protected Excel document. The locked 
document will also be the site for storing the participants’ emails, if these 
are provided (see above point). During the analyses, I will only be using 
the participant ID, and during reporting, there will be no way of identifying 
individual/specific participants.   
• In relation to 6, no covert monitoring devices will be used. The Implicit 
Association Test (IAT) is a reaction time measure, and though 
participants are instructed to go as fast as possible, this measurement is 
not explicit. However, knowledge of what various measures of one’s 
achievements goals suggest is unlikely to have as negative an impact on 
students as IATs measuring racial stereotypes, self-esteem, and gender 
bias.  
• In response to item 9, I have considered the potential implications of 
completing the Scrambled Sentences Task, the Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire and the achievement goal Implicit Association Test on 
the participants. I have concluded that participants will not, as a result of 
participating in this research, be placed in a situation that will mentally, 
emotionally, or physically endanger them on any occasion during or after 
participation.  
 
Continuation sheet YES/NO (delete as applicable) 
 
Declaration 
I have read the Department’s Code of Practice on Research Ethics and 
believe that my research complies fully with its precepts.  I will not deviate 
from the methodology or reporting strategy without further permission from 
the Department’s Research Ethics Committee. 
Signed:  Laura da Costa  
Date: 24/02/2014 
SUBMISSIONS WITHOUT A COPY OF THE RESEARCH PROPOSAL WILL NOT BE 
CONSIDERED.  
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Research Proposal 
Research has shown that goals can be activated nonconsciously (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Bargh et al., 2001; Bongers, 
Dijksterhuis, & Spears, 2009; Chartrand, 1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; 
Chartrand & Bargh, 2002; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003), to influence an 
individual’s behaviour, cognitions and affect. The current line of research 
examines whether the same applies to achievement goals, and works toward a 
better response to the question, how should researchers measure students’ goals for 
studying?  
 
Purpose 
Building on the researcher’s first three studies, the current study looks to 
again use priming to non-consciously activate participants’ mastery or 
performance goals, and then use a self-report method, the Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R, Elliot & Murayama, 2008) and an implicit 
method, the achievement goal Valence Implicit Association Test (Valence IAT, 
da Costa & Remedios, 2012) to provide some idea of which method, both, or 
neither, might represent a valid measure for capturing students’ achievement 
goals. It should also shed further light on the potentially non-conscious nature 
of achievement goals.  
 
Sample 
The sample will comprise 60 university student volunteers. There will be 
equal numbers of participants per group (15 performance prime + AGQ, 15 
performance prime + IAT; 15 mastery prime + AGQ, 15 mastery prime + IAT). A 
balance will be sought between postgraduates and undergraduates, and 
females and males. 
 
Materials 
The Scrambled Sentences task used here to prime achievement goals is 
adapted from Kawada, Oettingen, Gollwitzer, and Bargh (2004, experiment 2), 
and has previously been used to activate processing and behavioural goals 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Bargh et al., 2001) after its original use by Srull and 
Wyer (1979). For an example Scrambled Sentence Task, see Appendix A. 
Elliot and Murayama’s (2008) 12-item Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R) will represent the explicit, self-report measure. 
The questionnaire comprises four subscales: performance approach, mastery 
approach, performance avoidance, and mastery avoidance.  Participants will 
respond on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The AGQ-R is 
shown in Appendix B.  
The Valence Implicit Association Test (Valence IAT, da Costa & 
Remedios, 2012) will be the implicit measure, with categories ‘Good’, ‘Bad’, 
‘Performance Goals’, and ‘Mastery Goals’. More details on the Valence IAT are 
shown in Appendix C. 
 
Procedure (Ethics considerations in Bold) 
All participants will be run individually, in a quiet room away from noise 
and distractions. After filling out a consent form (see Appendix D), 
participants will choose an envelope from a pile on the desk. In this way, the 
researcher will be blinded to the condition. The task instructions will ask 
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participants to unscramble 25 scrambled sentences, using four out of five of the 
available words to create coherent, complete sentences. The sentences 
presented to those in the performance goal conditions (n = 30) will contain 10 
performance approach goal scrambled sentences. These will contain words 
related to the normative comparison criteria of performance goals, such as win, 
compete, overtake, better, and best, and will be interspersed with 15 neutral 
sentences (i.e., only using non-achievement-related words). The mastery goal 
experimental condition (n = 30) will operate similarly, with task- or self-based 
competence words, such as understand, learn, improve, progress, competent, and 
persist.  
Participants will then be given either the AGQ-R or the Valence IAT. If 
the first participant does the AGQ-R, the next one will do the Valence IAT, the 
next will do the AGQ-R and so on. 
Finally,  the researcher will  engage each participant in 
funnelled debriefing (see Appendix E) to gauge awareness of the real 
purpose of the Scrambled Sentence test. The researcher will  then explain 
the full  purpose of the experiment, answer any questions, and 
remind participants that any information on how they did or more 
general findings is available to them if  they wish. Finally, the 
researcher will thank and dismiss them. 
 
Analyses 
Anonymity will be maintained during statistical testing. Priming condition and 
AGQ-R average score will be correlated, as will priming condition and IAT 
score, and comparisons made. Results will be sent to interested participants, 
and prepared for inclusion in PhD thesis and a publishable article. 
 
10.1.1.2 Approval 
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10.1.2 Achievement Goal Questionnaire - Revised  
Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised  
 
Instructions: While filling out this questionnaire, please think about the goals you 
pursue in your classes at university in general. Then circle the number that best 
corresponds with the extent to which you pursue the specified goal.  
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. My aim is to perform well 
relative to other students.  
1 2 3 4 5 
2. My aim is to completely 
master the material presented 
in my classes.  
1 2 3 4 5 
3. My aim is to avoid learning 
less than I possibly could.  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I am striving to avoid 
performing worse than others. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. My goal is to learn as much 
as possible. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. My goal is to avoid learning 
less than it is possible to 
learn.  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am striving to do well 
compared to other students.  
1 2 3 4 5 
8. My aim is to avoid doing 
worse than other students.  
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I am striving to understand 
the content of my classes as 
thoroughly as possible.  
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I am striving to avoid an 
incomplete understanding of 
the course material.  
1 2 3 4 5 
11. My aim is to avoid performing 
poorly compared to others.  
1 2 3 4 5 
12. My goal is to perform better 
than the other students. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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10.1.3 Consent Form for AGQ-R  
	   	   	   	   December	  2011/January	  2012	  Dear	  Participant,	  My	  name	  is	  Laura	  da	  Costa	  and	  I	  am	  a	  PhD	  student	  at	  the	  School	  of	  Education	  at	  Durham	  University.	  My	  research	  focuses	  on	  student	  motivation	  and	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  your	  views	  about	  your	  studies.	  My	  study	  involves	  you	  completing	  a	  questionnaire	  now	  and	  then	  doing	  a	  10-­‐15	  minute	  task	  for	  me	  early	  next	  year.	  	  	  	  If	  you	  are	  happy	  to	  take	  part	  in	  this	  phase	  of	  the	  study,	  please	  sign	  the	  consent	  form	  below.	  I	  do	  need	  your	  name	  so	  that	  I	  can	  assign	  you	  the	  appropriate	  task	  next	  year.	  Please	  be	  assured	  that	  any	  details	  you	  provide	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential,	  and	  you	  will	  remain	  anonymous	  throughout	  the	  analysis,	  write-­‐up,	  and	  any	  publications	  that	  result	  from	  the	  work.	  In	  this	  way,	  no	  results	  will	  be	  linked	  back	  to	  you	  personally.	  	  However,	  if	  you	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  final	  results	  of	  the	  work,	  please	  leave	  me	  an	  email	  address	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  this	  sheet,	  and	  I	  will	  ensure	  you	  receive	  them.	  Please	  feel	  free	  to	  ask	  me	  any	  questions,	  if	  you	  are	  still	  unsure	  about	  any	  aspect	  of	  the	  research	  or	  your	  role.	  Thank	  you	  very	  much	  for	  your	  time	  in	  taking	  part,	  Laura	  da	  Costa	  	  I	  have	  read	  the	  above	  information	  sheet	  and	  I	  consent	  to	  taking	  part	  in	  this	  research	  	  Name:	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   Signature:	  Date:	  Degree	  Programme:	   	   	   	   	   	  If	  you	  would	  like	  further	  information,	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  future	  research,	  or	  to	  be	  kept	  updated	  with	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  research	  and	  its	  findings,	  please	  provide	  an	  email	  address	  on	  which	  I	  can	  contact	  you	  here:	  _______________________________________________	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10.1.4 Consent Form for IAT 
	   	   	   	   	   	   January	  2012	  Dear	  Participant,	  Recently,	  you	  completed	  a	  questionnaire	  for	  me,	  and	  agreed	  to	  complete	  a	  short	  task.	  If	  you	  are	  still	  happy	  to	  continue,	  please	  fill	  out	  the	  below.	  However,	  please	  be	  assured	  that	  any	  details	  you	  do	  provide	  me	  with	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential,	  and	  you	  will	  remain	  anonymous	  throughout	  the	  analysis,	  write-­‐up,	  and	  any	  publications	  that	  result	  from	  the	  work.	  In	  this	  way,	  no	  results	  will	  be	  linked	  back	  to	  you	  personally.	  However,	  if	  you	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  final	  results	  of	  the	  work,	  please	  leave	  me	  an	  email	  address	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  this	  sheet,	  and	  I	  will	  ensure	  you	  receive	  them.	  Please	  feel	  free	  to	  ask	  me	  any	  questions,	  if	  you	  are	  still	  unsure	  about	  any	  aspect	  of	  the	  research	  or	  your	  role.	  Thank	  you	  very	  much	  for	  your	  time	  in	  taking	  part,	  Laura	  da	  Costa	  	  I	  have	  read	  the	  above	  information	  sheet	  and	  I	  consent	  to	  taking	  part	  in	  this	  research	  experiment.	  Name:	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   Signature:	  Date:	  Degree	  Programme:	   	   	  If	  you	  would	  like	  further	  information,	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  future	  research,	  or	  to	  be	  kept	  updated	  with	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  research	  and	  its	  findings,	  please	  provide	  an	  email	  address	  on	  which	  I	  can	  contact	  you	  here:	  _______________________________________________	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10.1.5 Example Instruction Page of IAT (Valence) 
 
Figure 20. Valence IAT instruction page 
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10.2 Study 2 Does achievement behavior indicative of 
mastery or performance goals correspond to implicit or 
explicit accounts? 
10.2.1 Anagrams Answer Sheet 
Anagrams 
INSTRUCTIONS:  
• Inside the folded cards in front of you are five anagrams.  
• Pick up card number 1 and work on the anagram.  
• When you have found the answer, or want to move onto the next one, 
close it again and put it aside.  
• Pick up the next card, working your way to the bottom of the pile.  
• Your solution for each anagram must use all of the provided letters. 
Solutions should be written below.  
• You can use the provided paper to do your working out. Use separate 
parts of the paper to work out each anagram.   
 
	  
Solutions 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
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10.2.2 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, 
Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988)  
Post-­‐Task	  Mood	  Scale	  
This	  scale	  consists	  of	  a	  number	  of	  words	  that	  describe	  different	  feelings	  and	  
emotions.	  Read	  each	  item	  and	  then	  mark	  the	  appropriate	  answer	  in	  the	  space	  next	  
to	  that	  word.	  Indicate	  to	  what	  extent	  you	  have	  felt	  this	  way	  during	  the	  anagram	  
activity.	  Use	  the	  following	  scale	  to	  record	  your	  answers:	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
very	  slightly	  or	  
not	  at	  all	  
a	  little	   moderately	   quite	  a	  bit	   extremely	  
	  
_____	  Interested	  
_____	  Distressed	  
_____	  Excited	  
_____	  Upset	  
_____	  Strong	  
_____	  Guilty	  
_____	  Scared	  
_____	  Hostile	  
_____	  Enthusiastic	  
_____	  Proud	  
_____	  Irritable	  
_____	  Alert	  
_____	  Ashamed	  
_____	  Inspired	  
_____	  Nervous	  
_____	  Determined	  
_____	  Attentive	  
_____	  Jittery	  
_____	  Active	  
_____	  Afraid	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10.2.3 Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI, Ryan, 1982) 
Task	  Evaluation	  Questionnaire	  
For	  each	  of	  the	  following	  statements,	  please	  circle	  to	  indicate	  how	  true	  it	  is	  for	  you,	  
using	  the	  following	  scale:	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
not	  at	  all	  
true	  
	   	   somewhat	  
true	  
	   	   very	  true	  
1. While	  I	  was	  doing	  this	  
activity,	  I	  was	  thinking	  about	  
how	  much	  I	  enjoyed	  it.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
2. After	  working	  at	  this	  activity	  
for	  awhile,	  I	  felt	  pretty	  
competent.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
3. It	  was	  important	  to	  me	  to	  do	  
well	  at	  this	  task.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
4. I	  thought	  this	  was	  a	  boring	  
activity.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
5. I	  didn’t	  try	  very	  hard	  to	  do	  
well	  at	  this	  activity.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
6. I	  think	  I	  am	  pretty	  good	  at	  
this	  activity.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
7. I	  enjoyed	  doing	  this	  activity	  
very	  much.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
8. This	  was	  an	  activity	  that	  I	  
couldn’t	  do	  very	  well.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
9. This	  activity	  was	  fun	  to	  do.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
10. I	  was	  pretty	  skilled	  at	  this	  
activity.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
11. I	  tried	  very	  hard	  on	  this	  
activity.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
12. This	  activity	  did	  not	  hold	  my	  
attention	  at	  all.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
13. I	  am	  satisfied	  with	  my	  
performance	  at	  this	  task.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
14. I	  didn’t	  put	  much	  energy	  into	  
this.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
15. I	  would	  describe	  this	  activity	  
as	  very	  interesting.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
16. I	  think	  I	  did	  pretty	  well	  at	  this	  
activity,	  compared	  to	  other	  
students.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
17. I	  put	  a	  lot	  of	  effort	  into	  this.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
18. I	  thought	  this	  activity	  was	  
quite	  enjoyable.	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
 	  
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  272 
10.2.4 Consent Form 
	   	   	   	   	   	   October	  2013	  	  Dear	  Participant,	  Thanks	  for	  coming	  in	  today!	  My	  name	  is	  Laura	  da	  Costa	  and	  I	  am	  a	  PhD	  student	  at	  the	  School	  of	  Education	  at	  Durham	  University.	  As	  I	  will	  have	  mentioned,	  I	  mostly	  work	  on	  students’	  experiences	  while	  learning.	  Today	  I	  would	  like	  you	  to	  complete	  a	  series	  of	  tasks	  for	  me.	  The	  first	  is	  an	  anagrams	  task,	  followed	  by	  some	  questionnaires.	  I	  may	  also	  ask	  you	  to	  complete	  a	  computer-­‐based	  categorization	  task.	  The	  entire	  process	  should	  take	  about	  an	  hour	  of	  your	  time.	  	  	  	  If	  you	  are	  happy	  to	  take	  part,	  please	  sign	  the	  consent	  form	  below.	  Please	  be	  assured	  that	  any	  details	  you	  provide	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential	  and	  that	  your	  identity	  will	  remain	  anonymous	  throughout.	  Also,	  if	  at	  any	  stage	  you	  would	  like	  to	  withdraw,	  that	  is	  absolutely	  fine.	  	  If	  you	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study,	  please	  leave	  me	  an	  email	  address	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  this	  sheet,	  and	  I	  will	  ensure	  you	  receive	  them.	  Finally,	  please	  feel	  free	  to	  ask	  me	  any	  questions	  during	  or	  after	  today’s	  session,	  if	  you	  are	  still	  unsure	  about	  any	  aspect	  of	  the	  research	  or	  your	  role.	  Thank	  you	  in	  advance	  for	  your	  time,	  Laura	  da	  Costa	  	  I	  have	  read	  the	  above	  information	  sheet	  and	  I	  consent	  to	  taking	  part.	  	  
Name:	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Signature:	  
Date:	  
Degree	  Programme:	   	   	   	   	   	  If	  you	  would	  like	  further	  information,	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  future	  research,	  or	  to	  be	  kept	  updated	  with	  my	  progress,	  please	  provide	  an	  email	  address	  on	  which	  I	  can	  contact	  you	  here:	  _______________________________________________.	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10.2.5 Order of AGQ-R and Counterbalanced Valence IAT 
Allocation  
Table 40. Participants (by number) allocated to each method 
AGQ-R  Valence IAT 
(Performance Goal + 
Good First) 
Valence IAT  
(Mastery Goal + Good 
First) 
1, 2, 3, 8, 12, 16, 17, 21, 
22, 25, 31, 32, 33, 38, 
39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 
46, 47, 48, 49, 50 
4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 18, 19, 
23, 26, 28, 30, 34, 36 
5, 7, 10, 14, 15, 20, 24, 
27, 29, 35, 37, 42 
Note. AGQ-R = Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised, IAT = Implicit 
Association Test. 
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10.2.6 Alternative analysis of correspondence between 
behavior and achievement goal methods 
A key analysis for this study involved determining whether what participants 
either said about their goals on the explicit method or showed via the implicit 
method matched their persistence behavior on the anagrams task. To assess 
this, a performance group was made up of all who had endorsed performance 
goals more strongly than mastery goals on the AGQ-R and those who had been 
faster to categorize performance and positive words when Performance Goals 
and Good were combined. The same was done for mastery. There were two 
AGQ-R respondents who emerged with equivalent performance and mastery 
subscale averages, so these participants were excluded from the analysis. Of the 
remaining 48 participants, 22 favored (AGQ-R or Valence IAT) performance 
goals whereas 26 favored mastery goals, revealing a 46-54% performance-
mastery split in the sample. The mean persistence in terms of times and number 
of attempts on anagrams by performance and mastery group are shown in Table 
41 and Table 42 below. 
Table 41. Means and standard deviations of average amount of time on 
anagrams 1-3 by group 
 AGQ-R_IAT Combined 
Group 
n M SD 
Avg Time on  
Anagrams 1-3 
Performance 22 0:06:16 0:03:23 
Mastery 26 0:07:04 0:05:39 
 Total 48 0:06:42 0:04:43 
Note. AGQ-R = Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised, IAT = Valence 
Implicit Association Test, n = number of participants per group, M = mean, Min. 
= minimum, Max. = maximum, SD = standard deviation.  
Table 42. Means and standard deviations of average amount of attempts 
on anagrams 1-3 by group 
 AGQ-R_IAT Combined Group n M SD 
Avg Attempts on  
Anagrams 1-3 
Performance 22 10.11 7.68 
Mastery 26 10.28 10.46 
 Total 48 10.20 9.20 
Note. AGQ-R = Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised, IAT = Valence 
Implicit Association Test, n = number of participants per group, M = mean, Min. 
= minimum, Max. = maximum, SD = standard deviation. 
For both time spent on these anagrams and attempts made, the means differed 
as expected by group. In other words, participants for whom the implicit and 
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explicit methods suggested a favoring of performance goals spent about one 
minute less on average per anagram than those who had favored mastery goals. 
On average, those who had favored performance goals also made slightly fewer 
attempts on the anagrams than those who had favored mastery goals. However 
the differences between the performance and mastery means did not reach 
significance for either time spent or attempts made on anagrams 1-3. 
10.2.6.1 Factorial ANOVA 
Next, two 2 x 2 factorial ANOVAs were run. One attempted to determine the 
effect of type of achievement goal method and goal type on persistence in terms 
of average time on anagrams 1-3. The other attempted to do the same, albeit 
using average attempts on anagram 1-3 as the dependent variable. Both 
ANOVAs were conducted to assess if there were any differences by type of 
method (implicit or explicit) and whether performance or mastery was 
endorsed on the dependent variable of participants’ persistence behavior. Table 
43 below shows how many of the 48 participants belonged to each of the groups: 
AGQ-R or IAT condition, and performance or mastery goal endorsement.  
Table 43. Number of participants by method and goal 
 Performance Mastery Total 
AGQ-R 11 12 23 
Valence IAT 11 14 25 
Total 22 26 48 
Note. AGQ-R = Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised, IAT = Valence 
Implicit Association Test.  
The first analysis of variance (ANOVA) failed to reveal a main effect of type of 
achievement goal method, F (1, 44) = 2.946, MSe = 79142.123, p = .093, α = .05, a 
main effect of goal type, F (1, 44) = .464, p = .499, and an interaction of 
achievement goal method and goal type, F (1, 44) = .189, p = .666. The second 
ANOVA, with a dependent variable of average attempts on anagrams 1-3 found 
a similar lack of main or interaction effects (type of achievement goal method,  
F (1, 44) = 2.212, MSe = 85.755, p = .144, α = .05; goal type, F (1, 44) = .018, p = .895; 
interaction of achievement goal method and goal type, F (1, 44) = .066, p =.798). 
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10.3 Study 3 Priming achievement goals? Successful 
nonconscious activation of achievement goals – 
behavioral evidence of nonconscious operation of 
achievement goals? 
10.3.1 Performance Scrambled Sentence Task 
Scrambled Sentence Task 
INSTRUCTIONS: For each set of words below, make a grammatical four-word 
sentence and write it down in the space provided. Each item may have more than one 
solution, but please provide only one solution per sentence.   
Example: flew eagle the plane around  
Solution: The eagle flew around. 
 
1. a look takes they he 
 
 
2. feeling win she pretty was 
 
 
3. sun morning drums the glittered 
 
 
4. to has compete he main 
 
 
5. money gave he four them 
 
 
6. brown the yes window clean  
 
 
7. them better a than you’re  
 
 
8. was unaware he kick completely 
 
 
9. drink east needed she a 
 
 
10. a was fire victory there 
 
 
11.  time now concrete is the  
 
 
12.  to she army overtake wanted 
 
 
13. we walk to have mushroom 
 
 
14. to started he perform well  
 
 
15. cheered grant the loudly crowd 
 
 
16. felt Ben tired very entry 
 
 
17.  class the she in best 
 
 
18. was ball thrown the table 
 
 
19. to wanted refuse hand he 
 
 
20. the cut outperform tree down  
 
 
21. mouse plot scroll the with 
 
 
22. wheat best cultivate the they 
 
 
23. ate too much he wings  
 
 
24. buses year my topped I 
 
 
25. water hold bottle the brown
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10.3.2 Mastery Scrambled Sentence Test 
Scrambled Sentence Task 
INSTRUCTIONS: For each set of words below, make a grammatical four word 
sentence and write it down in the space provided. Each item may have more 
than one solution, but please provide only one solution per sentence.   
Example: flew eagle the plane around  
Solution: The eagle flew around.	  
	  
1. a look takes they he 
 
 
2. fit comprehend trousers now 
the  
 
 
3. sun morning drums the 
glittered 
 
 
4. study in sit want the 
 
 
5. money gave he four them 
 
 
6. brown the yes window clean 
 
 
7. master it dog’s the lost  
 
 
8. was unaware he kick 
completely 
 
 
9. drink east needed she a 
 
 
10. he time needed more effort  
 
 
11. time now concrete is the  
 
 
12. tried to understand he I 
 
 
13. we walk to have mushroom 
 
14. boat the learn rowed they 
 
 
15. cheered grant the loudly 
crowd 
 
 
16. felt Ben tired very entry 
 
 
17. can improved cake be it 
 
 
18. was ball thrown the table 
 
 
19. to wanted refuse hand he 
 
 
20. progress long took 
programming the  
 
 
21. mouse plot scroll the with  
 
 
22. they with many persisted 
enthusiasm  
 
 
23. ate too much he wings 
 
 
24. sometimes moths must 
persevere you  
 
 
25. water hold bottle the brown 
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10.3.3 Neutral Scrambled Sentence Test 
Scrambled	  Sentence	  Task	  
INSTRUCTIONS:	  For	  each	  set	  of	  words	  below,	  make	  a	  grammatical	  four	  word	  
sentence	  and	  write	  it	  down	  in	  the	  space	  provided.	  Each	  item	  may	  have	  more	  than	  
one	  solution,	  but	  please	  provide	  only	  one	  solution	  per	  sentence.	  	  	  
Example:	  flew	  eagle	  the	  plane	  around	  	  
Solution:	  The	  eagle	  flew	  around.
	  
1. a look takes they he 
 
 
2. wore she then jumper a 
 
 
3. sun morning drums the 
glittered 
 
 
4. the on door was knock 
 
 
5. money gave he four them 
 
 
6. brown the yes window clean 
 
 
7. pouring main water the was 
 
 
8. was unaware he kick 
completely 
 
 
9. drink east needed she a 
 
 
10.  me it laugh to made 
 
 
11. time now concrete is the 
 
 
12. to decided I sleepy go 
 
 
13. we walk to have mushroom 
 
14. the consequences accepted 
were love 
 
 
15. cheered grant the loudly 
crowd 
 
 
16. felt Ben tired very entry 
 
 
17. everything she think him told 
 
 
18. was ball thrown the table 
 
 
19. to wanted refuse hand he 
 
 
20. defended they castle the joke 
 
 
21. mouse plot scroll the with 
 
 
22. they in steps unicorns 
believed  
 
 
23. ate too much he wings 
 
 
24. match peppers the watch I  
 
 
25. water hold bottle the brown  
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10.3.4 Consent form 
	   	   	   	   	   	   January	  2013	  Dear	  Participant,	  Thanks	  for	  coming	  in	  today!	  My	  name	  is	  Laura	  da	  Costa	  and	  I	  am	  a	  PhD	  student	  at	  the	  School	  of	  Education	  at	  Durham	  University.	  As	  I	  will	  have	  mentioned,	  I	  mostly	  work	  on	  students’	  experiences	  when	  they	  complete	  tasks.	  Today	  I	  would	  just	  like	  to	  run	  a	  couple	  of	  tasks	  and	  questionnaires	  with	  you	  to	  see	  if	  they	  might	  be	  useful	  in	  my	  future	  studies.	  It	  should	  not	  take	  more	  than	  half	  an	  hour	  of	  your	  time.	  	  	  	  If	  you	  are	  happy	  to	  take	  part,	  please	  sign	  the	  consent	  form	  below.	  I	  do	  need	  your	  name	  so	  that	  I	  can	  assign	  you	  the	  appropriate	  task.	  Please	  be	  assured	  that	  any	  details	  you	  provide	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential	  and	  that	  your	  identity	  will	  remain	  anonymous.	  Also,	  if	  at	  any	  point	  you	  would	  like	  to	  withdraw,	  that	  is	  absolutely	  fine.	  	  If	  you	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  final	  results	  of	  my	  future	  work,	  please	  leave	  me	  an	  email	  address	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  this	  sheet,	  and	  I	  will	  ensure	  you	  receive	  them.	  Finally,	  please	  feel	  free	  to	  ask	  me	  any	  questions,	  if	  you	  are	  still	  unsure	  about	  any	  aspect	  of	  the	  research	  or	  your	  role.	  Thank	  you	  in	  advance	  for	  your	  time,	  Laura	  da	  Costa	  	  I	  have	  read	  the	  above	  information	  sheet	  and	  I	  consent	  to	  taking	  part.	  	  
Name:	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Signature:	  
Date:	  
Degree	  Programme:	   	   	   	   	   	  If	  you	  would	  like	  further	  information,	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  future	  research,	  or	  to	  be	  kept	  updated	  with	  my	  progress,	  please	  provide	  an	  email	  address	  on	  which	  I	  can	  contact	  you	  here:	  _______________________________________________.	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10.3.5 Funnelled Debrief Procedure 
Funnelled Questioning 
 
1. What do you think the purpose of this experiment was? 
2. Did you think that the tasks were related in any way? (If yes, in what 
way?) 
3. Did anything you did on the first task affect what you answered on the 
questionnaire? (If yes, how exactly did it affect you?) 
4. When you were completing the Scrambled Sentence Test did you notice 
anything unusual about the words? 
5. Did you notice any particular pattern or theme to the words that were 
included on the scrambled sentence test? 
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10.4 Study 4 Which achievement goal method captures 
primed achievement goals? 
10.4.1 Consent form 
	   	   	   	   	   	   March	  2014	  Dear	  Participant,	  Thanks	  for	  coming	  in	  today!	  My	  name	  is	  Laura	  da	  Costa	  and	  I	  am	  a	  PhD	  student	  at	  the	  School	  of	  Education	  at	  Durham	  University.	  As	  I	  will	  have	  mentioned,	  I	  mostly	  work	  on	  students’	  experiences	  while	  learning.	  Today	  I	  would	  just	  like	  you	  to	  complete	  two	  quick	  tasks	  for	  me.	  The	  first	  will	  involve	  unscrambling	  some	  sentences,	  and	  the	  second	  will	  be	  either	  a	  learning	  questionnaire	  or	  a	  computerized	  sorting	  task.	  The	  entire	  process	  should	  take	  between	  ten	  to	  fifteen	  minutes	  of	  your	  time.	  	  	  	  If	  you	  are	  happy	  to	  take	  part,	  please	  sign	  the	  consent	  form	  below.	  Please	  be	  assured	  that	  any	  details	  you	  provide	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential	  and	  that	  your	  identity	  will	  remain	  anonymous	  throughout.	  Also,	  if	  at	  any	  stage	  you	  would	  like	  to	  withdraw,	  that	  is	  absolutely	  fine.	  	  If	  you	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study,	  please	  leave	  me	  an	  email	  address	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  this	  sheet,	  and	  I	  will	  ensure	  you	  receive	  them.	  Finally,	  please	  feel	  free	  to	  ask	  me	  any	  questions,	  if	  you	  are	  still	  unsure	  about	  any	  aspect	  of	  the	  research	  or	  your	  role.	  Thank	  you	  in	  advance	  for	  your	  time,	  Laura	  da	  Costa	  	  I	  have	  read	  the	  above	  information	  sheet	  and	  I	  consent	  to	  taking	  part.	  	  
Name:	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Signature:	  
Date:	  
Age:	  
Degree	  Programme:	   	   	   	   	   	  If	  you	  would	  like	  further	  information,	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  future	  research,	  or	  to	  be	  kept	  updated	  with	  my	  progress,	  please	  provide	  an	  email	  address	  on	  which	  I	  can	  contact	  you	  here:	  _______________________________________________.	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10.4.2 Funnelled Debriefing Procedure 
1. What do you think the purpose of this experiment was? 
2. What do you think this experiment was trying to study? 
3. Did you think that any of the tasks you did were related in any way?  
a. (If yes) In what way? 
4. Did anything you did on one task affect what you did on the other task?  
a. (If yes) How exactly did it affect you? 
5. When you were completing the scrambled sentence task, did you notice 
anything unusual about the words? 
6. Did you notice any particular pattern or theme to the words that were 
included in the scrambled sentence task? 
7. What were you thinking of while working on the learning 
questionnaire/computerized sorting task? Did you have any particular 
difficulty or strategy?  
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10.4.3 Analysis of Reliabilities by Priming Condition 
To explore whether the priming procedure may have impacted on the 
reliabilities of the two goal methods, such that being primed with a 
performance goal might elicit erratic responses on mastery subscale items, and 
vice versa, the sample was split according to priming condition and the 
correlations and alphas recalculated. Table 44 below lists the resultant 
reliability coefficients for the Valence IAT and the AGQ-R. 
Table 44. Achievement goal method reliabilities when split by priming 
condition 
  Pearson’s r, Sig.  Cronbach’s α 
Priming Condition  n Valence IAT n PAP PAV MAP MAV 
Performance 7 r = .47, p = .29 9 .97 .97 .59 .13 
Mastery 9 r = .40, p = .28 7 .71 -.92 -.04 .59 
Note. n = number of participants per priming condition, IAT = Implicit 
Association Test, PAP = Performance Approach, PAV = Performance 
Avoidance, MAP = Mastery Approach, MAV = Mastery Avoidance.  
 
In terms of the reliability of the Valence IAT by priming condition, the 
correlation failed to reach significance for both groups, implying an equal lack 
of reliability for both priming conditions. Splitting the sample by priming 
condition showed that the reliability of the performance subscales on the AGQ-
R was considerably stronger for the performance goal primed participants than 
for the rest of the sample, while reliability on the mastery subscales was poor. 
For those in the mastery goal prime condition, the reliability of the performance 
approach subscale was the appropriate, followed by a slightly lower alpha for 
mastery avoidance, but the performance avoidance and mastery approach 
subscale alphas emerged as negative, indicating a negative average covariance 
among the items.  
Nichols (1999) has suggested that negative alphas can occur as a result of item 
coding errors such as the researcher forgetting to reverse score items. The data 
were therefore checked for mistakes, but all items were coded and entered 
correctly. Given the extensive validation of the AGQ-R, in addition to the fact 
that the subscale alphas were acceptable in study 1, which had a similarly small 
sample size, Nichols’s suggestion that the items may simply not have positive 
covariance is unlikely. Instead, the only remaining suggestion, “most likely with 
small sample sizes and small numbers of items, is that while the true population 
covariances among items are positive, sampling error has produced a negative 
average covariance in a given sample of cases” (Nichols, 1999, para. 2).  
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10.5  Authored article in Journal of Mixed Methods 
Research (da Costa & Remedios, 2014) 
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Abstract 
Achievement goal theory is one of the most popular theories of achievement 
motivation. Techniques researchers have used to assess goals include 
standardized questionnaires and interviews. One curious finding is that 
participants whose self-report questionnaire responses strongly indicate they 
operate with a performance goal do not make performance goal responses in 
subsequent interviews. In this paper, we consider the nature of this divergence 
using a mixed methods approach and discuss how a third technique, the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT), might help address divergent goal responses. 
More broadly, we suggest that implicit measures may offer an additional 
and/or alternative technique for assessing the prevalence of psychological 
constructs thought to be underpinned by processes involving social cognition. 
Keywords: Achievement motivation; Goal Theory; Implicit Association Tests; 
Self presentation; Social Cognition. 
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Different Methods, Different Results: Examining the implications of methodological 
divergence and implicit processes for achievement goal research 
In recent years, Mixed Methods Research (MMR) has provided 
researchers with opportunities to explore how synergistic combinations of 
methods may offer the nuanced understandings necessary for meaningful 
study of complex phenomena (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2010, p. 9). MMR studies 
are governed by the challenging of paradigmatic and methodological dualisms 
in favor of continua. Using methodological eclecticism and triangulation, 
carefully integrated research designs draw from both the qualitative and 
quantitative traditions, emphasise the best aspects of each method and 
minimise the impact of its limitations. Ultimately, using MMR can provide 
greater confidence in research findings. 
However, while obtaining convergent results from different 
investigative methods seems to imply robust measurement of an underlying 
concept, the ontological implications of divergent results are often less clear. 
Through thorough re-examination of methods and conclusions via further 
study (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003, p. 17), divergence can indirectly lend 
empirical support for the revision of models and theoretical understandings of 
multi-faceted phenomena (Erzberger & Prein, 1997, p. 141). When divergence is 
encountered in fields where even a loosely designed mixed methods approach 
is applied, researchers must engage in this re-examination, confronting 
whether divergent findings spring from a lack of reliability and validity in one or 
more of the utilized methods, or if they are suggestive of a greater complexity 
inherent in the phenomenon under study. The divergence question remains 
unanswered in the study of achievement goals, a prominent theory within the 
literature on achievement motivation.  
The past decade has seen achievement goal theorists discuss a variety of 
conceptual and methodological issues. One such issue has been the disparate 
conclusions derived from studies using questionnaires compared to studies 
using interviews. A present concern lies in accounting for, and addressing, the 
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divergence across achievement goal measures. This paper explores this issue 
utilizing the principle of divergence in MMR. Current achievement goal 
measures are re-examined and problematized by highlighting the potential 
consequences of using researcher-defined constructs in questionnaires and of 
demand characteristics in participant responses during interviews. The paper 
then considers the over-dependence on self-report in achievement goal 
research especially in light of research outlining the limitations of such self-
reports. The final section offers a relatively unique, alternative method for 
assessing goal adoption, namely, the implicit association test (IAT, Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). IATs purport to capture attitudes that are 
(wittingly or unwittingly) not reported by individuals. Typical examples of such 
attitudes are biases towards (and away from) racial groups, political parties, 
religious affiliations and body shape. IATs rely on reaction times to assess levels 
of congruence between associated stimuli; the longer the reaction time, the 
greater the level of incongruence. In this paper, we argue that the nature of 
achievement goals makes them ideal candidates for examination using IATs. 
IATs thus offer researchers a potentially powerful additional tool to address the 
divergence in findings across methods in current achievement goal research. 
Before focusing on the methodological issues, however, a brief introduction to 
goal theory is provided for readers new to the concept and constructs. 
Achievement Motivation and Achievement Goals 
Achievement motivation is the study of behavior in achievement 
settings, most commonly in educational contexts, although theories of 
achievement motivation can apply in any achievement-focused domain (e.g., 
business, medicine, and sports). Popular theories of achievement motivation 
include expectancy-value theory (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000), intrinsic 
motivation theory (Deci, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1985), self-determination theory 
(Deci & Ryan, 1985), and interest theory (Renninger, Hidi, & Krapp, 1992). 
Achievement goal theory has developed alongside these theories, amassing 
over 1,000 (published) studies over the past 25 years (Hulleman, Schrager, 
Bodmann, & Harackiewicz, 2010).  
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Though achievement situations are simultaneously social and academic, 
and students may consequently possess multiple goals, including social goals 
(Wentzel, 1989, 1991; Urdan & Maehr, 1995) and work avoidance goals 
(Nicholls, 1989), research on achievement goals (Nicholls, 1984; Diener & 
Dweck, 1978, 1980) focuses purely on the purposes for students’ competence-
related behaviors (Elliot, 2005, p. 53). Goal theory started as a simple dichotomy 
between goals that were characterized as mastery (the desire to understand 
material) or performance (the desire to show ability to others) (e.g., Diener & 
Dweck, 1978, 1980). A trichotomous model followed, adding an avoidance 
valence to performance goals, such that performance avoidance was 
characterised by a desire not to perform poorly (see Elliot & Harackiewicz, 
1996). In 2001, a full two-by-two model was proposed that included mastery-
avoidance (a desire to avoid missing opportunities to learn) (Elliot & McGregor, 
2001). Most recently, a 3 x 2 model (Elliot, Murayama, & Pekrun, 2011) has been 
proposed, emphasizing differences between task-, self-, and other-based 
standards and more carefully aligning achievement goal constructs with the 
theorized core of competence.  
Despite the progression of theoretical models, the meaning of ‘goal’ 
often remains implied and inexplicit in research. This leads not only to diverse 
operationalizations and conclusions about findings but also to difficulty in 
obtaining a consistent body of results that translates into practical 
recommendations (Elliot & Murayama, 2008, p. 613). Clearer definitions can 
stem from reactions to how goals are operationalized in studies. For example, 
when Urdan and Mestas (2006) interviewed students about the reasons behind 
their goals, and suggested that different reasons behind goals may lead to 
different achievement outcomes, Elliot (2005, p. 65) argued that while both 
were valuable, goals, understood as aims, and the underlying reasons for these 
aims, are to be held as conceptually distinct. Disagreements have also occurred 
over whether students’ achievement goals are state-like and context-dependent 
or trait-like and akin to personal dispositions, and the implications of this for 
interventions. This definitional difficulty is in part due to a lack of explicit 
discussion regarding how goals are mentally represented (Pintrich, 2000, p. 
96). In this paper, achievement goals are believed to be cognitively represented 
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in a connectionist-type model (Pintrich, 2000; Smith, 1998), where purposes 
are nodes, linked within a network to other nodes, together representing an 
individual’s “definition of success, role of effort and errors, and standards” 
(Pintrich, 2000, p. 98). In achievement settings, paths between these nodes are 
activated in different ways based on how they interact with factors in the 
individual’s surrounding environment. Paths that are often activated in the 
same way may be strengthened over time and therefore more readily activated, 
producing a sort of intraindividual stability (Pintrich, 2000, p. 99) between, for 
example, success defined as obtaining good grades, effort considered as a 
necessary aspect of doing well, errors understood as learning experiences, and 
the task and one’s previous performance held as the standards for judging one’s 
success. This goal conceptualization has several implications. Goals are 
dependent both on contextual influences and internal representations; studying 
them requires examining how they are activated and which patterns of 
activation are strongest; and an individual’s awareness of the path of activation 
is not required for it to impact on their thoughts and behaviors (Pintrich, 2000, 
p. 98).  
Experimental and Questionnaire Methods  
Over the last three decades, achievement goal theorists have examined 
if differences in achievement can be explained by students’ mastery or 
performance goal pursuit. In early think aloud research conducted by Dweck 
(Diener & Dweck, 1978), mastery responses to failure on tasks were largely 
understood as adaptive because students attributed their failure to effort, 
maintained positive affect and expectations for success, persisted in the face of 
challenge, and were able to retain good performance even after failure. In 
contrast, students with performance responses displayed helpless, maladaptive 
behavior, negative affect, diminished expectations of success, lowered 
performance, ability attributions, lack of persistence, and also chose tasks that 
were either too difficult or too easy.  
Researchers have since employed experiments and questionnaires, and 
later interviews, to investigate students’ goals. In experiments, goals have been 
assigned to participants randomly and induced using task descriptions and 
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instructions that allude to normative evaluations or learning aspects. 
Experimental manipulations have explored achievement goals as differential 
predictors of performance (Butler, 1987), students’ choice of tasks, 
performance in the face of difficulty, attributions, and expressions of affect 
(Elliott & Dweck, 1988), use of effective learning strategies (Stipek & Kowalski, 
1989), levels of information processing (Graham & Golan, 1991), and intrinsic 
motivation (Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996). Theoretically allowing for the 
measurement instead of manipulation of achievement goals (Elliot & Church, 
1997, p. 219), questionnaires have also been used in an attempt to correlate 
reported achievement goal orientations with achievement-relevant outcomes, 
such as performance approach goals with academic attainment (Elliot & 
Church, 1997), mastery goals with adaptive help-seeking behaviors (Ryan & 
Pintrich, 1997), mastery goals with interest (Harackiewicz, Barron, Carter, 
Lehto, & Elliot, 1997), performance avoidance goals with academic self-
handicapping (Midgley & Urdan, 2001) and mastery goals with self-regulation 
(Middleton & Midgley, 1997). On the whole, findings from questionnaires have 
tended to agree with those of experimental manipulations, as, for example, in 
Elliot and Church’s (1997) precursor to the Achievement Goal Questionnaire, 
where positive relationships were observed between mastery goals and intrinsic 
motivation and performance goals and graded performance.  
Problems with Experimental and Questionnaire Methods 
Though experimental manipulations and self-report studies of 
achievement goals often produce similar results, there remain problems with 
the implications of their findings for causal models involving goals and 
outcomes. In addition to the often acknowledged difficulty of obtaining 
ecological validity in experimental manipulations, there is  potential difficulty 
in ensuring that participants have truly pursued the goal that the researchers 
intended to induce, and that this has subsequently led to differentiated 
achievement-related outcomes by goal. Contributing to this problem are issues 
with task instructions that are meant to activate only the desired goal but may 
activate another goal simultaneously. An example of this occurs in Elliot and 
Harackiewicz (1996) with the supposedly performance approach description of 
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the task “this session will give you the opportunity to demonstrate that you are a 
good puzzle solver” (p. 464) and the performance avoidance description “this 
session will give you the opportunity to demonstrate that you are not a poor 
puzzle solver” (p. 464), where the emphasis may have shifted from normative 
comparison to solely “trying to do well” (Brophy, 2005, p. 170), which is 
traditionally regarded as mastery. A further issue regarding causality in the 
goal-outcome relationship lies in the use of questionnaires. Here, levels of past 
performance (e.g., on exam scores) may impact on students’ reports of 
performance approach goal pursuit, instead of the pursuit of performance 
approach goals leading to high performance, in much the same way that 
endorsing such goals would be unrealistic for those with histories of lower 
attainment (van Yperen, 2003; Brophy, 2005). Therefore, despite the similarity 
of results for these methods, which may be perceived by some as a strength of 
achievement goal research, it is clear that more research is required to better 
elucidate the nature of the causal, rather than purely correlational, relationships 
between goals and performance.  
Additional problems with using questionnaires have been highlighted by 
an interesting methodological debate that has arisen around the construct 
labelled the performance approach goal. Researchers have suggested that the 
goal of “comparing oneself to others” has been either over-emphasised 
(Brophy, 2005), or that it under-emphasises many other goals that pupils seem 
to have (Lemos, 1996; Urdan, 2004a, 2004b; Urdan & Turner, 2005; Urdan & 
Mestas, 2006). One key criticism has surrounded the usefulness of 
questionnaires commonly used to assess goal adoption (e.g., Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire, AGQ-Revised, Elliot & Murayama, 2008; Patterns of Adaptive 
Learning Scales, PALS, Midgley et al., 2000). For example, Urdan and Mestas 
(2006, p. 355) suggested that questionnaires pose a danger of overestimating 
how often mastery and performance goals occur spontaneously in classroom 
settings. When faced with a questionnaire with Likert-scale response 
categories, they suggest, participants are not mentioning achievement goals 
spontaneously or in their own words, and their endorsement of achievement 
goals may be due to a ‘now-that-you-mention-it’ effect (Urdan & Mestas, 2006, 
p. 354). In addition, questionnaire statements that reflect important theoretical 
AUTOMATICITY AND ACHIEVEMENT GOALS  292 
	  
	  
distinctions can be interpreted by respondents in ways that do not match the 
researchers’ intentions. With no follow-up questions to verify understanding, 
students’ incomprehension and achievement goals may be masked (Urdan & 
Mestas, 2006, p. 362; see also Ciani & Sheldon, 2010). The consequences of 
using questionnaires are that participants are only able to agree or disagree to 
differing extents with the available items. They cannot ask for clarification or 
indicate if they agree more with part of the statement than the whole. So even if 
questionnaires are claimed to measure rather than manipulate students’ goals, 
formats that only provide the options to agree or disagree with what will be 
understood by researchers as performance-approach, performance-avoidance, 
mastery-approach, and mastery-avoidance items give the impression that 
students themselves actually do pursue these goals and only these goals 
(Brophy, 2005, p. 168).  
Using interviews in achievement goal research 
Such problems with experimental and questionnaire methods have led 
to the exploration by some of using interviews to access learners’ achievement 
goals (Lemos, 1996; Brophy, 2005; Urdan & Mestas, 2006). To avoid 
researcher-defined operationalizations of goals, advocates of interviews 
suggest investigating the meanings students themselves give to achievement 
goals (Urdan & Mestas, 2006, p. 364) in more naturalistic and non-laboratory 
classroom conditions (Lemos, 1996, p. 154). What is most interesting in terms of 
goal theory is that when researchers have used interviews to examine goals, 
differences between theory and responses have emerged. For example, Urdan 
and Mestas (2006) asked participants to complete the PALS and then 
interviewed them. Focusing on participants who rated performance avoidance 
items highly, Urdan and Mestas found that students repeatedly provided 
approach reasons to explain their endorsements of avoidance items (Urdan & 
Mestas, 2006, p. 363). This mismatch between what the item was supposed to 
be measuring and what students thought the item meant suggested 
participants’ difficulty understanding the avoidance form of the goal. Brophy 
(2005, p. 171) has also pointed out the infrequency of students’ spontaneous 
mentions of performance goals in interview research (i.e., Lemos, 1996; Urdan, 
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2001; Urdan, Kneisel, & Mason, 1999). For example, when Lemos (1996) asked 
Portuguese sixth graders open-ended “what for” questions (e.g., “What do you 
want?”, “What are you trying to accomplish?”), she found that the goals 
students reported related to achievement per se included working goals (e.g., 
“to finish it and to go on to the next one”, “to get it done”), evaluation goals 
(e.g., “desire to be positively evaluated and/or…avoid negative evaluations 
concerning academic classifications”), learning goals (e.g., “to know more 
about”, “to find out how”), and enjoyment goals (e.g., “activities in which they 
engaged for pleasure, enjoyment, and fun”). Even in the goal most similar to 
the aforementioned characterization of performance goals, the evaluation goal, 
students only mentioned succeeding in terms of grades, rather than being seen 
to do well or better than one’s peers (Brophy, 2005, p. 171).  
In short, when probed in different ways, students seem to suggest a 
whole range of goals. Although Senko, Hulleman and Harackiewicz (2011) 
provide evidence that students do spontaneously report performance goals 
more frequently than reported by Brophy and colleagues (see Harackiewicz, 
Barron, Carter, Lehto, & Elliot, 1997; Levy, Kaplan, & Patrick, 2004; Urdan, 
2004a; Job, Langens, & Brandstätter, 2009), it is clear that in some research, 
participants do not make any mention of performance goals.  
Despite clear evidence from questionnaire-based research that students 
adopt performance goals, interview-based studies suggest either that they do 
not, or at least that the prevalence of performance goals is considerably 
overstated. Such equivocal findings pose a critical divergence in the study of 
achievement goals: which method is capturing the construct? Both, neither, or 
only one of them?  Moreover, how can researchers even assess which method 
might be more effective? 
What is particularly striking from research conducted using interviews is 
how convinced participants are about their goals. In fact, no study has reported 
participants saying, “I’m sorry, I really do not know what my goals are” nor, 
when asked about items that they have rated on an achievement goal 
questionnaire, have participants replied, “I don’t know why I said that”. Clearly 
participants were confident they knew what goals they were pursuing. One self-
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evident truth assumed from the questionnaire-based studies is that participants 
were reporting accurately on the reasons for their achievement behaviors. On 
the face of it, the claim seems entirely reasonable; individuals know the reasons 
why they behave. However, a large body of research suggests differently. 
Limited Introspective Accessibility 
As early as the 1970’s, questions were raised about whether social 
psychologists were justified in asking participants about the reasons for their 
behavior, choices, and evaluations (for a review, see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Cognitive psychologists Mandler (1975), Miller (1962), and Neisser (1967) 
controversially proposed that “we may have no direct access to higher order 
mental processes such as those involved in evaluation, judgment, problem 
solving, and the initiation of behavior” (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 232). While 
this claim stemmed from work on the relatively automatic processes 
underpinning perception and memory, more research was required to justify 
generalizing such claims to social psychology, where much self-report research 
depended (and still does) upon the assumption of introspective access. 
Reviewing work on cognitive dissonance, attribution, subliminal perception 
and complex judgment tasks, Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977, p. 233) seminal 
research on self-reports argued there was indeed evidence that people were 
often unable to accurately account for factors that were impacting on their 
responses.  
For example, in one study carried out by the authors, participants were 
provided with a list of word pairs to memorize. Interested in whether 
participants were aware of influences on their associative behaviors, the 
researchers provided some participants with pairs that were meant to activate 
associations with desired words that could then be elicited in participants’ 
responses during a later word association task (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 243). 
The critical word pairs participants were asked to memorize in the first task 
contained words such as “ocean” and “moon”. In the subsequent standard 
word association exercise, in which the experimenters provided participants 
with probe words (i.e., “Detergent”) and asked the participants to utter the first 
word that came to their minds, they found that words they had intentionally 
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semantically cued (target words, i.e., “Tide”) were twice as likely to be uttered 
by the participants who had been exposed to the critical word pairs. When 
asked about what influenced their responses, participants provided reasons 
such as “My mother uses Tide”, or “I like the Tide box” (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977, p. 243), with only a third of participants, when directly asked, ceding that  
the word pairing memorization may have been a possible influence. Nisbett and 
Wilson found similar instances in a wide range of social psychological research, 
including their own work examining positioning effects and reported reasons 
for product appraisal (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), and Latané and Darley’s (1970) 
classic bystander effect. Nisbett and Wilson concluded from such studies that 
participants’ self-reports were often inaccurate in three different ways. 
Participants were strikingly unable to report accurately that an influential 
stimulus existed (i.e., Nisbett & Schachter, 1966), that they were responding to 
this stimulus (i.e., Valins & Ray, 1967), or that these processes were even 
occurring (i.e., Bem & McConnell, 1970).  
The consistent inaccuracy of participants’ self-reports led Nisbett and 
Wilson to question where participants were actually drawing self-reports from, 
if not from direct introspection. One answer came in the form of Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1974) representativeness heuristic, by which “a particular 
stimulus will be deemed a representative cause if the stimulus and response are 
linked via a rule, an implicit theory, a presumed empirical covariation or 
overlapping connotative networks” (in Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 249). In other 
words, the often inaccurate reports implied that participants’ (strongly held) 
beliefs were not the product of awareness or memory of some internal process, 
but a priori theories linking stimuli and responses (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 
233). Participants were assessing a situation and (subconsciously) reporting 
what might be a plausible reason for their behavior. Support for this reasoning 
came from studies in which observers not participating in a situation were 
asked to explain reasons for the behavior of those actually participating. The 
studies showed that the observers’ predictions were identical to reports 
provided by participants, who were assumed to possess some introspective 
access that could be called upon in their self-reports (Nisbett & Bellows, 1976).  
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Not only is there considerable evidence that individuals are poor at (accurately) 
reporting reasons for their behavior, there is actually a very good reason. As 
human beings, we have built up a store of experience of causal connections 
between events and when asked to report the reason for our own behavior, we 
use that experience. So in the study by Latané and Darley (1970), in which a 
greater number of bystanders reduced one’s own likelihood of helping in an 
emergency, why would participants say “the reason I didn’t help was because 
there were so many other people around?” when much more plausible and 
personally defensible reasons such as “I was too busy” were available? 
Translating the evidence from studies reported by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), 
when asked about their goals, learners (quite reasonably) base their goal self-
reports on post hoc rationalizations of their achievement behavior, rather than 
direct introspection and accessing of the goals that directed it. 
Implications for Achievement Goal Research and the Reply from Goal Theorists  
In this paper, we have used Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) comprehensive 
review as an invaluable source of examples. The evidence that supports claims 
of poor introspective access is actually vast and varied (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999; Gazzaniga, 2000; Gopnik, 1993; Kihlstrom, 1987; Wegner, 2002). More 
importantly for this paper, the findings have compelling implications for the 
large amount of achievement goal research that has been conducted using 
interviews: learners may actually be unable to access and thus report accurately 
on why they have followed certain goals, whether they have pursued certain 
goals, or that they have even pursued goals in the first place. When asked, 
participants may simply put forth plausible, implicit theories about what directs 
their achievement behavior. These theories and self-reports may be informed 
by the frictions extant between certain positions or behaviors (e.g., not helping 
when a greater number of others are present; wanting to do better than others) 
and an individual’s concerns about how this reflects on them (e.g., an unethical 
human being; being overly competitive), thereby supporting the earlier critique 
of achievement goal interviews wherein demand characteristics and social 
desirability were provided as possible explanations for respondents’ reluctance 
to spontaneously endorse performance goals.  
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Crucially, for the implications of Nisbett and Wilson’s findings on 
limited introspection and ability to accurately self-report to apply to 
achievement goal research requires that goals share the same cognitive 
characteristics as the inaccessible higher mental processes Nisbett and Wilson 
discuss. In addition to the theorized cognitive representation of achievement 
goals provided earlier, this question can be considered in light of the attention it 
has received within motivation research (Murphy & Alexander, 2000), and in 
the achievement goal literature more specifically (Elliot & Fryer, 2008; Lemos, 
1996; Pintrich, 2000).  
Murphy and Alexander (2000) conducted a review of motivation 
terminology from a useful outsider’s perspective, and discussed the issue of 
accessibility. Trying to understand why there were fewer motivation studies of 
younger children, they suggested that younger individuals may lack the ability 
to reflect and articulate such concepts when asked (Murphy & Alexander, 
2000, p. 32). Given Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) work, this logically applies not 
only to younger children, but to all who are asked to report on their 
achievement goals. Murphy and Alexander (2000) also observed that the 
fundamental assumption made by motivation researchers, that their 
respondents can accurately self-report, was challenged philosophically by James 
(1890), who argued that most of our daily experiences and behaviors are set in 
motion unconsciously and that as a result, we can only know a limited amount 
about ourselves at any one moment (in Murphy & Alexander, 2000, p. 37). 
Ostensibly as a result of this assumption, Murphy and Alexander’s (2000) 
review of the motivation literature did not reveal much explicit discussion of 
accessibility. Instead, they often found the phrases learners’ “beliefs” or 
“perceptions” (Murphy & Alexander, 2000, p. 38) accompanying self-reports, 
and took these to represent motivation researchers’ acknowledgement that 
human access to motivational mechanisms is limited (Murphy & Alexander, 
2000, p. 39). 
Pintrich’s (2000) direct reply addressed the issue of accessibility from an 
achievement goal perspective. By distancing goals from unconscious constructs 
such as motives or needs, Pintrich suggested that Murphy and Alexander’s 
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(2000, p. 37) questions regarding the accessibility of motivation were therefore 
irrelevant to the valid operationalization of goals (Pintrich, 2000, p. 96). 
However, Nisbett & Wilson (1977) only use ‘motive state’ in line with 
developments in motivation research up until the time of writing, and Murphy 
and Alexander (2000) use it because their review is not only limited to 
achievement goal research; the concerns, therefore, remain. Despite this, 
Pintrich (2000, p. 96) and others (e.g., Lemos, 1996, p. 151; see also Elliot & 
Fryer, 2008) see goal theory as stemming from the cognitive revolution, with its 
associated assumptions. Goals are assumed to be cognitively represented in 
ways that are consciously accessible, accounting for Murphy and Alexander’s 
(2000) limited findings of its explicit discussion.  
Elliot and Fryer (2008) argue that a significant aspect of the definition of 
goals is that they are consciously committed to, and that such commitment 
begins with conscious intention. However, they simultaneously refer to 
research conducted by Bargh and his colleagues (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, 
Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001) on automatic processing, ceding that “once in 
place in the cognitive system, goals may be activated and may operate in a 
thoroughly automatic, nonconscious fashion” (Elliot & Fryer, 2008, p. 246). 
This claim is made without discussion of its implications. When and how often, 
for example, must such goals be consciously committed to, become part of the 
cognitive system, and then operate automatically? Is it every time that a new 
task is provided in an achievement setting or can goals that have previously 
been activated for similar tasks become automatically activated given similar 
environmental conditions? Can learners access these automatic, nonconscious 
goals, and report on their activation and adoption within everyday achievement 
settings? Acknowledging research findings on automaticity is interesting not 
only given the implications of Bargh’s findings for the continued use of self-
report measures in achievement goal research, but considerably more so in 
terms of the centrality of especially Elliot in producing achievement goal self-
report measures, coupled with the sustained absence of automaticity from the 
definition of achievement goals.  
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Despite a wealth of findings implying the limitations of introspective 
accessibility, there remains a reluctance to engage with its implications for 
using self-reports in measuring social psychological constructs. At least for 
achievement goals, this can be argued to result from assumptions linked to the 
origins of achievement goal theory in the cognitive revolution. 
The Automaticity of Goal Setting  
However, the cognitive revolution also resulted in work that strongly 
challenges goal theory assumptions. Crucially, this includes research by Bargh 
and his colleagues on the interactions between conscious and automatic mental 
processes. Acts of the former are characterized by awareness, intention, effort, 
and control (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 463), and would seem to describe how 
Pintrich (2000), Lemos (1996), and the studies that Murphy and Alexander 
(2000) reviewed conceptualize goals. Automatic mental processes, which 
interest Bargh, and which Elliot and Fryer (2008) acknowledge, have not yet 
met the same definitional consensus within the literature. One 
conceptualization involves processes that are originally consciously intended 
and goal-driven, such as wanting to learn how to ride a bicycle, which become 
more efficient and automatic over time and through practice (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999, p. 463), while another is characterized by the effortless, 
unintended, and unaware perception and analysis of environmental factors 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 463-464).  
Both conceptualizations of automatic mental processes revolve around 
the concept of “limited conscious attentional capacity” (Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999, p. 464). Baumeister, Tice and colleagues (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998) have investigated 
the detrimental effects on performing a second, minor self-regulatory act (e.g., 
avoid laughing while watching a funny movie) in an unrelated activity after 
participants have been asked to perform a first, also minor self-regulatory act 
(e.g., do not think about white bears). The limits to conscious attentional 
capacity that they have observed have led them to suggest that because even 
small conscious self-regulatory acts use this capacity, as little as 5% of our daily 
acts of self-regulation can occur consciously (in Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 
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464). Thus the remainder – the majority – of our mental processing occurs on a 
nonconscious, automatic level. While it could be argued that achievement goals 
would make good candidates for this 5%, the highly similar nature of many 
academic tasks would suggest the greater likelihood that conscious goal 
decisions are made in the presence of novel or extraordinarily challenging 
academic tasks, and are absent from the everyday achievement settings that 
achievement goal researchers are generally interested in measuring using self-
reports.  
According to Bargh and Chartrand (1999), when a specific situation is 
presented to the learner, a conscious choice is made regarding response to that 
situational stimulus, a goal or purpose is decided, and then acted upon. With 
time, the repeated presentation of this situation or situations with similar 
features results in a bypassing through automatization of the conscious choice, 
such that the effortless, unintentional, and unaware perception of the situation 
activates the goal, its operation, and its fulfilment. This process, which can be 
intentionally or unintentionally acquired, is illustrated in Figure 1. Importantly, 
this raises similar questions to those surrounding Elliot and Fryer’s (2008) 
definition, especially in terms of when that conscious choice is made, whether 
students can comment on if it was consciously made, and in line with the model 
this paper proposes for the nature of the cognitive representation of 
achievement goals, how these paths of activation among relevant nodes are 
strengthened and readily activated over time.  
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Figure 1: (a) Conscious, Intentional Mediation of Goal Pursuit within a Situation 
and (b) Automatic Activation and Operation of Goals by Situational Features 
Following Repeated Choice of the Same Goal (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 
470) 
Using priming procedures, Bargh and his colleagues have been able to 
empirically examine this perception-to-action logic for the automatic, that is, 
the unintentional, effortless, and nonconscious, activation of both cognitive 
and behavioral goals. In an experiment examining cognitive goals, Chartrand 
and Bargh (1996) found that unobtrusively exposing, or priming, participants to 
synonyms of either the word ‘memorization’ or ‘evaluation’ in an unrelated first 
activity led them to adopt these concepts as goals for dealing with a set of 
unrelated information presented to them later on. In other words, participants 
were unaware that they possessed these goals, which had been activated by 
triggers in their environment (i.e., the primes) and yet acted on them. This 
replicated, albeit with implicit primes, the results of Hamilton, Katz and Leirer 
(1980), where participants explicitly asked to follow an impression-formation 
goal not only remembered more of the material but also gave evidence of 
having better organized the information in their memory than those instructed 
to memorize the material (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 469).  
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Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel (2001, experiment 
4) examined the automatic activation of behavioral goals by priming the goal ‘to 
achieve’ in some participants and not others. They found that when participants 
were asked, via intercom, to stop working on an activity in which they were 
given two minutes to find and note down as many words as they could using a 
set of Scrabble tiles, 57% of those who had been primed with the achievement 
goal, as opposed to only 22% of the control group, continued working so as to 
obtain a higher score.  
These experiments suggest that goals can become automatized 
processes to limit cognitive overload, and can guide cognitive and behavioral 
responses. Even unwitting perception of specific environmental factors can 
trigger goal adoption, with the same emotional and behavioral effects as 
intentional, consciously set goals. Indeed, Chartrand (1999) has shown that 
inducing success and failure affects mood and self-efficacy beliefs even for 
participants unknowingly primed with the goal ‘to achieve’. Because the 
process of automatization itself is automatic, and often not intended, goals may 
become automatic and activated in situations without our conscious awareness 
that this has occurred (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 469), affecting our ability to 
comment on them. Just as in Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) work, in each 
experiment, Bargh and his colleagues probed participants after they had 
outwardly pursued the implicitly primed goals, as indicated by the researchers’ 
dependent measures, and found them entirely unaware of having done so 
(Gollwitzer & Bargh, 2005, p. 633). These studies directly challenge 
achievement goals theorists’ assumptions that goals are conscious and 
accessible. When such research is placed alongside common achievement goal 
measures that rely entirely on these assumptions, goal theorists must begin to 
acknowledge the implications conceptually and methodologically.  
Implicit Association Tests and Achievement Goal Research 
So far we have outlined the dilemma for researchers trying to capture 
achievement goals and have suggested that these goals may be part of a system 
that is more unconscious than conscious. What is less clear is how researchers 
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could ever test this claim. Is it possible to access performance goals using a 
method other than interviews or questionnaires?  
In the past, motivation researchers used a nonconscious measure, the 
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT, McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 
1953), to measure achievement motives, today seen as antecedents to more 
concrete achievement goals (Elliot & Church, 1997). The TAT, a projective test 
first developed by Morgan and Murray (1935), involves presenting participants 
with ambiguous picture cards and asking them to tell stories about these 
pictures. Participants’ descriptive stories about the pictures are thought to 
reveal details of their current conscious or unconscious states. Implicit motives 
(McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989) were theorized to be inaccessible 
to self-report, and as such the construct presented a candidate for exploration 
using the TAT (e.g., McClelland & Liberman, 1949; Veroff, Wilcox and 
Atkinson, 1953; Feather, 1961). Because findings from TAT and self-report 
measures that aimed to assess achievement motives were seldom correlated 
(see Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2001), McClelland (1980) argued that self-
attributed motives, as measured by questionnaires, predict immediate, 
situation-specific choices (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989), while 
implicit motives, measured by story-based measures, predict spontaneous 
behavior over varying periods of time.  
Recently, Brunstein and Schmitt (2004) have compared implicit and 
explicit methods for assessing individual differences in achievement motives. 
However, instead of using the TAT, they experimented with an Implicit 
Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and found yet 
again that implicit and explicit measures of achievement orientation were 
uncorrelated. However, while participants’ self-reports about achievement 
orientations only predicted self-reports about whether students had enjoyed the 
task (a mental concentration test), Brunstein & Schmitt’s IAT successfully 
predicted students’ behavior. 
 IATs were developed in the early 1990’s to meet the perceived need for 
indirect measures that could access those cognitions that self-report measures 
could not (Greenwald et al., 2002, p. 4). The test measures the strength of 
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associations between concepts in an individual’s mind, as well as the extent of 
the individual’s awareness of and belief in these associations (Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998, p. 1464). Test procedure involves presenting 
participants with a computerized sorting task where they have to respond as 
quickly as possible in categorizing presented stimuli to specified categories 
(https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/).  
In a typical test, participants are first presented with a computer screen 
which has the words “Good” and “Bad” in the top left and right of the screen, 
respectively. Single target words are presented in the middle of the screen and 
participants have to indicate whether the word is good or bad by pressing the 
“E” or “I” on the keyboard, respectively. Typical words to be categorized 
include “joy”, “love”, “peace” and “wonderful” as good words, and “awful”, 
“agony”, “terrible”, and “evil” as bad words. Once the participant has practiced 
this categorization, a second set of categories is presented, for example, with 
“African American” and “European American” on the top left and right of the 
screen, respectively. Images of the faces of members of these two groups appear 
in the center of the screen, and participants must very quickly categorize faces 
as African American using the “E” key, or European American using the “I” 
key. After a similar number of practice trials, the third, critical block of the 
experiment begins. Participants allocate stimuli (previously presented good and 
bad words and face images) to combined categories using the same key (i.e., 
“African American” and “Good” pressing the “E” key, “European American” 
and “Bad”, pressing “I”). In the fourth (practice) and fifth (critical) blocks of the 
experiment, participants carry out the same categorization, but with the 
categories switched around (i.e., “African American” and “Bad”, “European 
American” and “Good”) in order to address ordering effects.  
The logic is that quicker reaction times imply the two concepts are 
automatically associated and congruent in the participants’ minds. When the 
word pair is not automatic and incongruent in the participant’s mind, reaction 
times are slower. So if participants are consistently quicker to categorize 
negative stimulus words to “Bad” when it is paired with “African American” 
than when it is paired with “European American”, the results would suggest a 
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preference for European Americans, with degrees of slight, moderate and 
strong preference also calculated. Because the IAT requires very quick response 
latencies, it avoids intervening thoughts and the time to come up with “self-
presentation strategies” (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998, p. 1465), 
which were earlier discussed as some of the problems with interviews, and 
affect, albeit to a lesser extent, anonymous questionnaires. In line with our 
proposed conceptualization of the cognitive representation of goals as a system 
of nodes, quicker reaction times would indicate the automatic activation by 
stimuli words of those strengthened and most readily activated paths. If the 
activated nodes on that path are collectively congruent with a positive approach 
to normative comparison, for example, then when a performance approach 
stimulus word appears, a faster categorization response would theoretically be 
seen. If there is no association or the path is collectively incongruent with a 
positive approach to such a concept, then a slower response time may be seen. 
As such, IATs might be one answer for researchers interested in assessing 
achievement goals. 
The idea that IATs can be used to assess constructs that have commonly 
been assessed using questionnaire and/or interview techniques is not new. In 
addition to Brunstein and Schmitt’s (2004) successful adaptation for implicit 
motives, authors within achievement goal research have also begun employing 
IATs. At the American Educational Research Association conference in 2011, 
Urdan and Cafasso reported their initial attempts to build a ‘Like Me’ IAT, in 
which participants were presented with words describing achievement goals in 
the center of the screen and had to allocate these to either a “Like Me” or a 
“Not Me” category. Stimulus words included “improvement”, 
“understanding”, and “learning” for mastery goals, “winner”, “best”, and 
“competitive” for performance approach goals, and “inferior”, “worse”, and 
“incompetent” for performance avoidance goals. In total, there were eight 
words per goal construct, and these appeared in random order to be 
categorized. One of the concerns for this IAT was the range of words used as 
stimuli. Nouns and adjectives may have variable processing times, thereby 
providing an alternative explanation for slower reaction times that is not 
attributable to a lack of automatic association. In addition, IATs determine 
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whether an association is automatic, and the individual’s implicit preference, by 
measuring response times, not by explicitly asking the participants if they are 
like or unlike the words appearing on the screen in front of them. Another 
example of an IAT for achievement goals is the IAT-Type (IAT-T) measure 
piloted by Marzouq, Carr, and Slade (2012), which uses the 2 x 2 model of 
achievement goals and has so far demonstrated good reliability for each of the 
goals. One concern regarding this IAT is the use of more than one word at a 
time as the stimulus. Although this is held constant for all goal stimuli, it does 
not rule out a potential impact on processing time, again unattributable to a lack 
of automatic association..  
In addition, the current authors have designed and tested two 
dichotomous model (i.e., mastery and performance goals) achievement goal 
IATs. One example is the Valence IAT, which pairs “performance goals” with 
“good” and “mastery goals” with “bad”, and then switches in accordance with 
usual IAT procedure to “performance goals” and “bad” with “mastery goals” 
and “good”. Participants are shown performance words (e.g., “compete”, 
“overtake”) or mastery words (“learn”, “understand”). In this version of the 
IAT, we have tried as much as possible to use only verbs for stimulus words, and 
to use words that apply uniquely to one type of goal. Our Valence IAT operates 
on the underlying assumption that the speed with which participants categorize 
performance or mastery words into these combined categories, for example by 
putting the word "compete" into the combined category of "performance goals" 
and "bad", gives an idea of how strongly associated these combined categories 
are in their heads, their goal preference and ultimately an insight into one part 
of the strengthened activation path connecting often activated patterns of 
nodes.   
Clearly, although IATs have become an established research tool in 
fields such as stereotypes and prejudice (for a review, see Nosek, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2007) and self-esteem and self-concept (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), 
their use in studying achievement goals is nascent. Indeed, it is still to be 
established whether an IAT that shows quicker reaction times for word pairs 
associated with “performance” and “good” is evidence that participants 
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operate with such goals in achievement settings. A further issue lies in the 
implications of comparing IAT measures with questionnaire and interview 
methods. It may be found that IATs correlate more with questionnaires than 
interviews, or differently depending on goal type, or that they do not correlate 
at all with self-reports, as was often found with the Thematic Apperception Test 
and is demonstrated with the IAT in Brunstein and Schmitt’s (2004) study. 
More important will be identifying those achievement behavioral outcomes and 
the occasions on which the IAT can, and self-reports cannot, predict (and vice 
versa). Also, we still need to establish if goals are initially conscious and then 
move to being automatic because when this is established, IATs might actually 
be able to help identify when this shift occurs. As research builds, various tests 
of validity will help to establish the place of the IAT in goal research. For 
theorists interested in MMR, IATs represent an interesting opportunity to 
examine not just goals but a whole variety of attitude-based phenomena.    
MMR and Achievement Goals Re-visited 
To summarise, one of the most popular theories in achievement 
motivation has a problem: researchers cannot agree how to study the key 
constructs. Moreover, using different methods has resulted in divergent 
outcomes and conclusions. Considerable evidence from work on limited 
introspection coupled with evidence from social psychology suggests that 
individuals can behave in ways contrary to their espoused beliefs. Implicit 
Association Tests have been shown to be useful indicators of non-conscious 
beliefs.  
For researchers interested in studying goals using MMR, the question is 
whether current interview and questionnaire methods should be used in 
conjunction with implicit methods. If research using interviews and 
questionnaires continues to produce divergent results, then researchers need to 
further assess current methods and look to other methods. IATs seem a useful 
and important way forward. This is especially so if, as evidence suggests, 
students’ achievement goals may be adopted both consciously and non-
consciously. It seems that it is no longer sufficient to use interviews and 
questionnaires without considering the implicit/explicit distinction because 
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current divergence in findings just produces differences in positions. It is no 
longer enough to say questionnaires produce different results from interviews, 
or to assume that goals can be accessed entirely through self-reports. We think 
it important for goal theorists to employ a variety of methods when studying 
goals, but this means the field has to reach some agreement regarding whether 
the constructs can be triangulated using different methods. If goal theorists 
want to develop useful predictive models, then constructs need at least to be 
consistent across different measures.  
For researchers who do not study goal theory, the implications of IATs 
are potentially far-reaching and infinitely more controversial; divergence 
between methods implies the potential inadequacy of self-report to provide 
accurate introspective insight. This is not our position. We urge researchers to 
re-examine the constructs they research by using techniques that appeal to the 
literature underpinning IAT development. When we sat down with many of the 
authors we have cited and asked them why they were so sure students were 
reporting their goals accurately, the reply was often “how can you ever be 
sure?” Our reply is that it is better not to assume you can or cannot but to 
develop methodologies that build confidence about the reliability and validity 
of findings. Current divergence in findings suggests methodological 
inappropriateness and goal theorists need to address the problem. IATs may be 
one way forward when examining achievement goals; they may be the way 
forward for other constructs as well. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, adopting the mixed methods concept of divergence as a 
lens to re-examine current achievement goal methods highlights serious self-
report limitations. Given that considerable evidence suggests our ability to 
access these goals is limited, paradigms used for measuring achievement goals 
(and similar social psychological constructs) must supersede a dichotomous 
view of qualitative and quantitative methods and even a lateral continuum, to 
consider the implications of a three-dimensional model, incorporating methods 
that distinguish between the consciously accessible and inaccessible. This 
further level of research should begin to shed light on both how achievement 
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goals are mentally represented and the interplay between conscious and 
nonconscious motivational factors activated in everyday classroom tasks. This 
will ultimately enhance researchers’ understanding of the achievement goals 
students pursue and how these can be better conceptualised, measured, and, if 
need be, acted upon.  
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